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Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code 1 was promulgated 
in August, 1987.2 During the seven years of study and drafting 
which culminated in Article 2A,3 the wisdom of imposing a 
1. ALI, NAT'L CoNF. oF CoMM'Rs ON UNIFORM STATE LAws. UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL 
CoDE: 1987 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS. The Uniform Commercial Code will be hereina f-
ter referred to as the Code; all citations to the Code are to the 1987 Official Text with 
Comments unless otherwise noted, and all citations to the Code are by section numbers 
only. Article 2A began its life as the Uniform Personal Property Leasing Act. See genera lly 
Boss, The History of Article 2A: A Lesson for Practi ti oner and Scholar Alike, ;39 ALA. L. 
REv 575 (1988) (this Symposium). 
2. The American Law Institute approved Article 2A at its Annual Meeting in May, 
1987, and The National Conference of Commissioners on Unifo rm State Laws gave its final 
approval to certain changes at its Annual Meeting in August, 1987 (the Conferen ce had 
previously approved an earlier version of Article 2A in August, 1986). 1 d. at 59:3 -94. 
3. The commencement of the s tudy process began with the creat ion of the Subcom-
mittee on Personal Property Leasing, Committee on Uniform Commercial Cod e, American 
Bar Association Section of Corporation, Banking, and Business Law (here inafter ABA UCC 
Committee). Boss, supra note 1, at 584-85 & n .57. Earlier, more general suggestions were 
made to the effect that leasing wou ld benefit from uniform statutory treatment. DeKoven, 
Proceedings After Default by the Lessee Under a True Lea se of Equipment, in l C P Coo-
GAN, W. HoGAN, D. VAGTs & J. M cDoNNELL, SEcURED TRAN::>ACTroNs UN DER THE iJN rF ORM 
CoMMERCIAL CoDE (MB) § 29B.06[4][e] (1987); Heisman & Mooney, Drafting, Ner;utiating, 
and Construing the Equipment Lease - An Overview, in EquiPMENT LEASING-LEVERAGED 
l 
l 
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mandatory public notice (filing) requirement for leases of goods 
often was debated. 4 The debate reflected earlier proposals and in-
spired new proposals that a filing requirement for leases of goods 
be adopted. Indeed, the debate continues in the pages of this jour-
nal.~ With one exception,6 however, Article 2A does not impose a 
filing requirement for leases.7 
Provisions for the public filing or recordation of leases of 
goods have been quite rare in the United States.8 Most recent com-
mentators, however, have urged the adoption of a public notice 
requirement. 9 Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson, for example, 
have argued that, subject to various exceptions, the Article 9 filing 
rules should be extended not only to leases of goods, but also to all 
other separations of ownership and possession.10 Although the 
drafters and sponsors of Article 2A did not opt for a filing require-
ment for leases, that decision was reached without the benefit of 
thorough commentary by those who deny or question the wisdom 
of such a filing rule. The Article 2A process, therefore, has not 
marked a clear path for future treatment of other, nonlease separa-
tions of possession and ownership of goods. 11 
LEASING 185-86 (B. Fritch & A. Reisman eds. 2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1983) [hereinafter EQUIP-
MENT LEASING- LEVERAGED LEASING]. 
4. Whether a filing requirement should be imposed for leases was the subject of spir-
ited debate by participants in programs on equipment leasing sponsored by the Practising 
Law Institute in 1981, 1983, and 1985; a program sponsored by the ABA UCC Committee in 
1981; and an invitational symposium sponsored by the American Law Institute- American 
Bar Association Committee (ALI-ABA) on Continuing Professional Education in 1983. It 
was also the subject of much discussion during meetings of the Subcommittee on Personal 
Property Leasing of the ABA UCC Committee and, of course, by the Drafting Committee 
for Article 2A. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. 
5. See Huddleson, Old Wine in New Bottles: UCC Article 2A - Leases, 39 ALA. L. REv. 
672-77 (1988) (this Symposium); Kripke, Some Dissonant Notes About Article 2.4, 39 ALA. 
L. REv. 798-801 (1988) (this Symposium). 
6. See U.C.C. § 2A-309 (1987) (providing for fixture filings). 
7. See id. § 2A-101 comment para. 5; id. § 2A-301 comment para. 3. 
8. See infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
9. See ge nerally infra Part III. 
10. Baird & Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of th e Scope of 
Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REv. 175, 189-94 (1983). 
11. See Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 901, 970 
(1986) ("Frequently, insight comes only through the accreting effects of successive scholarly 
efforts."). The "successive scholarly efforts" dealing with a filing requirement for leases of 
goods reached similar conclusions based on similar reasoning and have not been subjected to 
any searching criticism. 
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The principal goal of this article is to explore the appropriate-
ness of a filing rule for leases in view of the justifications for and 
functions and effects of the public notice (filing) rules under Arti-
cle 9 and earlier codifications of personal property law. 12 This 
article will address the important challenge posed so well by Baird 
and Jackson: "At the very least ... those who question the useful-
ness of a filing requirement in the case of leases should explain 
why there should be a filing requirement in the case of secured 
transactions that are identical from the point of view of third par-
ties. " 13 There are cogent reasons for treating leases and secured 
transactions differently in the context of public notice. The princi-
pal feature common to leases and many secured transactions is the 
possession of goods by a debtor or lessee. Concerns for third par-
ties based on the ostensible ownership by a possessor of goods, 
however, provide an incomplete explanation for the Article 9 filing 
rules. The historical development of chattel security law was not 
an inexorable march toward requiring public notice of separations 
of possession and ownership in order to reduce ostensible owner-
ship concerns. The judicial and legislative developments also were 
12. Much of this article deals with the identification of various "costs" and "benefits" 
of a tiiing requirement for leases. Those terms are used here in a broad sense. Although 
costs and benefits are sometimes dealt with in the context of arguments based (or stated to 
be based) on economic analysis, in general the reader may substitute freely such terms as 
"pros" and "cons" or "advantages" and "disadvantages." 
Part II of this article provides some background concerning the treatment of leases of 
goods under prevailing common law and Article 2A and distinguishes such treatment from 
that afforded secured transactions under Article 9. It also deals with the process which re-
sulted in the absence of a filing requirement in Article 2A. Part III summarizes the 
substance and reasoning of several proposals for the adoption of a filing requirement for 
leases. Part IV deals with the range of sanctions and effects (i.e., "priority rules") which 
might be imposed as a result of the failure of a lessor to comply with a filing requirement for 
leases. Part V considers the historical and current justifications and explanations for the 
doctrine of "ostensible ownership" and various filing and other public notice requirements . 
Part V also compares the functions and effects of the existing Code's public notice require-
ments for secured transactions, including sales of accounts and chat tel paper, and 
consignments with the functions and effects which might result from a filing rule for leases. 
Part VI draws on the preceding Parts and compares the costs and benefl.ts which might 
result from imposing, or not impos ing, a filing rule for leases. 
13. Baird & .Jackson, supra note 10, at 189 n.46. Ronald Cuming has asked a similar 
question: "If the [filing] system works reasonably well for secured transactions, why should 
it not be employed in the context of certain types of commercially important, non-security 
transactions such as chattel leases and consignments?" Cuming, Canadian Developments in 
Personal Property Security Law, in 1 P CooGAN. W. HoGAN, D VAGTS & J McDONNELL, 
supra note 3, § 5D.05[l][a][ii], at 5D-10. Although Cuming may have intended his question 
to be rhetorical, this article does not treat it as such. 
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influenced by concerns for fraud and fairness apart from mislead-
ing appearances of ownership. The Article 9 filing rules serve a 
variety of functions which are unrelated, or only tenuously con-
nected, to curing perceived problems of ostensible ownership. The 
Article 9 filing regime provides information about potential se-
cured claims so as to permit the ordering of priorities based 
generally on the principle of first-in-time. The filing regime also 
responds to concerns about fraud and collusion by enhancing the 
veracity of claims to security and the timing of those claims for 
priority purposes. Because of inherent conceptual and contextual 
differences between leases and secured transactions, a filing re-
quirement for leases would result in fewer and smaller benefits 
than are provided for many secured transactions under current 
law. If the effect of noncompliance with a filing rule for leases were 
similar to that which exists for secured transactions, a filing rule 
for leases also would result in greater costs than those resulting 
from the filing rules for secured transactions. Proponents of a filing 
rule for leases have not given adequate consideration to such costs 
or to the range of possible effects and sanctions for noncompliance 
with a filing rule. 
This article also addresses three additional goals. First, it 
identifies various empirical, behaviorial, and economic hypotheses 
and assumptions upon which proponents of a filing rule for leases 
(and advocates for the existing Article 9 notice filing rules applica-
ble to secured transactions) have relied as well as those upon which 
I have relied. It thereby reveals matters in need of further research 
and investigation by exposing weaknesses in the arguments of such 
proponents as well as weaknesses in the arguments made here. No 
firm conclusion is reached as to whether a filing requirement for 
leases is warranted, largely because an adequate informat ion base 
iS illlSSmg. 
Second, this article demonstrates that the wisdom of a 
mandatory filing requirement for leases is not a simple problem 
susceptible to a simple solution based on a simple principle, as sug-
gested by some of the proponents of such a rule. 14 The issue is, like 
14. Two proponents of a mandatory filing requirement have argued: 
[O]nce one realizes that these [ostensible ownership] pro blems have a common 
source, simple solutions to them become apparent. In proposing these simple solu-
t ions to problems that have consumed hundreds of pages of law review commentary, 
we are not advoca ting a radical departure from established wisdom. Rat her , we are 
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most matters of public policy, a complex one which demands an 
investigation and analysis of numerous factual, behaviorial, and ec-
onomic considerations. Previous proposals for a filing rule have 
been incomplete or deficient in methodology or both. H> 
Finally, this article may encourage a more thorough rethinking 
of the role of possession of personal property, particularly goods, 
and public notice requirements in our legal regime. Others have 
explored the role of possession in a variety of commercial law con-
texts and found the existing rules to be deficient. 16 The specific 
debate over the need for a filing rule for leases may be quieted by 
the promulgation and eventual widespread enactment of Article 
2A. But the explanations and justifications for attributing legal sig-
nificance to possession and requiring public notice of interests in 
personal property should continue to be the focus of study. Courts 
and commentators alike continue to be perplexed by bailments of 
goods, such as bailments for processing, which are neither leases 
urging only that rulemakers apply more generally the principle that has shaped the 
law of security interests in personal property for four hundred years: A party who 
wishes to acquire or retain a nonpossessory interest in property that is effective 
against others must, as a general matter, make it possible for others to discover that 
interest . 
. . . An ostensible ownership problem ... exists whenever there is a separation of 
ownership and possession. Article 9's treatment of the ostensible ownership problem 
created by secured credit naturally leads one to ask whether the ostensible ownership 
problem created by leases or other bailments is different. We believe the answer is 
simple: The two ostensible ownership problems are not different in any relevant re-
spect. They impose the same costs on third parties, and if a filing system is an 
appropriate response to the first problem, it is an equally appropriate response to the 
second. 
Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 178, 186 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). The 
arguments developed by Baird and Jackson are discussed in more detail in Part III. See 
infra notes 73-85 and accompanying text. 
15. These shortcomings may result, in part, from the overly narrow conceptualization 
of the issue as essentially a "secured transaction" or "Article 9" matter. Rather, such pro-
posals necessarily involve very basic, important, and longstanding principles of personal 
property law generally. See Jackson & Schwartz, Vacuum of Fact or Vacuous Theory: A 
Reply to Professor Kripke, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 987, 988 (1985) ("The lesson is that wisdom in 
result is unlikely to derive from error in method."). 
16. See, e.g., Coogan, Article 9-An Agenda for the Next Decade, 87 YALE L.J. 1012 
(1978); Dolan, The UCC's Consignment Rule Needs an Exception for Consumers, 44 OHio 
ST. L.J. 21 (1983); Helman, Ostensible Ownership and the Uniform Commercial Code, 83 
CoM. LJ. 25 (1978); Phillips, Flawed Perfection: From Possession to Filing Under Article 9 
(pts. 1 & 2), 59 B.U.L. REv. 1, 209 (1979). 
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nor consignments. 17 There is a reasonable prospect that in the for-
seeable future Article 2 will be subjected to study for the purpose 
of considering amendments. 18 Moreover, sooner or later, the spon-
sors of the Code may consider amending Article 9 as well. 19 A 
richer store of literature examining these issues no doubt will en-
hance significantly the quality of any future Code drafting 
projects. 
II. LEAsEs oF GooDs: RELEVANT BAcKGROUND AND BAsic IssuEs 
As a result of the "boom" in equipment leasing during the last 
twenty-five to thirty years, the leasing of goods has become an ex-
tremely important commercial device. 20 At common law, a lease of 
17. E.g., Wesgo Div. of GTE Prods. Corp. v. Harrison (In re Sitkin Smelting & Ref., 
Inc.), 648 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1981) (delivery of scrap material for extraction of metals held a 
secured transaction subject to Article 9 perfection requirements); Eastman Kodak Co. v. 
Harrison (In re Sitken Smelting & Ref., Inc.), 639 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1981) (delivery of 
waste film for extraction of metals held a true bailment not subject to Article 9 perfection 
requirements); General Motors Corp. v. Bristol Indus. Corp., 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 989 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (delivery of raw materials for processing held a secured 
transaction subject to Article 9 perfection requirements) , reu'd on other grounds , 690 F .2d 
26 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Medomak Canning Co., 25 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 437 
(Bankr. D. Me. 1978) (delivery of raw ingredients and packaging supplies for processing and 
packaging held a true bailment not subject to Article 9 perfection requirements), aff'd, 588 
F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1978); Harrington, A Caueat for Commodity Processing Industries: Insol-
vent Processors' Credit ors us. Putative Owners of Raw Materials, 16 D.C. C. L.J. 322 (1984); 
Comment, "Bailment for Processing": Article Nine Security Interest or Title Retention 
Contract, 61 OR L. REv. 441 (1982). The Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Com-
mercial Code ("PEB") now has under consideration a draft PEB Commentary dealing with 
such non lease , nonconsignment bailments. The scope of this article is confined essentially to 
bailments that are leases, however. As to consignments, see infra Part V.D. 
18. The ABA UCC Committee studied the prevailing problems under Article 2 and 
issued a consensus report in March, 1987, which does not represent any official ABA posi-
tion, calling for a formal study by the sponsors of the Code, the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and The American Law Institute, to consider the 
need for revisions to Article 2. That recommendation was discussed in a meeting of the PEB 
on September 19, 1987. At that meeting the PEB approved in principle a formal study of 
Article 2; the details and timing of the project remain on the PEB agenda. 
19. At the time of this writing neither the Code sponsors nor the PEB contemplate a 
project relating to revision of Article 9. However, a review and revision of Article 2, to the 
extent it would deal with issues relating to possession of goods, good faith purchase and the 
like, could involve reconsideration of related issues under Article 9. Cf. Dolan, Good Faith 
Purchase and Warehouse Receipts: Thoughts on the Int erplay of Articles 2, 7, and 9 of the 
UCC, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1978); ,Jackson & Peters , Quest for Uncertainty: A Proposal for 
Flexible Resolut ion of Inh erent Conflicts Between Article 2 and Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 87 YALE L.J. 907 (1977). 
20. The current volume of equipment leasing is impressive: 
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goods was, and remains, a form of "bailment for hire."21 The bail-
ment consists of a delivery of goods by the lessor (bailor) to the 
lessee (bailee), for use by the lessee during the term of the lease, in 
exchange for a consideration to be paid by the lessee to the lessor, 
and pursuant to which the lessee is to redeliver the goods to the 
lessor at the expiration of the term. 22 The concept might seem sim-
ple. Yet, the courts and commentators have struggled for many 
years to discover the essential distinctions between a lease (often 
referred to as a "true" lease, for purposes of contrast) and a trans-
action denominated a lease but which, in legal effect, is a secured 
transaction. 23 In recent years many reported decisions and much 
commentary have grappled with the true lease-security interest di-
chotomy under the pre-1987 section 1-201(37) of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, which defines the term "security interest."24 
Today equipment leasing accounts for over 20% of all capital investment each year in 
the United States. Over $310 billion in lease receivables are estimated to be outstand-
ing in this country. Well over $90 billion worth of equipment was financed through 
leasing in the United States in 1986 alone. 
Huddleson, supra note 5, at 616 n.1 (citations omitted); see also Boss, supra note 1, at 576-
77. The increased popularity of leasing as a means of acquiring the use of capital assets has 
resulted in large part from advantages based on the federal income tax treatment of lessors 
and lessees and the perceived advantages for financial accounting purposes. See generally 
Macan, Tax Aspects of Equipment Leasing, in EQUIPMENT LEASING-LEVERAGED LEASING, 
supra note 3, ch. 4; Dieter, Stewart & Underwood, Accounting for Leases, in EQUIPMENT 
LEASING-LEVERAGED LEASING, supra note 3, ch. 5. 
21. See, e.g., 8 C.J.S. Bailments § 8a (1962 & Supp. 1987); J . STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON 
THE LAw OF BAILMENTS, §§ 368, 372, 323-24 & 327 (9th ed. 1878); see also DeKoven, supra 
note 3. 
22. See, e.g., J. STORY, supra note 21, §§ 383-420, at 335-80; see also DeKoven, supra 
note 3. 
23. See, e.g., 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 3.6, at 75-81 
(1965); 3 L. JoNES, THE LAw OF CHATTEL MoRTGAGES AND CoNDITIONAL SALES, §§ 952-59, at 
59-67 (6th ed. 1933 & Supp. 1956); S. WILLISTON, THE LAw GovERNING SALES OF Goons, §§ 
336-37, at 296-302 (rev. ed. 1948). 
24. Most of the commentary considered infra Part IV deals in some detail with the 
true lease-security interest issue. See also Boss, supra note 1, at 579-80; Mooney, True 
Lease or Lease "Intended as Security"-Treatment by the Courts, in 1C P. CooGAN, W. 
HoGAN, D. V AGTS & J. McDONNELL, supra note 3, ch. 29A (1987) [hereinafter Mooney, True 
Lease]; Reisman & Mooney, supra note 3, at 9-41. A conforming amendment to the Code, 
promulgated in connection v:ith Article 2A, substantially revises the language of§ 1-201(37) 
as it relates to leases. There is case law support under the pre-1987 § 1-201(37) for virtually 
every change made by the revised § 1-201(37). The revisions were necessary, however, be-
cause of the large volume of other case law typified by mindless opinions citing other 
mindless opinions. Hopefully, courts will begin to rely on the concepts illuminated by the 
revised § 1-201 (37) even before its enactment. Both the statutory language of the pre-1987 § 
1-201(37) and much of the case law dealing with this issue have been subjected to stern 
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Many leasing transactions have taken the form of a so-called "fi-
nance lease." That term generally is used to denote a transaction 
wherein the lessor, at the request of a customer, acquires goods 
from a supplier selected by the customer and for the purpose of 
leasing the goods to the customer.25 Such transactions might ap-
pear to be the functional equivalents of secured purchase money 
financings. There are, however, important differences which bear 
on the wisdom of imposing a filing requirement for leases. 
The essence of a true lease is the existence, as reasonably an-
ticipated at the inception of the lease, of a meaningful residual 
interest for the lessor at the expiration of the lease term. 26 When a 
criticism over the years. See, e.g., Coogan, Leases of Equipment and Som e Other Uncon-
ventional Security Devices: An Analysis of UCC Section 1-201 (37) and Article 9, 1973 
DuKE L.J. 909, reprinted and revised in 1 P. CooGAN, W. HoGAN, D. V AGTS & J. McDONNELL, 
supra note 3, ch. 4A. The uncertainty and confusion surrounding the true lease-security 
interest issue was an important element in the decision to codify the law relating to leases of 
goods which has resulted in Article 2A. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) comment para. 2 (1987); see 
Mooney, Personal Property Leasing: A Challenge, 36 Bus. LAW. 1605, 1610-15, 1625 (1981) 
[hereinafter Mooney, Challenge]. The revised § 1-201(37) should reduce th is uncertainty 
and provide a more conceptually sound framework for parties, counsel and courts to address 
the issue, but it does not purport to deal expressly with all possible circumstances. See 
U.C.C. § 1-201(37) comment para. 11 (1987). The infinite variety of factual situations and 
the inherent uncertainty of any economic analysis or valuation process will continue to re-
sult in gray areas at the margin. For a thorough analysis of the true lease-security interest 
issue under the revised § 1-201(37) , see Cooper, Identifying a Personal Property Lease 
Under the UCC, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 195 (1988). 
25. See Leary, The Procrustean Bed of Financ e Leasing, 56 N.YU. L. REv. 1061, 1061-
62 & n.2 (1981); Reisman & Mooney, supra note 3, at 29-35; see also Boss, Panacea or 
Nightmare? Leases in Article 2, 64 B.U.L. REv. 39, 67-68 (1984) . Article 2A has codified the 
"finance lease" concept. 
"Finance lease" means a lease in which (i) the lessor does not select, manufacture or 
supply the goods, (ii) the lessor acquires the goods or the right to possession and use 
of the goods in connection with the lease, and (iii) either the lessee receives a copy of 
the contract evidencing the lessor 's purchase of the goods on or before signing the 
lease contract, or the lessee's approval of the contract evidencing the lessor's purchase 
of the goods is a condition to effectiveness of the lease contract. 
U.C.C. § 2A-103(l)(g) (1987). 
26. See, e.g., Boss, Leases and Sales: Ne'er or Where Shall the Twain Meet?, 1983 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 357, 363-65; Burns, Uniform Commercial Code, Public Filing and Personal 
Property Leases: Questions of Definition and Doctrine, 22 WAKE FoREST L. REv 425, 469-
73 (1987); Coogan, supra note 24, at 954, 972-73; Mooney, Tru e Lease, supra note 24, § 
29A.02[2J[c], at 2958-59. For example, if a lessee will be entitled to become the owner of the 
goods or to purchase the goods for a nominal consideration upon compliance with the terms 
of the lease, the transaction will not be a true lease. U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(d) (1987). Similarly, 
if the lease term, including any renewal term for a nominal consideration, extends to or 
beyond the remaining economic life of the goods, the transaction will be legal ly recharacter-
ized as a secured transaction. !d. § 1-201(37)(a) & (c). On the other hand, when a lessee is 
692 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 39:3:683 
lessee complies with its obligations under a true lease, a meaning-
ful residual value of the leased goods is left for the lessor at the 
end of the term. When a debtor in a secured transaction satisfies 
its secured obligat ions, the collateral remains the property of the 
debtor alone, and the secured party's security interest expires. The 
existence, at the end of the term, of a meaningful residual value of 
the leased goods that is retained by a lessor and not transferred to 
the lessee represents a fundamental conceptual distinction between 
true leases and secured transactions under current law. 
Both Homer Kripke and John Ayer have argued, incisively 
and elegantly, that no meaningful distinction exists between a true 
lease and a secured t ransaction. 2 7 Rather, they argue , there is a 
continuum comprised of an infinite variety of transactions. 28 They 
view an attempt to force transactions into one of only two possible 
categories--lease or security interest-as an artificial and senseless 
exercise .29 Kripke explains that a lease is a transfer of a temporal 
property right of use to a lessee with a property right in the 
residual value retained by t he lessor. 30 Ayer persuasively demon-
strates t hat when property is divided into separate bundles of 
rights, each representing some combination of upside and down-
side benefits and risks, t here is an infinite variety of possible 
clivis ions.31 Viewed in this context, current law employs a crude ap-
proach: If a putative lessor's retained bundle of rights is material, 
t he transaction is a t rue lease, and if t he putative lessor 's retained 
interest is expected to be nonexistent or immaterial at the end of 
the t errn, a secured t ransaction exists. 
vVhether it makes sense for the law to maintain the true lease-
securi ty interest dichotorny is it self a senseless inquiry unless an-
free to term inate the lease at 3 t ime when it is not en t it led to a bargain purchase option or 
t he like, t hen th e transaction should be a tr ue lease even th ough the lessee might be entitled 
to a bargain purchase option if it we re to elect to con tinue with t he t ransa ction for an ad-
di o!!a l period . See icf . § l - 201( ~n) (secon d paragraph) (" [A] transaction creates a security 
in tei'e;:t. if t he cons idera t ion t he lessee is t o pay t he lessor for t he right to possession and use 
uf the good:.; i :J an ob ligation for lh e term of the lease not subject to termination by the 
!e.-..· ... ?e . .. . ' · ~ en1phasis ad ded)). 
:r; ,-\yH . On the Vacu ity of th e Saie/Lea se Dist inct ion , 68 IowA L. REv. 667 (1983); 
Kr ipke. Ew'k Rf:\'iew, 37 Bus. L AW 723 (1982) (rev iewing EQUIPMENT L EASING-LEVERAGED 
L K\:;l !\G, su prn note 3) ; see ais o K r ipke , supra note 5, at 797 -98. 
~8 - ,~, ye;-, sup.ra not e 27 , at 667 passim; K ri pke, supra note 27, at 727- 29. 
29. Ayer, sup ra n ot e 2/ , at 67 3-84; Kr ipke, supra note 27 , at 727 -29. 
:10 . Kripke, supra no te 27 , a t 729. 
:n. Ay 2r , supra note 27, at n73-84; K ri pke, supra note 27, at 726 -29. 
1988] Mystery and Myth 693 
other question is asked and answered: If the legal distinction were 
abolished, how would transactions that are leases under current 
law be treated? It has been argued that the distinction is one 
which must be made, at least for some purposes. 3 2 One such pur-
pose under current law is the difference between the applicable 
remedies of, and damages recoverable by, a lessor when compared 
to the enforcement rights available to an Article 9 secured party. 
When a debtor defaults and a secured party takes possession of 
collateral, the secured party generally will be required to dispose of 
the collateral in a "commercially reasonable" manner and to give 
the debtor prior notice of the intended disposition.33 After the dis-
position, the secured party will be entitled to recover from the 
debtor any deficiency (i.e., remaining unpaid balance of secured 
obligation less net proceeds of the disposition) or will be required 
to pay over to the debtor any surplus (i. e ., net proceeds of disposi-
tion less remaining unpaid balance of the secured obligation).34 
These rules underscore the significance of a lessor's residual 
interest and the inappropriateness of Article 9 remedies for parties 
to a lease. A secured party is required to credit t he debtor with the 
entire net proceeds of a disposit ion. Were a lessor required to 
credit a lessee with the entire net proceeds from a disposition, 
however, the lessee would receive the benefit of the lessor 's 
residual value-a stick in the bundle which was not transferred to 
32. See , e.g., Boss, sup ra note 26, at 357; Coogan, Is There a Difference Between a 
Long-Term Lease and an In stallment Sale of Personal Property?, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1036 
(1981). The true lease -security interest dist inction is determinative of many issues outside 
of the Article 9 perfection, priority, and enforcement context. For example, leases generally 
are not subject to usury laws, but a lease recas t as a secured t ransaction often would be 
subject thereto. See , e.g., McGalliard v. Liberty Leasing Co., 534 P .2d 528 (Alaska 1975); 
Hill v. Bentco Leasing , Inc. , 288 Ark. 623 , 708 S.W.2d 608 (1 986); Reisman & Mooney, supra 
note 3, at 12 & n.28. The issue also may be determinitive for purposes of ad valorem t axes, 
sales and use taxes, applicabili ty of ce rtain consumer protection laws, and treatment for a 
variety of purposes under the Bankru ptcy Code. See, e.g. , Mooney, T rue L ease , supra note 
24, § 29A.03 [3]-[ll], at 2929- 37; Reisman & Mooney, supra note 3, at 12-14, 123-34, 164-76. 
Eliminating t he distinction under t he Code certainly would not end the need to make the 
determination in many other circumstances. Cuming has asserted, however , in addressing 
the registration (fi li ng) requ irement fo r leases under Saskatchewan law, t hat " [ o ]nee the 
issue of registration is removed, the problem of characterization becomes commercially in-
significant." Cuming, supra note 13, § 5D.05[1 J[ a][iv], at 5A- ll ; see a lso in fra note 40 
(discussing Saskatchewan law) . Insofar as the quoted statement is in ten ded to encompass 
circumstances in the United States (and the context suggests that it is), the statement is 
inaccurate. 
33. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1987) . 
34. Jd. § 9-504(2 ). 
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the lessee and for which the lessee was not obliged to pay. 35 It fol-
lows that abolishing the true lease-security interest distinction 
should not eliminate the necessity of taking into account the 
residual interest of a lessor in transactions which constitute true 
leases under current law. 36 
Abolishing the true lease-security interest distinction also 
might subject leases to the perfection and priority regime of Arti-
cle 9. As a general matter, a secured party must perfect its security 
interest in order to achieve protection against most conflicting 
creditor and purchaser claims to collateral.37 Perfection in goods 
intended for use, such as equipment,38 is normally achieved by fil-
ing a financing statement.39 In most jurisdictions in the United 
States and Canada, as well as in England, however, no filing or 
other public notice requirement is imposed on the parties to true 
leases, and the interest of a lessor generally is immune from attack 
on ostensible ownership grounds.40 Most proponents of imposing a 
35. Ronald DeKoven has stated an appropriate measure of damages applicable to a 
lessee default: "[T]he present value of the difference between the rent reserved for the bal-
ance of the term less the market value of the use of the repossessed equipment for the 
balance of the term .... " DeKoven, supra note 3, § 29B.05[3], at 3012; see also DeKoven, 
Leases of Equipment: Puritan Leasing Co. v. August, A Dangerous Decision, 12 U.S.F. L. 
REv 257 (1978). This measure would credit the lessee only with t he value of its own prop-
erty interest-the use value of the goods for the remainder of the term-for which it is 
required to pay rentals. Mr. DeKoven was the Reporter for Article 2A and the basic lessor 
measure of damages upon a lessee default provided by Article 2A is patterned closely on Mr. 
DeKoven's modeL See generally Rapson, Deficiencies and Ambiguities in L essors ' Reme-
dies Under Article 2A: Using Offi.cal Comments to Cure Problems in the Statute , 39 ALA. L. 
REv. 875 (1988) (this Symposium). 
36. Kripke acknowledges this point. Kripke , supra note 27, at 729 ("It should not be 
too difficult for Mr. Mooney's subcommittee to work out a formula by which the proceeds of 
such a sale would be divided in proportion to the present values of the term and the 
residual useful life, with the former applied against the present value of the lessee's liability 
for rent.") . 
37. See U.C.C. §§ 9-301(1)(b) to 9-312(5)(a) (1987); see also Bankruptcy Code § 
544(a) . As used in this article, "Bankruptcy Code" refers to 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982 & 
Supp. VI 1986). 
38. See U.C.C. § 9-109(2) (1987) (defining "equipment" as "goods .. . if they are used 
or bought for use primarily in business"). 
39. Id. § 9-302(1). 
40. There are exceptions, however. South Carolina 's " bailment statute" has long pro-
vided that unless a lease of goods is recorded (or is for "temporary use" or qualifies under 
certain other minor exceptions) it is "null and void as to subsequent creditors .. . or pur-
chasers for a valuable consideration without notice. " S.C. CoDE ANN.§ 27-23-80 (Law Co-op. 
1976); see Note, Mandatory Recording of Personal Property Leases in South Carolina, 30 
S.C.L. REv. 557 (1979); see also IDAHO CoDE § 25-2001 (Supp. 1987) (recording of " [!] eases of 
more than ten (10) head of livestock must be in writing ... acknowledged ... and recorded . 
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filing requirement for leases of goods have failed to consider, much 
less grapple with, the effect of a lessor's noncompliance on the les-
sor's residual interest in the goods. It is central to the thesis of this 
article that an analysis of the merits of a filing rule for leases must 
take seriously the accompanying priority rules, including the effect 
of noncompliance on a lessor's residual interest. This issue is ad-
dressed in Part IV. 
Article 2A does not mandate filing or any other form of public 
notice for leases, with the exception of leases of goods which be-
come fixtures. 41 The Official Comments to Article 2A offer little 
insight into the drafters' decision to reject the nearly uniform call 
of the commentators for a filing requirement.42 Although the mat-
ter was one which was intensely discussed and debated prior to 
.. and the failure to comply ... renders the interest of the lessor ... subject ... to the 
claims of creditors ... and of subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers ... in good faith 
and for value"). 
Saskatchewan has adopted a filing requirement for certain leases by including such 
leases within the definition of "security interest" under The Personal Property Security Act. 
SASK. STAT. 1979-80, ch. P-6.1. A "security interest" includes "the interest of a lessor under 
a lease for a term of more than one year," but such leases are defined to exclude "a lease 
transaction involving a lessor who is not regularly engaged in the business of leasing goods." 
!d. § 2(nn), (y). Thus, only leases by "professional" lessors are subjected to the filing re-
quirements. Moreover, leases are excluded from the Act in respect of issues of enforcement 
upon a lessee's default. ld. § 55(1). See generally, Cuming, supra note 13, § 5D.05, at 5D-9 
to -13; Cuming, True Leases and Security Leases Under Canadian Personal Property Se-
curity Acts, 7 CAN. Bus. L.J. 251 (1982-1983); Shanker, The Past and Future of True Leases 
and Disguised Security Agreements, 7 CAN. Bus. L.J. 288 (1982-1983). 
41. See U.C.C. § 2A-309 (1987). As a general matter a lessee cannot transfer leased 
goods to a third party purchaser or creditor free of the lessor's claim and interest. See, e.g., 
McDonald's Chevrolet, Inc. v. Johnson, 376 N.E.2d 106 (Ind. App. 1978); Crest Inv. Trust, 
Inc. v. Atlantic Mobile Corp., 252 Md. 286, 250 A.2d 246 (1969); Cooperider v. Myre, 37 
Ohio App. 502, 175 N.E. 235 (1930). But a lease to a lessee who is a "merchant who deals in 
goods of that kind" would empower the merchant-lessee to transfer the lessor's rights to a 
"buyer in ordinary course of business." U.C.C. §§ 1-201(9), 2-403(2) & (3) (1987). Similarly, 
a lessor's rights might be cut off under circumstances where theories of apparent authority 
or estoppel would apply. See id. § 1-103. The most the lessee could transfer is its own lease-
hold interest-the right to use the goods during the term of the lease. See id. § 2A-303(l)(a) 
(lease contract can prohibit voluntary transfer of interest by lessor or lessee); cf. id. § 9-311 
(debtor may transfer rights in collateral notwithstanding prohibition in security agreement). 
42. The Comments provide: 
The lessor was not required to file a financing statement against the lessee or take 
any other action to protect the lessor's interest in the goods (Section 2A-301). The 
refined definition of security interest will more clearly signal the need to file to poten-
tial lessors of goods. Those lessors who are concerned will file a protective financing 
statement (Section 9-408). 
U.C.C. § 2A-101 comment para. 5 (1987); see also id. § 2A-301 comment para. 3. I do not 
contend that the drafters should have been more explicit. If my conjecture is correct that 
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and during the drafting process,43 there may be a good reason for 
the paucity of elaboration. Although there was a general consensus 
of the drafting committee in result-not to adopt a filing require-
ment-it is doubtful that there was a consensus on the reasoning 
or the weight afforded to the several arguments made for and 
against a filing requirement.44 
III. RECENT PROPOSALS TO EXTEND ARTICLE 9 FILING 
REQUIREMENTS TO LEASES 
Undoubtedly influenced by the leasing "boom,"45 recent years 
have witnessed a contemporaneous "boom" in legal writing dealing 
with the leasing of goods, usually denominated "equipment leas-
ing." During the 1960s and 1970s several commentators proposed 
that true leases of goods be subjected to the Article 9 or similar 
filing requirements. 46 The commencement in 1980 of a formal con-
there was no clear consensus as to t he reasoning, it is doubtful that any attempt to elaborate 
would have been fruitful. 
43. See generally infra Part III. 
44. The speculation in the text is based on discussions of the filing issue with the 
Reporter , Mr. DeKoven, and many of the members of the drafting committee both during 
and subsequent to the drafting process. 
There is a lesson here for future scholars looking back on the Article 2A process as well 
as for scholars today engaged in drawing inferences from the past in other contexts. It would 
be a serious mistake to attribute any particular analysis, motive, or reasoning to t he draft-
ers' decision to eschew a filing requirement for leases. There is no basis to infer that the 
drafters concluded that filing would not be useful, that the ostensible ownership of a posses-
sor of goods is not misleading to third party creditors or purchasers, or that any single, 
overriding consideration represented a consensus position of the drafters. Moreover , it cer-
tainly would be a mistake to conclude that the result was largely dictated by the strong 
expressions of opposition to a filing requirement voiced during the process by representa-
tives of the leasing industry. See generally Huddleson, supra note 5, at 672-77; Kripke, 
supra note 5, at 798-801. As with any legislative process, the end resul t speaks with one 
voice, but the basis for the result may be difficult to identify. On balance, the drafters chose 
not to adopt a filing rule. 
45. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
46. Hawkland, The Proposed Amendments to Article 9 of the UCC-Part 5: Consign-
ments and Eq uipment Leases, 77 CoM. L.J . 108, 112-15 (1972) (filing requirement for leases 
would solve problems of ostensible ownership as well as fraud issues arising out of sale-
leaseback transactions); Leary, Leasing and Other Techniques of Financing Equipment 
Under the U. C.C. , 42 TEMPLE LQ. 217, 252-53 (1969) (leases for "substantial term" should 
be "fully subjected to Article 9" in order to "disclose all claims against t he assets of a busi-
ness"); Levie, Security Interests in Chattel Paper, 78 YALE L.J. 935, 941 (1969) (unaware of 
any argument defending current law distinguishing between true lease and secured transac-
tions for "security purposes"); Peden, The Treatment of Equipment Leases as Security 
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sideration of the need and prospects for a uniform statutory 
treatment of personal property leasing presented a new agenda for 
the erstwhile and future essayists on the subject. The uniform law 
project that resulted in Article 2A provided a motivation and a me-
dium for further exploration of the filing requirement issue.47 
Kripke offered some advice and raised even more questions for 
the drafters of the new law in a scintillating book review written in 
1981.48 Kripke argued that notice of a lessor's interest should be 
filed in order to be "perfected. "49 Coogan and Leary reacted to 
Kripke's book review. 5° Coogan allowed that "it may not be too 
(1971) (filing for long term noncancelable leases should be required based on concerns for 
apparent ownership); Note, Leases as Security: Some Problems of Identi ficati on, 8 B.C. IND. 
& CoMM. L. REv. 764, 770 (1967) (filing requirement for leases may bt: necessary as a result 
of inability of courts to properly make true lease-security interest distinction); Note, 49 
CoRNELL L.Q. 672 (1964) (Article 9 filing requirements should be applied to leases so as to 
reduce potential litigation and abolish "secret lien"); Note, Recording of Equipment L eases: 
A Proposed Amendment to the Uniform Commercial Code, 47 NOTRE DAME LAw 993, 1008 
(1972) (Article 9 filing and priority rules should be applied to leases of more than four 
months to give notice to creditors and reduce judicial difficulties with true lease-security 
interest distinction) ; Comment, Equipment Leasing Under the UCC , 13 UCLA L. REv. 125, 
136-37 (1965) (leases other than "short term rental agreements" should be subjected to Arti-
cle 9 filing rules to eliminate " secret lien"). 
William Hawkland, speaking in May 1971 on the floor of the American Law Institute, 
proposed that Article 9 be amended to require filing for leases so as to deal with the "prob-
lem ... of ostensible ownership." 48 A.L.L PROC. 298-99 (1971). Hawkland also expressed 
concern that a precautionary filing by a lessor might create a risk that the filing itself would 
be viewed as an indication that the transaction was not a true lease. Hawkland's proposal 
apparently came too late for any serious consideration by the Article 9 Review Committee. 
Telephone interview with Homer Kripke (June 18, 1987); see 48 A.L.I. PRoc. 299-301 (1971); 
Hawkland, supra, at 115 & n .37. Hawkland's comments do appear to have sparked some 
action by the Review Committee, however. Responding to Hawkland 's proposal, Peter Coo-
gan suggested that the Official Comments might be revised to include a statement to the 
effect "that a filing does not necessarily indicate that the parties consider that they have a 
security agreement or that they have created a security interest. " 48 A.L.I. PROC. 300 (1971). 
The Review Committee subsequently proposed a new § 9-408 which accomplished precisely 
what Coogan had suggested and which became a part of the 1972 Official Text of the Code. 
Hawkland , however, was disappointed that a filing rule had not been promulgated. Hawk-
land, supra, at 115. 
47. See generally Boss, supra note 1; Mooney, Challenge, supra note 24, at 1623-29. 
48. Kripke, supra note 27. 
49. Id. at 728. Kripke provided some gloss on his view in materials he prepared for an 
invitational symposium held in February 1983. ALI-ABA Invitational Symposium, Personal 
Property Leasing: Prospects and Proposals for a Uniform Statut e , ALI-ABA COMM. ON 
CONTINUING PROF. Enuc. 40 (1983). Neither Kripke 's book review nor his symposium materi-
als explicitly identify his rationale for urging a filing requirement. It appears, however, that 
his principal concern relates to the ostensible ownership of a lessee in possess ion of goods. 
See also Kripke, supra note 5, at 798-801. 
50. Coogan, supra note 32; Leary, supra note 25. 
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difficult to fit the filing ... and priority provisions of the UCC to 
most true leases."51 A filing requirement would "eliminate uncer-
tainty" in situations where it is difficult to characterize a 
transaction as a true lease or a secured transaction. 52 As to the is-
sue of priorities, Coogan thought that the Article 9 priority rules 
had worked well for non-security transactions, such as consign-
ments and sales of accounts and chattel paper, and similarly would 
work for leases.53 
Leary's new filing proposals were more refined than those he 
had formulated a dozen years earlier.54 Leary still viewed a filing 
requirement as a means to "protect" creditors of and purchasers 
from a lessee. 5 5 He argued, however, that a strict application of the 
Article 9 "race-to-the-record" priority rules would be "punitive," 
at least if applied to provide creditors, as opposed to purchasers, 
with priority over a lessor's interest. 56 He urged adoption of a 
"pure notice" system, coupled with a "purchase money priority" 
5L Coogan, supra note 32, at 1047-48 (footnotes omitted). His reasoning, to the lim-
ited extent that he shared it, was relegated to a footnote. Id . at 1047 n.6L 
52. Id. Of course, such "burdensome" filing requirements should not be applicable to 
certain leases; he suggested that leases of one year or less by excepted. I d. Coogan based his 
one-year exception suggestion on the Saskatchewan model. Id.; see supra note 40. Coogan 
did not explain why he had changed his position from that expressed in an earlier article 
where he concluded that a filing requirement for leases "not only is of questionable wisdom 
but also is unlikely to be adopted in the foreseeable future ." Coogan, supra note 24, at 960-
61 ; see Coogan, Leasing and the Uniform Commercial Code, in EQUIPMENT LEASING-LEVER-
AGED LEASING, supra note 3, ch. 7. Coogan's earlier article attempted to distinguish 
consignments and sales of accounts and chattel paper, which are subject to the public notice 
requirements under the Code, from leases, which are not. He appears to have been influ-
enced primarily by a distaste for the complexity of drawing lines to exclude certain leases 
and his belief that § 9-408 would result in filings being made for most leases even in the 
absence of a requirement for filing. See Coogan, supra note 24, at 959-61. 
53. Coogan, supra note 32, at 1047-48 & n.62; see also Coogan & Boss, Uniform Com -
mercial Code Treatmen t for All Leases, in 1 P. CooGAN, W. HoGAN, D. V AGTS & J. 
McDoNNELL, supra note 3, ch. 4.3; infra Parts IV, V.D. & V.G. 
54. See Leary, supra note 46. 
55. Leary, supra note 25, at 1066, 1086-89. 
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similar to that in section 9-312(4).67 Leary limited the scope of his 
proposals to "finance leases" of "equipment."58 
Four significant and relevant articles were published in 1983.59 
Amelia Boss and Coogan co-authored an article which urged that 
true leases be included within the scope of Article 9.60 Their ra-
tionale was based squarely on the policy of protecting third parties 
from a lessee's apparent ownership.61 
57. !d. at 1087-89. Under the proposed "pure notice" system a creditor would not 
achieve priority over a lessor if the creditor had "actual notice" of the lessor's interest. Such 
notice could result from an Article 9 filing, general knowledge "in the relevant market area 
that equipment of the type involved is generally leased or bailed rather than sold to users," 
or from financial accounting information available to a creditor. !d. at 1087. It is not clear 
whether Leary would extend this rule to purchasers as well as credit·)rs or, if he would so 
extend it, whether he would consider a secured party to be a purchaser for this purpose. 
Normally a secured party would be a "purchaser." U.C.C. § 1-201(32) & (33) (1987). 
58. See Leary, supra note 25, at 1061 & n.2. As to "finance leases," see generally supra 
note 25 and accompanying text. 
59. Ayer, Further Thoughts on Lease and Sale, 1983 ARiz. ST. L.J. 341; Baird & Jack-
son, supra note 10; Boss, supra note 26; Coogan & Boss, supra note 53. 
60. Coogan & Boss, supra note 53, § 4.3.04[ 4][a], at 4.3-44 to -46. They described their 
conclusions as "tentative." !d. at 4.3-44. They acknowledged the necessity of special rules 
for a lessor's remedies after a lessee's default. !d. § 4.3.04[3], at 4.3-28 to -44. Their proposal 
would except leases for terms of less than one year from compliance with the perfection (§§ 
9-302, 9-303, 9-305) and statute of frauds (§ 9-203(1)) requirements. !d. § 4. 3.04[2][b], at 
4.3-26 to -28. 
61. 
[T]he public policy of protecting third parties which is exemplified in the public no-
tice perfection requirements of Article 9 applies equally to any situation where the 
person in possession of goods-whether denominated the debtor, consignee, or 
lessee- has less than full ownership of the goods. He is not now the owner and even if 
he is to become the owner, goods in which another has an interest are on his prem-
ises. Thus, the perfection requirements (in [Article 9] Parts 3 and 4) should apply to 
leases. 
!d. § 4.3.04[2][a], at 4.3-24 (footnote omitted). Their efforts to justify the proposed filing 
rule, however, were largely devoted to a listing of the acceptance of similar rules in other 
contexts. "A requirement of public notice as to chattel leases is a natural next step- from 
the real estate mortgage to the chattel mortgage, to conditional sales, to accounts and other 
intangibles, to consignments, to leases of chattels." I d. § 4.3.04[ 4][a], at 4.:3-45. The authors 
also refer to the Canadian experience and discuss the UNIDROIT draft convention on inter-
national financial leasing. As to developments in Canada, see supra note 40. The current 
draft of the UNIDROIT draft convention does not require public notice of financial leases 
within its scope, but only requires compliance with applicable local rules as to public notice, 
if any. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), Summary 
Report on the Committee of Governmental Experts for the Preparation of a Draft Conven-
tion on International Financial Leasing, Study LIX, Doc. 46, App. II , Art. 5, 1111 2, 3 (3d Sess. 
Apr. 27-30, 1987). Coogan and Boss have stated elsewhere that "[i)t is contemplated that 
most countries who adopt the UNIDROIT Leasing Rules will provide some sort of a public 
notice system to give local creditors of and purchasers from the lessee the type of protection 
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Prompted in large part by his participation in a 1983 invita-
tional symposium,62 John Ayer also addressed the issue of public 
notice for leases.63 Ayer had "discovered one case that [threw] a 
wrench into" the argument that filing should be mandated for 
leases. 64 Ayer posed a hypothetical which assumed a filing require-
ment for perfection against creditors of the lessee. Ayer concluded 
that the hypothetical lessor of a widget with a 1,000,000 dollar 
value, for a twenty-month lease term with aggregate rentals of 
200,000 dollars, would, if it neglected to file, lose a 1,000,000 dollar 
widget and be left with only a 200,000 dollar unsecured claim in 
the lessee's bankruptcy proceedings.65 Ayer thus raised an issue 
which had not been addressed squarely by earlier commentators: 
the effect of nonfiling under a mandatory filing requirement.66 He 
also recognized that an understanding of the function and effect of 
filing requirements for secured transactions is essential to any 
analysis of the need for, and application of, a similar filing rule for 
leases.67 
such a system can provide." Coogan & Boss, Recent Developments in Chattel Security 
Law-1985, The United States, Canada and the World, in 1 P. CooGAN, W. HoGAN, D. 
VAGTS & J. McDoNNELL, supra note 3, § 5C.04(3][d][iv), at 5C-106. I served as the United 
States representative to the Second and Third Meetings of Governmental Experts for the 
UNIDROIT convention on international financial leasing, in April 1986 and April 1987 in 
Rome, Italy. My impressions are precisely the opposite, at least insofar as true leases within 
the convention's scope are concerned. The convention is now scheduled to be finalized at a 
diplomatic conference to be held in Ottawa, Canada, in May 1988. 
As to the priority rules, Coogan and Boss were satisfied to allow the rules of Article 9, 
Part 3, to control. Coogan & Boss, supra note 53, § 4.3.04[4], at 4.3-46. They proposed that 
Article 9 be clarified to ensure the applicability of § 9-312(3) and (4) to leases, presumably 
depending on the use of the leased goods. 
62. Ayer, supra note 59, at 342-43. Ayer gained "new perceptions" at an invitational 
symposium sponsored by the ALI-ABA Committee on Professional Education, held in New 
York, February 17-18, 1983. See ALI-ABA Invitational Symposium, supra note 49. Ayer 
endeavored to elaborate on the analysis and conclusions he advanced in an earlier article. 
See Ayer, supra note 27 (arguing that there is no rational and consistent borderline between 
true leases and sales); see also supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. 
63 . Ayer, supra note 59, at 345-51. 
64. !d. at 345. 
65. !d. 
66. My recollection is that this "penal effect" on the interest of a nonfiling lessor was 
the subject of much discussion before and during the invitational symposium mentioned by 
Ayer (for which I served as Planning Chairman and moderator of the plenary panel discus-
sions). See supra 10te 62. Several proponents of a filing rule for leases were perplexed by 
this analysis of the effect of nonfiling. 
67 . Ayer, supra note 59, at 347-49. Ayer observed that the traditional notion that pub-
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Boss responded to Ayer.68 She took quite seriously Ayer's con-
cern with the effect of nonfiling under a rule requiring filing for 
leases, an issue which she and Coogan did not treat in their then-
recent proposal.69 She continued to defend the policy of requiring 
filing for leases based on the ostensible ownership rationale.70 She 
argued that Ayer's concerns did not impugn the policy of a filing 
requirement, but merely suggested that "the consequences of a 
failure to file as currently formulated may impose disproportionate 
penalties on the true lessor who fails to perfect. "71 She concluded 
that leases may justify "special treatment" for the effect of nonfil-
ing and that if there were to be uniform treatment of a failure to 
file for leases and secured transactions, "the entire scheme of con-
sequences flowing from a failure to file would have to be 
reexamined."72 She did not propose, however, any resolution of 
this issue or suggest any new priority scheme. 
Baird and Jackson offer the most elaborate . argument in sup-
port of a rule requiring filing for leases of goods. 73 They argue for a 
more general acceptance in the Code of the principle that if a non-
possessory interest is to be acquired or retained in property the 
holder of the interest must "make it possible for others to discover 
that interest," i.e., cure the problem of ostensible ownership.74 A 
conceptual cornerstone of their argument is that "metaphysical" 
notions of the location of "title" and divisions of property rights 
account for all cases under existing law. !d . at 348-49. Ayer concluded that his analysis may 
have added only confusion, but he did take a "step forward" from earlier discussions of the 
filing issue by identifying t he source of his confusion. Id. at 351. 
68. Boss, supra note 26, at 381-86. 
69. Coogan & Boss, supra note 53. 
70. Boss, supra note 26, at 382-85. Boss explained that there should be a "de mini-
mus" exception from a filing requirement when the risks posed by nonfiling will not exceed 
the costs of imposing a filing requirement. !d. at 385 & nn.109-10. The de minimus excep-
tion might be based on the length of the lease term, the value of the goods, or the nature of 
the goods (such as consumer goods). Id. 
71. Id . at 385 (footnote omitted). 
72. !d. at 386. 
73. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 10. Baird and Jackson do not limit their proposal 
to leases, however. They argue that the filing requirement should logically be extended to 
other separations of possession and ownership such as other bailments generally, subject to 
exceptions. !d. at 186, 190-94. Various portions of this article dwell on the Baird and Jack-
son arguments, largely as a result of their elaborate and articulate analysis. The value of this 
critique has benefited greatly from their work. Indeed, this critique relies materially on 
other efforts by both Baird and Jackson writing together, separately, or with others. 
74. !d. at 178. 
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that may not be discovered easily by third parties, such as an un-
filed lessor's interest in leased goods, impose costs on third 
parties. 75 Whether the costs should be borne by such third parties 
or by the holder of the property interest, such as by imposing a 
filing requirement on lessors, Baird and Jackson argue, should de-
pend on a cost-benefit analysis: "whether the duty to give notice 
imposes costs without producing corresponding benefits."76 The 
determination should not turn on the characterization of the trans-
action as between the parties, since the costs imposed on third 
parties are the same in each case.77 Baird and Jackson recognize 
that both the imposition of a filing requirement on a lessor and the 
acquisition of information by a third party involve costs, but they 
argue that the burden generally should be placed on the lessor be-
cause the lessor is the party who can solve the ostensible 
ownership problem in the least costly way-i.e., by filing. 78 
Although Baird and Jackson's cost-benefit analysis purports to 
encompass third parties generally, their rationale and discussion 
focuses primarily on costs to secured parties resulting from the se-
cret interest of a lessor or bailor. They argue that the Article 9 
filing system is more important to secured creditors than to un-
secured creditors because secured creditors rely more on specific 
property of a debtor.79 The information provided by filing is espe-
cially important to secured creditors because of Article 9's general 
75. Id. Baird and Jackson perceive that these costs result from the possession by a 
lessee-debtor of the property in question- the historical basis for the ostensible ownership 
doctrine. Id. at 180. 
76. I d. at 179, 186. 
77. I d. at 186-90. 
78. !d. at 188-89. Their proposal would merely extend the existing notice filing rules of 
Article 9 to leases and other bailments. Id . at 188-89 & n.46. The costs relating to filing and 
searching public records are the only costs identified by Baird and Jackson. See id. at 185-
86. 
79. Id . at 183-84. Baird and Jackson acknowledge that their argument " ultimately 
rests on empirical assumptions about the need parties have for information and the ability 
of a filing system to provide it cheaply." !d. at 183. Baird has furth er articulated the argu-
ment that the Article 9 filing system serves mainly to sort out conflicting claims among 
secured creditors. Baird, Notice Filing and the Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 12 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 53, 64-66 (1983); see also Baird & Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the 
Transfer of Property , 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299 (1984). Secured creditors, they argue, charge 
lower interest rates because they rely on specific assets of a debtor rather than "solely on 
the debtor's honesty and general financial health." Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 183. 
Therefore, secured creditors desire reliable information as to competing claims against such 
assets. !d. at 184. By reducing risks for secured parties, the advantages of secured 
credit-principally, priority over unsecured creditors-are enhanced. !d. at 189. 
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priority rule of "first-in-time, first-in-right"8 0 and "because of the 
possibility of debtor misbehavior, it is undesirable to rely on the 
debtor for information about claims to his own assets."81 As to the 
effect of a lessor's failure to file, Baird and Jackson offer little elab-
oration. Apparently they would allow a lessor who failed to file , or 
whose filing was in some way defective , t o be subject to the priority 
rules of Article 9, Part 3. 82 
Baird and Jackson, like most of the earlier proponents of a 
lease filing rule, conclude that some leases and other bailments 
should be excepted from the general filing rule. 83 They acknowl-
edge that, in constructing and applying such exceptions, "one may 
have to balance the virtues of clear rules against those of flexible 
standards as well as balance competing equities of two innocent 
parties. "84 Yet, they prefer such line-drawing, coupled with a pos-
80. Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, ::>.t 179, 185 ; see Baird, supra note 79, at 64-65 
("The Code's filing system fo llows from its fir st -to-fi le rule .. . . [A]rticle 9's notice-fi ling 
system meshes perfectly with its first-to-file rule. It clearly est ablishes t he priority of each 
secured credi tor and littl e else."). 
81. Ba ird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 179. But cf. Bai rd , supra note 79, at 61 (" If 
debtor misbehavior is a problem that notice fi ling is intended to cure, it is a bad rule."). 
82. Baird & J ackson, supra note 10, at 189 n.46 ("Our proposal goes no furt her than to 
incorporate leases, bailments, and the like into Article 9's fi ling rules and other third-party 
oriented rules ." (emphasis added)). Baird and J ackson, however, have argued t hat a lessor 
should be subject to a purchase money priority rule similar to the one in § 9-312(3), which 
would require notice to prior- fi led claimants to overcome t he generally applicable fi rst- to-
file rule. Id . at 194-96. Although Baird and Jackson ex press doubt as to the wisdom of a 
non-notice " purchase money" priority rule, such as t hat provided by § 9-312(4) , they do 
note that such a rule might be justified "on aggregate cost-reduction grounds- for example, 
if reliance by earlier secured claimants were considered unlikely." !d . at 196 (footnote om it-
ted; see infra notes 296-97. 
83. Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 190-94, 201. Such except ions should take into 
account fac tors such as whether (i) " another legal regime," such as cert ificate of ti tle laws 
fo r automobiles, "solves the ostensible ownership problem," id. at 190; (ii) property of ce r-
tain types is generally known not to be the property of the possessor (such as te lephone 
equipment, in a previous era), id. at 191; (iii) certain possessors (such as pawn brokers) are 
generally known to possess property of others, id.; (iv) a t ransfer of possession occurs for 
such a short t ime, such as the loan of a lawnmower to a ne ighbor , that t he cost of compli -
ance with a filing rule would be ineffici ent, id . at 191-92; (v) a fil ing ru le would be 
inconsistent wi th rules of negotiability of certain property, such as instruments, id. at 192; 
and (v i) automatic perfect ion without fi ling, as in the case of consumer goods, would be cost 
effective, id . at 193 . 
84. Id. at 194 (footnote omitted ). 
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sessiOn trigger, to attempts to determine Issues of ownership and 
title. 85 
An additional filing proposal deserves mention. In April 1985 
the National Commercial Finance Association (NCF A) suggested 
that the Article 2A drafting committee adopt a filing requirement 
for leases.86 Their rationale for requiring filing for leases, by and 
large, is based on ostensible ownership concerns.87 Their proposal 
differs significantly from earlier proposals , however, in that the ef-
fect of nonfiling would be limited to providing priority to a prior-
filed Article 9 secured party and then only to the extent of ad-
vances made by such secured party subsequent to the lessee's 
receipt of possession of the leased goods.88 Presumably, this limita-
tion is intended to be a rough substitute for favoring only those 
third parties who rely directly on the lessee's possession as evi-
dence of ownership. 
Most of the commentators mentioned above relied substan-
tially on the ostensible or apparent ownership rationale as a 
justification for adopting a filing rule for leases. None subjected 
the factual assumptions underlying this notion to rigorous analysis. 
Some also argued that a filing rule would reduce litigation over 
whether a purported lease was a true lease or a secured transac-
tion. Most of the commentators conceded that some leases, such as 
"short term" and consumer leases, should be excluded from any 
filing requirement. Most of the commentators also recognized that, 
even with a filing rule for leases, the true lease-secured transaction 
distinction still must be made for some purposes (principally, rem-
edies and damages on a lessee's default). Of those who mentioned 
85. Nevertheless, Baird and Jackson apparently would retain t he "thief rule," pursu-
ant to which secured creditors and other purchasers remain subject to t he risk that t here is 
a thief in the debtor's chain of title. I d. at 176 n.4. 
86. Letter from Donald Schwartz to Charles W. Mooney, Jr. (Apr. 22, 1985) (enclosing 
undated memorandum entitled Proposal for a Filing R equirement Under the Personal 
Property Leasing Act and draft proposed § 305(d) to the Uniform Personal Property Leas -
ing Act) (on file with the Alabama Law R eview). 
87. "The basis for the proposal is that leases present at least t he same ostensible own-
ership or secret lien dangers t hat liens or security interests do." Id., memorandum, at 2. 
88. !d., draft § 305(d). Consumer goods and leases for terms of less than 21 days would 
be excepted from the NCFA filing requirement. Moreover, lessors would be required to fi le 
within 10 days after a lessee received possession of the leased goods-essentially t he same 
rule as is now provided for purchase money security inte rests under§ 9-312(4). NCFA is a 
t rade assoc iation whose membership is comprised primarily of organizations that extend 
secured credit. 
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priorities and the effect of nonfiling, only Leary proposed a rule 
that would differ from the existing Article 9 scheme,89 although 
Boss, as a result of Ayer's questions, acknowledged that a different 
rule for leases and secured transactions might be appropriate. 90 
But Leary, Boss, and Ayer did not consider priority rules and the 
effect of nonfiling for leases beyond the immediate effect of subor-
dination of the lessor to some creditors of and purchasers from the 
lessee. 91 
The commentary has not been uniformly supportive of a filing 
requirement for leases.92 At the time Article 2A was promulgated, 
however, the literature contained no comprehensive response to 
the arguments made. by proponents of such a filing requirement. 
Baird and Jackson's important challenge, which bears repeating, 
essentially remained unanswered: "[T]hose who question the use-
fulness of a filing requirement in the case of leases should explain 
why there should be a filing requirement in the case of secured 
transactions that are identical from the point of view of third 
parties. "93 
In a recently published article, Maryellen Burns endeavors to 
explain why a filing requirement should not be adopted for leases 
89. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
90. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. 
91. See generally infra text accompanying note 134 (discussing effects of nonfiling af-
ter expiration of lease term) . 
92. For example, Richard Speidel, Robert Summers, and James White reject as "out-
rageous" the notion that all nonpossessory owners of personal property should be required 
to file in order to prevail as against creditors of the possessor. R. SPEIDEL, R. SuMMERS & J. 
WHITE, CoMMERCIAL LAw, TEACHING MATERIALS 300 (4th ed. 1987). Interestingly, they derive 
their position from the concept of ostensible ownership. In their view a lessee's possess ion of 
equipment does not create expectations in third parties that the lessee is an owner, but a 
bailee's possession of inventory does convey the appearance of ownership. !d. at 300-01; see 
also White, Dancing on the Edge of Article 9, 91 CoMM. L.J. 385, 397 (1986). Jeffrey Helman 
has argued that ostensible ownership concerns should be disregarded as vestiges of an obso-
lete doctrine and that a filing requirement for leases is, therefore, unnecessary. Helman, 
supra note 16, at 2728. Edwin Huddleson also has argued in defense of the omiss ion of a 
filing requirement in Article 2A. See Huddleson, supra note 5, at 672-77. I, also, have ques-
tioned the need for a filing requirement for leases. See Mooney, Recent Cases Relating to 
Equipment Leasing, in EQUIPMENT LEASING 1983 (PLI) 74 (R. Bayer & A. Reisman co-chair-
men) ("the benefits which might be achieved from a mandatory filing system for true leases 
would not outweigh the detriments"); Mooney, Challenge, supra note 24, at 1626 (question-
ing the need for mandatory public notice requirement for leases of goods). 
93. Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 189 n.46. 
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but is appropriate for secured transactions.94 Burns argues, as have 
others, that the doctrine of ostensible ownership has become obso-
lete.95 More persuasively, she also argues that the Article 9 filing 
rules provide benefits, such as discouraging fraud and collusion, in 
addition to curing problems of ostensible ownership.96 These issues 
are addressed in Part V of this article.97 Burns fails, as have other 
commentators, to appreciate the significant extent to which choices 
as to priority rules bear on whether a filing rule for leases should 
be adopted. 98 
IV. PRIORITY RuLES, INCLUDING THE EFFECTS oF NoNFILING: 
CosTs 
This Part addresses the priority rules, including the effects of 
nonfiling, which might be applied under a regime which would 
mandate filing for leases of goods. Legal rules which give one per-
son's property to another, or which command compliance with 
formalities such as fi ling as a condition to enforcing transfers and 
divisions of property against third parties, should to be adopted 
only if there are good reasons for doing so.99 Various Code rules, 
including the Article 9 perfection and priority provisions, produce 
such results. 100 The proponents of a filing rule for leases generally 
have assumed or concluded that the adoption of a filing rule would 
expose the property rights of a noncomplying lessor of goods to 
third party claims. Such risks of noncompliance represent costs 
94. Burns, supra note 26. I obtained the Burns article after the initial draft of this 
article had been submitted to the Alabama Law Review. 
95. ld. at 428-29, 462. For reasons explained in Part VI.A.2., that argument is not an 
adequate response to the issue posed by Baird and Jackson. 
96. ld. at 443-67. However , her explanation of why a filing requirement for leases 
would be less beneficial than filing under Article 9 is not persuasive. See infra note 265. 
97. See infra Part V.A. to V.C. 
98. Burns recognizes that one appropriate consideration is "the opportunity cost im-
posed on those who mistakenly fail to tile and lose their otherwise rightful interest in the 
subject [leased] property." Burns, supra note 26, at 461. But she generally fails to incorpo-
rate such costs into her analysis. 
99. See Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: 
Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REv. 605, 612 (1981) ("In a society that 
recognizes property as something more t han theft, you do not go around lightly destroying 
property rights; you must have a compelling reason for awarding A's property to C.") . 
100. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-403 , 9-301(1) & 9-312 (1987). 
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that would be imposed on lessors by a filing requirement. 101 A fil-
ing requirement for leases probably would impose greater costs on 
lessors, lessees, and third parties than the corresponding costs im-
posed on secured parties, debtors, and third parties by the existing 
Article 9 perfection and priority regime. It is impossible to evalu-
ate the wisdom of a filing requirement for leases without 
considering the effects of compliance and noncompliance. 102 
The following examples may aid the discussion. First, assume 
that applicable law provides that a financing statement must be 
filed in order to perfect a lessor's interest in the leased goods. Sec-
ond, assume, as most of the commentators proposing a lease filing 
requirement have proposed or assumed, that the Article 9 perfec-
tion and priority rules would be applied to leases as well as to 
secured transactions, with leases treated as purchase money secur-
ity interests for such purposes pursuant to section 9-312( 4). 103 
101. The aggregate benefits might outweigh such costs, and the benefits provided by a 
filing requirement for leases might be different in magnitude and quality than those pro-
vided by the Article 9 perfection and priority regime for secured transactions. The costs 
imposed on the players by the existing regime for leases of goods (no filing requirement) 
also are relevant. The possible similarities and differences in the benefits and the costs im-
posed under the existing regime are discussed in Parts V and VI. 
102. Conclusions as to the wisdom or utility of a filing requirement under a scheme 
where the only sanction for failing to file would be a ten dollar fine would be quite different 
than a scheme where a lessor who failed to file would lose all its rights in the leased goods 
and forfeit any right to claim damages from the lessee. Contract law provides an apt anal-
ogy. For example, whether the law provides a remedy will determine whether a promise will 
be annointed with "contract" status. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 1 (1981) 
(stating that" [a] contract is a promise ... for the breach of which the law gives a remedy"). 
Just as public notice of a lessor's interest in leased goods may be a good idea as a general 
matter, observance by a promisor of its promises generally may be a good id ea. Yet, the law 
does not enforce all promises. See Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. l, 2-6 
(1979). The consideration of the costs to lessors of a filing scheme generally has been limited 
to compliance costs associated with making filings, searching records, and the like. See, e.g., 
Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 185-86. Obviously, a lessor could avoid the risk and costs 
of noncompliance by complying (i.e., filing) , and general compliance, at least by profession-
als, is not an unreasonable expectation. But a filing rule for leases shifts the risk of 
noncompliance from the lessee's creditors and purchasers to the lessor and its creditors and 
purchasers. This additional risk to lessors is a cost of a filing rule that is in addition to 
fi ling-related costs of compliance. Measuring and balancing such costs against costs imposed 
on a lessee's purchasers and creditors, however, are substantially more problematic than 
merely identifying the existence and nature of such costs. See generally infra Part VI. Yet, 
it is difficult to measure and balance anything unless it is first identified and taken into 
account. 
103. The proper purchase money priority provision also could be § 9-312 (:3), dealing 
with purchase money security interests in inventory. Although leases of goods to lessees who 
hold them for sale may be unusual, lessees who hold goods for lease (i.e., sublease) may be 
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Example A 104 
Lessor leases equipment to Lessee for a term of two years, at 
which time Lessee is to redeliver the equipment to Lessor. The 
value of the equipment at the beginning of the lease term is 
1,100,000 dollars. A reasonable estimation of the value of the equip-
ment at the end of two years is 800,000 dollars. Lessee is obligated 
to pay rent in twenty-four monthly installments of 20,000 dollars 
each, for a total of 480,000 dollars. For some reason, Lessor fails to 
file a financing statement or files a defective statement. Six months 
later, Lessee files a petition seeking relief as a debtor under the 
Bankruptcy Code. On that date the value of the equipment is 
1,000,000 dollars. 
What are the rights of Lessee's trustee in bankruptcy?105 The 
trustee in bankruptcy may exercise the rights and powers of a hy-
pothetical judicial lien creditor .106 Those rights include the rights 
of a lien creditor/07 and because Lessor's interest is unperfected, 
the trustee's rights are superior to Lessor's interest in the equip-
ment.108 Presumably, the trustee in bankruptcy may recover the 
equipment valued at 1,000,000 dollars for the benefit of the un-
secured creditors.109 
This result troubled Ayer and Boss.U0 But Ayer concluded (or 
assumed) that Lessor's unsecured claim in Lessee's bankruptcy 
would be no more than the unpaid rentals under the leasing agree-
ment-here, 360,000 dollars assuming six monthly payments had 
more common. See U.C.C. § 9-109(4) (1987) (defining "inventory" as "goods ... held by a 
person who holds them for sale or lease") (emphasis added)). 
104. Example A is similar to, and is intended to raise the issues raised by, Ayer's Ex-
ample 1. See Ayer, supra note 59, at 345; see also supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text. 
105. The ramifications of nonperfection explored here would be the same whether or 
not a trustee in bankruptcy were appointed. For example, under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, a debtor in possession could utilize the avoidance powers of a trustee in 
bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Code § 1107(a). 
106. Bankruptcy Code § 544(a). 
107. See U.C.C. § 9-301(:3) (1987) (defining "lien creditor"). 
108. Id. § 9-301(l)(b). 
109. If the example were varied by assuming a prior-filed and perfected secured lender 
to the lessee, the secured lender also would have priority over the lessor to the extent of the 
secured loans. !d. § 9-312(5)(a). The trustee in bankruptcy, then, would be entitled to any 
excess value of the equipment over the secured lender's secured claim. See Bankruptcy 
Code § 506(a). 
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been made prior to bankrupcty.111 Ayer's conclusion is incorrect. 
Lessee is in breach of a fundamental obligation under the 
lease-namely, the obligation to return the equipment at the end 
of the term or earlier in the event of Lessee's default. If the equip-
ment has been "appropriated" for the payment of Lessee's other 
creditors, then Lessor should recover damages, which, presumably, 
would include an amount approximately equal to the present value 
of the anticipated residual value of the equipment. 112 In order to 
111. 
This case differs from most of the bankruptcy cases because the [lessor's] claim does 
not correspond to the value of the property. In this example, no one ever intended 
that the [lessee] make payments approximating the value of the widget. To give the 
palm to the trustee here is certainly to award him a bonanza of some sort. 
I confess that I am not sure how the law should deal with this case. 
Ayer, supra note 59 , at 345. 
112. SeeR. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY§ 11.7, at 282-84, § 11.9, at 300-
02 (3d ed. 1975); J. STORY, supra note 21, § 414, at 374-75. The statement in the text is 
somewhat incomplete and oversimplified. Applying the damages rules of Article 2A, Lessor 
would be entitled to recover, upon Lessee's default, the present value of future rentals less 
the market rental value of the equipment for the remainder of the term. U.C.C. § 2A-528(1) 
(1987). Nothing in existing law or Article 2A, however, should prevent Lessor from recover-
ing, in addition, damages for Lessee's failure to return the leased equipment. See id. § 2A-
525 comment para. 3 (explaining that Article 2A does not displace the common law of bail -
ment in regard to, inter alia, "refusal of the lessee to return goods to the lessor after 
termination or cancellation of the lease"). Presumably, Lessor's damage claim for loss of its 
residual would be approximately equal to the present value of $800,000. 
The Uniform Commercial Code Committee of the State Bar of California is concerned 
about Article 2A's statutory silence on this point. That commit tee has made a preliminary 
recommendation that Article 2A be changed to make it clear that the lessor's damage recov-
ery for the lessee's failure to return leased goods includes the value of the lessor's 
anticipated post-lease residual interest. REPORT OF THE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE COMMIT-
TEE OF THE BUSINESS LAW SECTION OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA ON PROPOSED 
CALIFORNIA CoMMERCIAL CoDE DIVISION 10 (ARTICLE 2A), PRELIMINARY DiscussiON DRAFT 58-
59 (Apr. 7, 1987). That report recommends the addition of a new § 2A-532 to provide as 
follows: 
In addition to any other recovery permitted by this article , the lessor shall be 
entitled to recover from the lessee an amount that will fully compensate the lessor for 
any loss of or damage to the lessor's residual interest in the goods caused by the 
default of the lessee. 
!d. at 59; see also Rapson, supra note 35, at 895 n.67. Similar concerns have been rai~ed in 
connection with draft personal property security legislation in British Columbia, which, like 
the Saskatchewan law, would treat certain leases as secured transactions for purposes of 
perfection and priority. See Draft British Columbia Personal Property Security Act§§ 1, 21 
(quoted in letter from Ronald Cuming to Charles W. Mooney, Jr. (Oct. 7, 1987) (on file with 
Alabama Law Reuiew)). 
Where the interest of a iessor . . . is subordinated to a trustee in bankruptcy . . . the 
lessor ... is deemed as against the lessee ... to have suffered ... damages in an 
amount equal to 
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avoid a trial on the issue of damages, the leasing contract might 
well contain a liquidated damages provision covering Lessee's fail-
ure to redeliver the equipment. 113 
The foregoing example and discussion illustrate several impor-
tant points. Lessor has lost its residual interest in the goods, 114 
even though the residual interest never was transferred to Lessee 
and Lessee never agreed to pay for it. 115 An Article 9 secured party 
has no residual interest to lose in the event of its failure to perfect. 
However, this comparison, standing alone, does not show that the 
costs imposed on unperfected lessors necessarily would be greater 
than the costs imposed on unperfected secured parties. An un-
perfected secured party also stands to lose a property 
interest-namely, a security interest with a value equal to the 
lesser of the value of the collateral and the amount of the secured 
obligation. Moreover, in Example A Lessor lost its residual interest 
(valued at the present value of 800,000 dollars), but received a 
claim, albeit unsecured, against Lessee of an approximately equal 
amount. 116 This simple arithmetic suggests that the unperfected 
lessor and an unperfected secured party stand to suffer equally. 
But the problem is not so simple. "Simple arithmetic" notwith-
(a) the value of the leased . . . goods at the date of bankruptcy, and 
(b) the amount of loss resulting from the termination of the lease .. .. 
!d . § 21; see supra note 40. The issue of the amount and nature of an unperfected lessor's 
claim does not appear to have been the subject of any reported case under the Saskatche-
wan or South Carolina filing provisions . .See generally supra note 40. 
A policy argument could be made, in support of Ayer's conclusion as to the amount of a 
lessor's claim, that the lessor should bear the risk of nonfiling or defective filing because the 
lessor is in the best position to avoid such errors. That argument is not persuasive. First, it 
would result in a substantial windfall to lessees and their creditors. Second, its premise 
would, in many cases, be false . For example, the filing might be defective as a result of the 
lessee's wrongful or negligent removal of the equipment to another jurisdiction or the 
lessee's change in its own location. See U. C. C. § 9-103(1)(d)(i) & (3)(e) (1987). Third, to the 
extent that custom is of any guidance, the risk of non perfection, as between a debtor and a 
secured party, normally is borne contract'-1ally by a debtor as a result of representations and 
warranties and events of default contained in conventional documentation. 
113. See , e.g., U.C.C. § 2A-504 & Cumment (1987). 
114. A priority rule could be fashioned to provide that an unperfected lessor's residual 
interest is not subject to third party clain!s. Under such a rule, third party claims would be 
confined to the lessee's property interest-----the use value during the term. This possibility is 
discussed infra at notes 136-38 and acco:rnpanying text. 
115. Lessor transfered to Lessee only the right to use the equipment for two years. At 
the inception of the transaction, Lessee's \Jse rights were valued by Lessor and Lessee at the 
present value of $480,000 payable over hvo years in equal monthly installments. 
116. See supra note 112. 
l 
' 
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standing, an unperfected lessor may be exposed to greater costs 
arising out of the loss of its residual value than that incurred by an 
unperfected secured party. In order to understand why, it is neces-
sary to consider the differences between leases and secured 
transactions in the commercial context of the transactions. 117 
It is fair to assume that a principal goal of lenders, whether 
secured or unsecured, is that debtors satisfy their obligations.118 
Viewed in this context, security interests are merely incidental to 
the obligations secured. If the obligation is satisfied, the corre-
sponding security interest is terminated. 
Since a creditor's primary desire is to be paid or otherwise sat-
isfied, it might be useful to ask why creditors sometimes are not 
paid. Although I am not aware of any empirical study precisely on 
point, it is probable that the failure of secured creditors to obtain 
their intended priority with respect to collateral would rank quite 
low on any list of such reasons. 119 Stated differently, creditors nor-
mally do not view recovery from the debtor's collateral as their 
117. There may be normative concerns about the fairness of the potential elimination 
of lessor's property rights beyond the property rights transferred to lessee (i. e., lessee's 
leasehold interest). Cf. Ayer, supra note 59, at 342-43; Boss, supra note 26, at 382-87; supra 
notes 62-72 and accompanying text. Ultimately, such arguments that any particular effect of 
lessor noncompliance would be a sanction that "does not fit the crime," that is "penal," or 
that otherwise is "unfair" are merely claims that the disparity is too great between the 
sanction imposed and the benefits provided by a filing requirement. It is more useful to 
focus on the relative costs and benefits. 
118. Creditors also may desire to engage in profitable repeat business with debtors and 
to observe norms essential to maintenance of their status in the community. For a discus-
sion of the Article 9 coverage of transactions that do not secure obligations in the 
conventional sense, such as a consignment deemed a "sale or return" and a sale of accounts 
or chattel paper, see generally infra Part V.C. 
The following discussion depends on the assumption in the text and several other as-
sumptions based on literature dealing with the credit process and the author's personal 
observations and experience. 
119. See Phillips, supra note 16, at 6: 
[W]hat [a secured creditor] wants is repayment of the debt, not ownership of [the 
debtor's) assets. A "security interest" may be viewed as a property right, but its func-
tion is understood by the participants to be limited; the aim is to salvage more for 
this creditor in the event [the debtor's] enterprise fails. 
!d . (footnotes omitted). Phillips cites statistics (from Bankruptcy Act Revision, Hearings on 
H.R. 31 and H.R. 32, before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 94, No. 27, Pt. 1) demonstrating that secured 
creditors often recover less than their secured claims in bankruptcy proceedings. ld . at n .26. 
The point is that even perfected secured creditors often, perhaps usually, fail to fully re-
cover the amount of their claims when a debtor is financially distressed . 
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principal "way out. " 12° Collateral is only one of many factors af-
fecting whether secured creditors decide to extend credit and 
whether secured obligations will be repaid. 121 
To be sure, contemporary equipment leases normally involve 
substantial elements of credit extension. A lessor expects and 
desires payment of the rentals, and particularly in the case of a 
long-term lease, the credit analysis undertaken and the other deci-
sion-making behavior of lessors may bear substantial similarities to 
that of lenders generally. 122 But some important differences exist. 
A lessor expects to keep one foot outside of the credit market. As 
an investor in and owner of the equipment, a lessor 's interest, un-
like a security interest, is not measured by the amount of credit 
extended. An analysis of the economic substance of leases makes 
this clear. The value of the lessor 's residual interest in the leased 
120. See, e.g., A. FARNSWORTH & J. HoNNOLD, Co MMERCIAL LAw 774 (4th ed . 1985): 
A lawyer who thinks t hat the securi ty device is the most important part of a credit 
t ransaction will be quickly correct ed by a banker or merchant. F rom the point of view 
of seller or lender, the most important safeguard for the loan is the likelihood t hat 
the borrower will voluntarily repay. Evaluation of this likelihood calls for mature 
judgment of the borrower's character , ability and financial sta tus , and of the busi ness 
outlook. R ecourse t o the most ironclad security is sure to be cos tly .. .. Foreclosing on 
securi ty indeed involves a serious breakdown of t he lending opera tion, which depends 
for profi t on a rapid and routine fl ow of money in and out th rough t he hands of 
clerks. 
S ee also Scot t, su pra not e 11, at 944-49. 
121. See, e.g., Bryan, The Bank er and the Credit Decision, in BA!'l K CREDIT 2-4 (H. 
Prochnow ed. 1981) (discussing " the three C's of credi t .. . character , capac ity a nd capital " ). 
There is much to say in favor of legal rules which force players to confront the actual trans-
actiona l risks that t hey face in any given context. For exam ple, it is not necessarily cos t 
effective to insulate creditors from risks of debtor misbehavior and dishonesty, such as at-
tempts to deceive creditors as t o the nature of a debtor -lessee's in terest in eq uipment. 
Gilmore made a similar point in connection wit h his cr iticism of the Code's re peal of the 
rule of Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S . 353 (1925). H e stated: 
The fi nancing assignee, who serves a usefu l fun ction in provid ing working-cap ital 
loans , is not an ignorant stranger. He is in a position to find out-and , before putt ing 
up his money, does find out-all t here is to know about t he operations of his borrow-
ers. He has a close and continuing relationship with t hem. He can, if he chooses, 
require t he strictest account ing from them. He does not need to be insula ted , as a 
matter of law, from t he r isks of the t ransactions in which they engage. Beca use he can 
inves t iga te , supervise , and cont ro l, he should be encouraged to do so and penalized if 
he has not done so. 
Gilmore, supra not e 99, at 627. 
122. See Ahlstrom & Bole, E conomics of Leueraged Leasing, in EQUIPMENT LEAS-
ING-LEVERAGED LEASING, supra note 3, at 627, 645-47; Bayer, Equip ment Lease 
Documentation Hand book , in EQ UIP MENT LEASING 1985 (PLI) 79-81 (R. Bayer & C. Mooney 
co-chairmen) . 
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goods normally will exceed the amount of the lessee 's rental obliga-
tions.123 A lessor, then, does not rely on the lessee 's satisfaction of 
its obligations as the lessor's "way out. "124 A lessor necessarily re-
lies on the leased equipment itself to be made whole for its 
investment. This may be contrasted with a typical secured creditor 
that expects to receive satisfaction from the disposition of the 
debtor's collateral as a last resort. Viewed ex ante, the effects of 
nonperfection for lessors, therefore, would be more costly than for 
secured creditors because lessors rely more on the leased equip-
ment. 125 This disparity in costs of noncompliance would exist even 
123. Since the sticks in the bundle representing the entire value of the equipment are 
comprised of the use value during the lease term plus the residual value at the expiration of 
the lease, the market value of equipment at any point in time during the lease term necessa-
rily would exceed the use value. It follows that a lessor's interest, assuming it could recover 
possession of the equipment free of the lessee's interest as in the case of a default, would 
normally exceed the amount of a lessee's obligations to pay rent under the lease, assuming 
also that the lease rental obligations approximate the market value of the use of the equip-
ment during the lease term. Circumstances such as the destruction of uninsured leased 
equipment, obsolescence, or depreciation at a more than the anticipated rate could affect 
the actual value of equipment. 
124. A lessee's contingent obligation to respond in damages in the event the goods are 
not returned to the lessor, however, would approximate the entire value of the goods. See 
supra note 112 and accompanying text. But the central point here is that the nature of the 
bargain and the expectations of a lessee and a lessor are that the obligation of the lessee for 
failure to return the goods would normally arise only in the event of a contingency such as a 
casualty loss, which can be insured against. A lessor's "way out" necessarily involves recov-
ery from its residual interest in the leased goods. 
In response, it can be argued that the imposition of a filing rul e would mean that a 
lessor could continue to rely on its residual interest in the goods to be made whole only by 
being exposed to risks of noncompliance. Stated otherwise, the legal rule would change the 
expectations of the lessor. Imposing such risks would impose costs on lessors. Experience 
with secured transactions indicates that if a filing requirement were imposed for leases, 
some percentage of leases necessarily would involve the failure to file or defective filings . 
The risk of noncompliance may be substantial even for professionals. See Baird & Jackson, 
supra note 79, at 312 ("Defective filings ... are an everyday affair when at issue are security 
interests in personal property .... ");see also Harris, The In teraction of Articles 6 and 9 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code: A Study in Conveyancing, Priorities, and Code Interpreta -
tion, 39 VAND. L. REv. 179, 212-13, 220 (1986); Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 
STAN. L. REv. 725, 734 n.26, 764 n.ll7 (1984). Such noncompliance losses thus incurred by 
lessors as a class would represent costs imposed on lessors as a direct resul t of the filing 
requirement. And because reliance on the goods generally is more significant to lessors than 
to secured creditors, such costs would be greater for lessors. 
125. This increased noncompliance pain (i. e., cost) to lessors might be compared to 
the pleasure (i.e., benefit) experienced by a secured creditor who becomes senior as a result 
of lessor noncompliance. Assume the situation in which a secured party claiming a security 
interest in all existing and after -acquired equipment of a debtor-lessee and an equipment 
lessor which inadvertently fails to file or files in t he wrong filing office. If a debtor-lessee 
default were to occur, the secured party would be pieased to discover that it could look to 
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as between a lessor and a secured purchase money seller of equip-
ment, the closest Article 9 analogue of an equipment lessor. 126 
The foregoing discussion of lessor costs does not suggest that 
the "metaphysical" distinction between a true lease and a secured 
transaction necessarily affects the costs imposed on third parties, 
such as a lessee's creditors and purchasers, as a result of ostensible 
ownership concerns. The location of title or ownership alone 
should not drive the consideration of the wisdom of public notice 
requirements for various types of transactions or relationships. 127 
Example A illustrates another category of costs that would re-
sult from a lease filing requirement that incorporates the Article 9 
priority rules. Recall that Lessor will be entitled to a claim against 
Lessee for damages arising out of Lessor's loss of its residual inter-
est in the leased goods. 128 Lessor's property rights would be cut off 
by the trustee in bankruptcy, but Lessor's contract rights would 
not be. This distinguishes the treatment of a lease from that of a 
secured transaction, even if the the same perfection and priority 
rules are applied to each. The total amount of a lessor's claim will 
vary depending on whether a lessor's interest is perfected. The to-
the leased equipment as a possible source of recovery. But secured creditors often do not 
rely on the collateral as the principal source of repayment and normally do not expect any 
default to occur. The lessor, however, relies on the existence of the res idual value of the 
equipment as an essential component of its recovery of its investment. In other words, the 
value placed on the equipment by the lessor exceeds that placed on the same equipment by 
the secured creditor; the lessor's pain outweighs the secured creditor's pleasure. Posner cites 
Holmes for a similar point in a different context. 
Oliver W endall Holmes long ago suggested an interesting economic explanation for 
adverse possession. Over time, a person becomes attached to property that he regards 
as his own, and the deprivation of the property would be wrenching. Over the same 
time, a person loses attachment to property that he regards as no longer his own, and 
the restoration of the property would cause only moderate pleasure. This is a point 
about diminishing marginal utility of income. 
R. PosNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw§ 3.10, at 70 (3d ed. 1986) (footnote omitted) (citing 
Holmes, Th e Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 477 (1897)). 
126. This statement depends on the accuracy of the assumptions made about the na-
ture of credit extensions. Douglas Baird has observed correctly that the case for a filing 
requirement may be stronger for some secured transactions than others and that the costs 
and benefi ts of a filing requirement for leases must be compared with those of the filing 
requirement for purchase money security interests. Letter from Douglas Baird to Charles W. 
Mooney, k (Dec. 30, 1987) (on file with the Alabama Law Review). 
127. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 179-79, 186. 
128. See supra note 112. 
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tal amount of the claim of a secured party, however, would be the 
same whether or not the secured party's interest were perfected.129 
It follows that if an "unperfected" lease were avoided, a deter-
mination of the amount of a lessor's damages for failure to return 
the leased goods would be necessary; such a determination would 
not be necessary in the case of an unperfected secured transaction. 
The necessity of this determination, whether provided for in the 
leasing agreement or made the subject of post-default negotiation 
or litigation, imposes costs on a lessor and a lessee. Moreover, the 
only way that the parties and a court will know whether this deter-
mination is necessary is by first determining whether the trans-
action involved is a lease or a secured transaction.130 
Example A suggests still other costs which would be imposed 
on lessees. By forcing the appropriation of Lessor's property rights 
in order to satisfy other claims against Lessee, at once a new, 
greater obligation of Lessee has surfaced. Presumably, Lessee did 
not desire or intend to obligate itself to pay for the entire value of 
the equipment. Rather, it only desired and intended to "purchase" 
a portion of the value: the right to use the equipment for two 
years. Thus, Lessee has been forced to incur a debt that it other-
wise would not have incurred. 131 In response, one might argue that 
the increase in Lessee's debt, resulting from Lessor's damage claim 
on account of its loss of the residual value, normally would be off-
set by a corresponding increase in Lessee's estate or reduction of 
debt owed to another creditor. But this often may not be the case. 
The amount of Lessor's claim, under the leasing agreement and 
129. A security interest also can secure a contingent obligation, but security interests 
granted in connection with extensions of credit normally secure liquidated obligations. 
130. Several proponents of a lease filing rule have recognized that this determination 
also involves costs and have touted a filing rule for the very reason that it would reduce 
costly determinations of the lease-security interest issue. See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, supra 
note 10, at 200; Coogan & Boss, supra note 53, § 4.3.04[ 4][a], at 4.3-45; Coogan, supra note 
32, at 1047 & n.61; Hawkland, supra note 46, at 114; Peden, supra note 46, at 1.58; Note, 
supra note 46, at 1006; see also Ziegel, The New Canadian Personal Property S ecurity 
Legislation, 1986 LLOYD's MAR. & CoM. L.Q. 160, 173. 
131. This conclusion might not follow if the lessee is conceptualized as voluntarily as-
suming a contingent obligation to pay damages in the event of nonperfection . The statement 
in the text assumes that the lessee desires only to purchase and pay for the temporary use of 
the equipment and to incur additional obligations only in the event of a casualty loss (which 
normally can be insured against) or the lessee's voluntary actions. Whether the policy ra-
tionale for a lease filing rule justifies imposing this additional nonperfection risk on the 
lessee is, of course, a subject of this article. The point here is that the exposure of the lessee 
to additional obligations as a result of nonperfection is a factor, and a cost, to be considered. 
716 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 39:3:683 
applicable law, may exceed the amount actually realized from the 
equipment. 132 For example, assume the existence of a prior-filed 
secured party who has the benefit of an after-acquired property 
clause. The secured party's disposition of the equipment may pro-
duce less than the amount of Lessor's damage claim against 
Lessee. It is likely that the amount recovered by a lien creditor, 
who sells at a sheriff's sale outside of bankruptcy, would produce 
even less than a sale by a secured party, who sells m a commer-
cially reasonable manner.' 33 
Example B 
Assume the same facts and assumptions as in Example A, ex-
cept that Lessee completed all payments under the lease and did 
not file a bankruptcy petition. At all pertinent times there existed a 
perfected secured lender (SP 1 ) to Lessee. SP 1 's security agreement 
contained an after-acquired property clause that covered all equip-
ment acquired by Lessee at any time. Lessee did not default and, at 
the expiration of the lease, the equipment was turned over to Les-
sor. Lessor then sold the equipment to B 1 , a wholesaler, and B 1 
resold the equipment to B2 • B2 borrowed the purchase price from 
SP 2 and granted a security interest in the equipment to SP 2 • SP 2 
properly and timely perfected by filing. Two years later, Lessee de-
faulted on its obligations to SP 1 • SP 1 then learned of the earlier 
lease, traced the equipment, and sued B1 for conversion, B2 for con-
version and possession of the equipment, and SP 2 for a 
determination of the priority of SP /s security interest. 
What result? SP 1 probably will prevail in all of its claims, but 
may receive only one satisfaction. Under the Article 9 perfection 
and priority rules, SP 1 's security interest in the equipment "con-
tinues . . . notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition 
132. This lessee cost is not pronounced in the case of avoidance and disposition by a 
lessee 's trustee in bankruptcy. Because only a fraction of a lessor's unsecured claim nor-
mally would be paid in a bankruptcy proceeding, a lessee 's estate (and the general creditors) 
still would be better off after avoiding the unperfected lease even if a lessor's claim exceeded 
the amount actually recovered from the equipment by the estate. 
133. See U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1987) (requiring secured party's disposition of collateral 
after default to be made in a commercially reasonable manner). T he procedures for jud icial 
sales by judgment creditors generally do not afford a judgment debtor with such procedural 
protections designed to enhance the sales price. S ee, e.g., N.Y CIV. PRAC. LAw § 5233 (Mc-
Kinney 1978) (providing for sale at public auction and posting of notice or adve rti sement at 
least six days prior to sale). 
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thereof unless the disposition was authorized by [SP 1 ] in the secur-
ity agreement or otherwise."134 
Bu B2 , and SP 2 could have protected themselves by investigat-
ing the past history of the equipment, determining that at some 
point it had been leased to Lessee, searching the records for filings 
against Lessee, and discovering SP /s filed financing statement. 
Each transferor, including Lessor, could have produced documen-
tation demonstrating its acquisition of the equipment, but Lessor's 
documentation would not have affirmatively demonstrated a nega-
tive-the absence of any lease at any time. Under existing law, 
without a filing rule for leases, SP 1 's security interest would have 
attached only to Lessee's leasehold interest, and upon expiration of 
the lease, SP 1 's security interest also would have expired. 
Example B illustrates that a filing requirement for leases 
probably would impose greater costs on third parties than the costs 
imposed on those parties by the existing Article 9 regime in the 
same context. Assuming no third party had asserted prior rights, 
134. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1987). The mere expiration of the lease and the delivery of the 
equipment to lessor may not constitute a disposition. Cf. In re Jermoo's Inc., 38 Bankr. 197 
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984) (termination of franchise agreements pursuant to terms of agree-
ments not a "transfer" under Bankruptcy Code§§ 101(50) (then§ 101(40)), 548). But cf. In 
re Queen City Grain, Inc., 51 Bankr. 722 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) (termination of lease by 
lessor for lessee's default is a "transfer" under Bankruptcy Code §§ 101(50) (then § 
101(40)), 548); In re Ferris, 415 F. Supp. 33 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (termination of lease by 
lessor for lessee's breach of covenant is a " transfer" under Bankruptcy Act §§ 1(30) , 67d, 11 
U.S.C. §§ 1(30), 107(d) (1898) (repealed 1978)). The absence of a disposition would not help 
Lessor 's cause in any event. Absent a disposition, there is nothing in Article 9 which would 
give rise to any claim that SP 1 's security interest became ineffective. Lessor 's taking posses-
sion of the equipment following expiration of the lease would have perfected its interest if § 
9-305 were applied. But, since Lessor's interest was not perfected at the time that Lessee 
received possession of the equipment or within ten days thereafter, Lessor would not 
achieve priority over SP 1 under the purchase money priority rule of either§ 9-312(3) or (4) . 
SP 2 might argue that it is prior to SP1 by operation of the§ 9-312(4) purchase money prior-
ity rule, or the facts of Example B could be changed by positing that SP 2 claims under an 
after-acquired property clause and that SP 2 filed against B2 earlier than SP 1 filed against 
Lessee. SP2 might then argue that it is prior pursuant to the § 9-312(5)(a) first-to-file rule. 
SP 2 should not prevail in either case, although a literal reading of the cited priority provi-
sions would seem to favor SP2 • Barkley Clark has explained correctly that the first-to-file 
rule "presupposes only a single debtor ." B. CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS 
UNDER THE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE~ 3.8[4], 353-54 (1980 & Supp. 1987). B2 purchased 
the equipment subject to SP1 's security interest and there is no basis for SP2 to acquire 
greater rights in the equipment than SP.'s debtor , B2 , acquired. See id. ~ 3.8(4], at 54 ("The 
principle of limited ownership might well be read into § 9-312 as a supplementary principle 
of law via § 1-103."); see also Harris, supra note 124, at 225 & n.l82 (generally agreeing 
with Clark's conclusion). 
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upon expiration of a lease a lessor, even if unperfected, could re-
cover the goods and place them in the stream of commerce. Upon 
satisfaction of a debtor's obligations to an unperfected secured 
party, however, the goods would remain with the debtor. Under a 
filing scheme for leases incorporating the Article 9 perfection and 
priority rules, "negotiability" of the equipment in Example B 
would be diminished after the expiration of the lease. A filing rule 
designed to provide information for Lessee's purchasers and credi-
tors would serve to create additional, long-term clouds on an 
unperfected Lessor's title to the potential detriment of Lessor's 
purchasers and creditors. 135 
In the foregoing discussion of costs that would result from the 
adoption of a filing rule for leases, the applicability of the Article 9 
priority rules was assumed. Some of these costs could be reduced 
by varying the priority rules to fit the special case of leasing. One 
possible variance would serve to reduce the additional lessor costs 
arising out of lessor reliance on the residual interest. 136 The ad-
justed priority rule might provide that an unperfected lessor's 
residual interest would not be subject to claims of lien creditors of 
and purchasers, including secured creditors, from the lessee. The 
lessor 's unperfected interest, then, would result in an unsecured 
claim of the lessor for rentals and other damages attributable to 
the lease term only. This approach would be problematic in several 
respects. First, it would introduce substantial complexity both in 
formulation and operation. 137 Second, even if a conceptually neat 
135. This result might suggest a weakness in Article 9 rather than a reason for not 
imposing a filing requirement or. leases. Arguably, Article 9 should require secured parties 
to be more diligent when filings become seriously misleading. See U.C. C. § 9-402(7) (1987) 
(refiling required only for collateral acquired more than four months after change results in 
seriously misleading financing statement; refi ling not required when collateral transferred by 
debtor). See generally Burke, The Duty To R efile Under Section 9-402(7) of the Revised 
Artil e 9, 35 Bu s. LAw. 1083 (1980). 
136. See supra notes 105-25 and accompanying text. 
137. Assume a lessee of equipment is in default under an unperfected lease and rights 
prior to those of the lessor are asserted by either the lessee 's trustee in bankruptcy or a 
secu red cred itor of the lessee. The trustee or secured creditor may desire to dispose of the 
leased goods. The rule might permit the disposition of only the lessee's leasehold interest, 
but that interest might not be marketable as a practical matter. Or, the rule might permit 
disposition of all interests in the goods accompanied by a vnluation and division of proceeds 
between the trustee or secured creditor (proceeds attributable to the leasehold interest) and 
the lessor (proceeds attributable to the residual interest) . 
Next assume that the lessee is a debtor in possession in a case brought under Chapter 
11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The debtor may desire to continue to use the equipment during 
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rule were to be devised, it would not be fully protective of a les-
sor's residual interest to the extent that a lessor, upon a lessee's 
default, would be deprived of its ability to claim the benefit of its 
residual interest prior to the end of the lease term. 138 Third, such a 
priority rule would not be responsive to the principal rationale that 
most proponents of a lease filing requirement have relied upon: os-
tensible ownership. If the purpose of a lease filing requirement is 
perceived to be the elimination of misleading appearances, a prior-
ity rule that permits third parties to recover less than the full 
value of the goods and respects a lessor's "secret" residual interest 
would not be strictly faithful to that goal. Notwithstanding these 
deficiencies, such a priority rule might be a useful compromise. 
The third party costs illustrated by Example B could be ad-
dressed by requiring a creditor of or a purchaser from a lessee to 
assert its rights in the leased goods against an unperfected lessor 
prior to the expiration of the lease term. Again, such a rule would 
introduce complexity1 39 and would not be fully responsive to osten-
sible ownership concerns. 
One possible modification to the Article 9 priority scheme re-
lates to another cost. The cost of a filing requirement for leases 
would be most harsh in the case of amateur, casual, nonprofes-
sional lessors. Filing might be required only for leases by 
the lease term. Presumably, t he debtor could do so without making any rental payments 
because the lessor is merely an unsecured creditor for purposes of its claim for rents. And, 
presumably, the lessor would be treated as an owner or secured creditor as to its residual 
interest. It is unciear, however, how application of this priority rule (or even the Article 9 
perfection and priority rules, if applied to leases) would mesh with Bankruptcy Code § 365 
in the case of a lessee bankruptcy. Section 365 provides a framework for the assumption or 
rejection of executory contracts and unexpired leases. If the unperfected lessor's interest 
were avoided pursuant to § 544 (a), would the lease nevertheless be treated as a lease for 
purposes of§ 365? Could t he trustee in bankruptcy use or dispose of the leased goods with-
out assuming the lease pursuant to § ::165? Would § 365 overr id e § 544(a)? Cf. In re Air 
Vermont, Inc., 761 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1985) (unperfected secured creditor held entitled to 
protection of Bankruptcy Code § 1110 notwithstanding otherwise applicable avoidance 
power under Bankruptcy Code § 544(a)). But cf. In re Bazen. 425 F. Supp. 1184 (D.S.C. 
1977), aff'd mem., 571 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1978) (lessor's interest not avoidable under Bank-
ruptcy Act § 70, 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1898) (repealed 1978), because lessor complied with 
recording requirement of South Carol ina bailment statute). 
138. T his result might occur if' a lessee-debtor in possession sought to retain use of the 
leased goods during the lease term. S ee supra note 137. 
139. For example, such a rule would necessar ily have to deal with what constitutes 
"assertion." 
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"professional" lessors. 140 Essentially, the Article 9 rules are 
designed for use by professional creditors. 141 Perhaps Article 9 se-
cured transactions involving nonprofessional secured parties are 
quite rare, with the possible exception of possessory pledges. Ex-
tending these rules to casual, nonroutine leasing transactions 
entered into by nonprofessionals, who are unfamiliar with the rules 
and who might not be expected to obtain advice of counsel, could 
impose unreasonable and substantial risks and costs on such 
lessors. 142 
Priority rules applicable to a lease filing requirement also 
might be varied from the Article 9 rules by narrowing and refining 
the class of beneficiaries to those who warrant special protection.143 
This approach would reduce the additional costs that a filing re-
quirement would create by restricting the circumstances in which a 
third party could assert priority. The NCFA proposal provides an 
example. 144 That proposal would eliminate the possibility of a su-
140. This is the approach taken in Saskatchewan, where the filing requirement for 
leases does not apply to "a lease transaction involving a lessor which is not regularly en-
gaged in the business of leasing goods." SASK. STAT. 1979-80, ch. P-6.1, § 2(y); see supra note 
40; cf. Leary, supra note 25, at 1061 & n.2 (proposed filing requirement limited to "finance 
leases") . 
141. This is, no doubt, what the Article 9 drafters had in mind when only sales of 
certain kinds of receivables , accounts and chattel paper, were included within the scope of 
Article 9. S ee 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 10.5, at 309; infra note 330. 
142. It may be that such casual leases are frequent occurrences, even if not usual for 
any particular lessor. The burden of complying with Article 9's public notice requirements 
might impose substantially greater costs for nonprofessionals than the costs imposed on 
professional extenders of credit presently affected by the rules. 
143. See, e.g. , Peden, supra note 46, at 155-58 (explaining that the Article 9 perfection 
rules are "designed to protect" the persons who obtain priority over unperfected security 
interests- i.e., the sanctions flowing from nonperfection reflect the persons intended to be 
protected by perfection) ; cf. U.C.C. § 7-404 (May 1949 Draft) (certain good faith buyers of 
leased equipment, but not lessee's creditors, take fr ee of interest of equipment lessor who 
fails to comply with "sign posting" requirement). 
144. S ee supra text accompanying notes 86-88. The "pure notice" priority rule pro-
posed by Leary would be a more modest variation from the existing Article 9 scheme. S ee 
supra text accompanying notes 55-56. Sanctions for nonfiling or defective filing might be 
devised that would not involve defeating the lessor 's property rights , such as civil or crimi-
nal fi nes for lessors. Or, similar sanctions on lessees who deceive creditors or purchasers 
concerning the status of leased goods could be constructed. Cf. Baird, sup ra note 79, at 61 ; 
Helman, supra note 16, at 31. The sanctions might even be so mild as merely shifting, in all 
cases, the burden of persuasion to an unperfected lessor as to the true lease character of the 
transaction. However, it is generally assumed in this article that the sanctions which would 
be imposed for noncompliance with a filing requirement for leases would impair a lessor's 
property rights as against some class of beneficiari es. 
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perior claim by a lien creditor or trustee in bankruptcy and would 
expose a lessor's interest only to certain secured parties. 
The Code itself provides other possible analogues for priority 
rules that might accompany a filing requirement for leases. One is 
the rule of section 2-403(1) which permits a good faith purchaser 
for value to obtain "good title" to goods purchased from a trans-
feror having only "voidable title" to the goods. 145 Such a purchaser 
need not be a buyer in ordinary course of business, 146 but often 
may be a reliance party that expects the goods to be free of un-
known, conflicting avoidance claims.147 Unsecured creditors, 
including lien creditors, do not benefit directly from the voidable 
title rule of section 2-403(1). 148 
145. See U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1987). A buyer obtains voidable title when, for example, he 
buys goods and induces the sale by fraud. S ee generally R. BROWN, supra note 112, § 9.6, at 
197-202; J. VAINES, PERSON AL PROPERTY 170-72 (4th ed. 1967); 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 
23, § 348, at 348-50; Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE 
LJ. 1057, 1059-60 (1954); Warren, Cutting Off Claims of Ownership Under the Uniform 
Comm ercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 469, 475-78 (1963). 
146. See U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1987) (defining "buyer in ordinary course of business"). 
147. A purchaser who is a buyer normally will be aware that the purchase is being 
made, and a buyer's reliance, by virtue of the voidable title rule of§ 2-403(1), presumably 
will include an element of reliance on the absence of any "secret" avoidance claims held by 
the seller's predecessors in interest. But the degree of reliance by a purchaser will depend on 
the context. A secured creditor of a debtor holding voidable title to goods is a "purchaser" 
that may benefit from the § 2-403(1) rule, even if the secured creditor is claiming under an 
after-acquired property clause in circumstances where the secured creditor has no subjective 
awareness of the particular goods in question. See U.C.C. § 1-201(32) (1987) (defining 
"purchase"); id. § 1-201(33) (defining "purchaser"); see also Shell Oil Co. v. Mills Oil Co., 
717 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Wyoming Nat'! Bank, 505 F.2d 1064 (lOth 
Cir. 1974); Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado Springs Nat'! Bank, 184 Colo. 166, 519 P .2d 
354 (1974) (en bane); Swets Motor Sales, Inc. v. Pruisner, 236 N.W.2d 299 (Iowa 1975). Any 
"reliance" by such a secured creditor might be only a general expectation as to rights to be 
obtained in after-acquired collateral. 
In the absence of the voidable title rule, disgruntled sellers might be encouraged to cry 
"fraud" in the face of conflicting claims of good faith purchasers, thereby creating difficult 
factual issues and, perhaps, facilitating straw grasping, strike suits, and even perjury. How-
ever, in priority contests between lessors and good faith purchasers from lessees, it is likely 
that lessors generally would possess more verifiable and concrete evidence (i.e., the leasing 
contract) that would demonstrate that the lessee obtained the goods under a lease rather 
than as a buyer. 
148. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(32) (1987) (defining "purchase"); id. § 1-201(33) (defining 
"purchaser"); id. § 2-403(1) (one with voidable title can transfer good title to good faith 
purchaser for value). Because the interest in property obtained by a lien creditor does not 
arise out of a voluntary transaction (at least on the part of the debtor-transferor), a lien 
creditor is not a purchaser. !d.; see id. § 9-301(3) (defining " lien creditor"); see also Mazer v. 
Williams Bros., 337 A.2d 559 (Pa. 1975). 
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Another potential analogue is provided by the entrustment 
rule of section 2-403(2). An "entrusting of possession of goods to a 
merchant who deals in goods of that kind" empowers the merchant 
"to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course 
of business."149 The beneficiaries of section 2-403(2) represent a 
still more limited class-buyers in ordinary course of busi-
ness-than the beneficiaries of the voidable title rule of section 2-
403(1) or the beneficiaries of nonperfection under the Article 9 
rules. 
A consideration and comparison of these analogues may reveal 
which, if any, might offer an appropriate model for the effect of 
nonperfection under a filing rule for leases. Although the spectrum 
presented by the Article 9 rules, the voidable title rule and the 
entrustment rule reveals an increasingly narrowing universe of 
beneficiaries, the impact and significance of the interests that are 
cut off by third parties, and the consequences to the party that is 
deprived of its interest, reveal an opposite pattern. 150 It also ap-
pears that the progression from the Article 9 rules to the voidable 
title rule to the entrustment rule illustrates an increasingly signifi-
cant role of possession of goods. 151 
149. U.C.C. § 2-403(2) & (3) (1987). See generally R. BROWN, supra note 112, § 9.7, at 
202-06; Leary & Sperling, The Outer Limits of Entrusting, 35 ARK. L. REv. 50 (1981). 
150. The unperfected secured creditor loses only its collateral in the context of a 
credit transaction in which the collateral often may not be the primary anticipated source of 
repayment. See supra notes 114-25 and accompanying text. Although the transferor of a 
voidable title loses its rights in the goods as against a good faith purchaser for value from 
the transferee , such a transferor nevertheless intends to sell the goods to the transferee and, 
presumably, often delivers to the transferee the goods together with documentary evidence 
of such transferee's acquisition of title. Such transferors normally do not expect to retain 
any interest in the goods after the transfer is consummated. Moreover, the entruster to a 
merchant loses its rights to a buyer in ordinary course of business even though it contem-
plated only a temporary bailment for safekeeping, repair, or the like and, presumably, 
provides the merchant with no documentary evidence of title. 
151. The unperfected secured creditor, who has not filed , taken possession of the 
goods, or notified a third party bailee of its security interest, see U.C.C. § 9-305 (1987), will 
be subordinated to third parties whether or not the debtor is in possession of the goods. 
Although the transferee of a voidable title will not necessarily be in possession of goods and 
the good faith purchaser from such a transferee need not take possession in order to benefit 
from the rule of § 2-403(1) (delivery of goods is not an essential element of a "purchase" 
under § 1-201(32)), the transferee of the voidable title usually would be in possession of the 
goods and the good faith purchaser who is a buyer usually would take possession. Cf. id. § 9-
301(1)(c). Finally, the applicability of the entrustment rule of§ 2-403(2) depends entirely on 
the possession entrusted to a merchant. 
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It is true that no filing regime is provided under current law to 
protect the defrauded seller from the holder of voidable title or the 
entruster from the merchant dealer. Yet, there is no reason why 
the drafters of a filing requirement for leases could not consider 
these non-Article 9 property rules in the context of determining 
the appropriate beneficiaries of such a filing requirement. A com-
parison of these priority rules (the Article 9 rules, the section 2-
403(1) voidable title rule, and the section 2-403(2) entrustment 
rule) suggests an important point: The different protected classes 
or beneficiaries of these rules and the different circumstances in 
which the rules operate indicate an attempt to adjust the results 
(i.e., subordinating or cutting off the rights of one party in favor of 
another party) to the particular circumstances and contexts in-
volved. u;z Whether analyzed in terminology and by methodology 
intended to estimate costs and benefits or efficiency, to determine 
which of two innocent parties is best situated to withstand or pro-
tect against the risks, or to allocate risks based on normative 
notions of fairness, such rules reflect an effort to match the sanc-
tions with the circumstances. This crucial exercise has been given 
scant attention by the proponents of a filing rule for leases. 153 The 
mere demonstration that a filing requirement for leases of goods 
would be useful does not necessarily lead to the conclusion or as-
152. Baird and Jackson have argued that the first-in-time principle should not be 
modified to incorporate an actual reliance standard. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 79, at 
318-20. Yet, they apparently believe that reliance by a protected class is a central compo-
nent of an appropriate priority rule, even if it is not applied on a case-by-case basis. See 
Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 208 n.96. The protected cla.ss that would benefit from 
lessor nonperfection might be limited to those who would normally be expected to rely on 
the absence of public notice and/or a lessee's possession of goods. See generally Dolan, Th e 
UC.C. Framework: Conveya ncing Principles and Property Int erests, 59 B.U.L. REv. 811 
(1979) (discussing the Code as a "single construct resting on four basic property interests 
and three basic conveyancing principles"). 
153. Any such consideration must take into account the relationship between the de-
sired function of a filing rule and the parties that vmuld benefit from compliance or 
noncompliance as well as the costs and benefits arising out of its application. Baird and 
Jackson have art iculated the point well in the context of consider ing what separations of 
ownership and possession should be excluded from a filing requirement: "As in other com-
mercial law problems, one may have to balance the virtues of clear rules against those of 
flexible standards as well as balance competing equities of two innocent parties." Baird & 
Jackson, supra note 10, at 194. It is not sufficient to stop with a considerat ion of candidates 
for exclusion from the rule. The effects of nonfiling in transactions subject to a filing rule 
also must be considered. 
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sumption that the Article 9 priority rules would be equally 
appropriate for leases. 
Finally, any perceived virtues of tailoring priority rules to the 
particular context of leasing transactions should be balanced 
against the inherent costs of special rules for leases. Some com-
mentators have argued that requiring filing for leases would reduce 
the need to grapple with the troublesome true lease-security inter-
est issue. 154 To the extent that special priority rules for leases, 
whether perfected or unperfected, were adopted, this goal would be 
undercut. For example, if the NCF A proposaP~>~> were adopted, a 
trustee in bankruptcy would remain motivated to attempt to char-
acterize a lease as a secured transaction whenever the equipment is 
not completely encumbered by a valid, prior security interest. 1 ~> 6 
More generally, in many cases it would be necessary to make the 
true lease-security interest determination in order to know which 
priority rule would apply. 167 
The discussion in this Part provides some of the responses to 
the challenge posed by Baird and Jackson-that critics of a filing 
rule for leases ought to explain why filing nevertheless should be 
imposed for secured transactions. 1 ~> 8 Depending on the applicable 
priority rules, there may be costs imposed by a filing requirement 
for leases that are of a different character and that exceed those 
which result in the case of secured transactions. It is not sufficient 
simply to note that in each case there is a separation of possession 
and property rights. However, other important distinctions lie not 
in the relative costs, but in the relative benefits. 
154. See supra note 130. 
155. See supra notes 86-88, 144. 
156. Unless t he putative lease were so recast, the trustee could not recover the "eq-
uity" in the leased goods under the NCFA proposal, which would provide only a limited 
benefit for certain secured creditors. 
157. Although the examples deal with nonfiling or defective filing, the structure of a 
priority scheme dealing with proper fi lings also could undercut the goal of simplification if 
the ru les applied to leases differed from those applied to security interest. Moreover, even if 
the Article 9 priority rules, without change, were applied to a lease filing requirement, the 
true lease-security interest issue would not go away. See supra note 130 and accompanying 
text (necessity of true lease-security interest characterization for purposes of determining 
amount of unperfected lessor's claim). The true lease-security interest distinction also would 
continue to play a role in many other contexts unrelated to perfection and priority. See 
supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
158. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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V. "OsTENSIBLE OwNERSHIP" AND THE ARTICLE 9 FILING REGIME 
This Part of the article explains that a filing requirement for 
leases would provide smaller and fewer benefits than are provided 
by the filing requirements of the Article 9 perfection and priority 
regime. It addresses some history and endeavors to explain some of 
the mystery and expose some of the myths surrounding the doc-
trine of ostensible ownership and the Article 9 filing rules. 
Subpart A explains that t he historical development of chattel 
security public notice systems and the doctrine of ostensible own-
ership provide little, if any, support for the imposition of a filing 
requirement for leases of goods. Subpart B explains that the bene-
fits of the Article 9 filing rules are not limited to curing problems 
of ostensible ownership. Rather, filing under Article 9 enhances the 
benefits of secured credit by providing readily available informa-
tion necessary to the ordering of priorities, generally on a first-in-
time basis. Filing provides this information in a manner that is less 
costly than other alternatives and is verifiable and certain as to 
time, thus discouraging fraud and collusion. These functions of fil-
ing are less significant, and therefore provide less benefit, in the 
case of leases. Subpart C explains why the existing public notice 
requirements for certain non-security transactions-consignments 
and sales of accounts and chattel paper-are not apt analogues for 
imposing a filing requirement on leases. Finally, Subpart D ad-
dresses the special case of sale-leaseback transactions. 
A. History, M ystery , and M y th 
Proponents of a filing requirement for leases consistently have 
relied on the doctrine of ostensible ownership as t he principal pol-
icy justification for such a rule. 1 59 When a lessor puts a lessee in 
possession160 of goods, the argument goes, the lessee's possession 
creates the appearance of ownership by the lessee and may mislead 
159. See generally supra P ar t III. 
160. What const it utes possession for purposes of any part icular legal rule is, itself, a 
di ffic ult enough issue. See, e.g., 1 G. GI LMORE , supra note 23, § 14.2 , at 440-4 1; Shartel, 
M ea nings of Possess ion , 16 MINN L. REv. 611 (1932); T ay, T he Co ncept of Possession in the 
Com mon Law: Foundat ions for a New A pproach, 4 M ELB. U.L. REv 476 (1 964); Thayer , 
Possess ion and Ownership, 23 L AW Q. REv. 175 (1907 ); T hayer , Possession, 18 HARV. L. REv. 
196 (1905). For present purposes, it is assumed that possession is somethi ng upon which all 
would agree. 
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third party creditors and purchasers, including secured creditors. 
Therefore, the lessor should be required to cure this ostensible 
ownership problem by giving notice (i.e., filing) of its otherwise se-
cret interest at the pain of having its interest subordinated to a 
third party upon failure to file. The proponents either explicitly or 
implicitly have assumed or argued that the same policy justifica-
tion underlies the filing and other perfection and priority rules of 
Article 9 and also underlay the development of pre-Code chattel 
security law. This Subpart explores some flaws in these arguments. 
1. Some history: Fraud and filing.-The development of chat-
tel security devices, including related public notice requirements, 
does not clearly reflect an engine fueled by an underlying policy of 
curing perceived problems of ostensible ownership. An adequate 
explication and critique of these historical developments would re-
quire, at the least, another article. It is sufficient here to 
demonstrate only that the "history" reflects an essentially ambiva-
lent, inconsistent approach and is not likely to offer a clear signal 
as to the wisdom of adopting a filing requirement for leases. 161 
The common thread running through the development of 
chattel security law was a pervasive judicial and legislative concern 
about fraud. This fraud concern is separable from the ostensible 
ownership concern that possession of personal property begets mis-
leading appearances of ownership upon which creditors and 
purchasers may rely. Unfortunately, the failure of many courts and 
commentators to make this distinction has led to much confusion 
and mystery. For example, the so-called "vendor-in-possession" 
doctrine, epitomized by the celebrated Twyne's Case/62 often has 
161. This is not to say that the history is irrelevant or that it does not offer valuable 
insight as well as support for arguments on both sides of the issue. The value of such insight 
would depend on the " history" to be considered and the intensity of the study. For a criti-
cism of most legal scholarship because of its failure to come to grips with critical 
historicism, see Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017 (1981). The 
following brief glance at the history succumbs to much of Gordon's critique. It mentions 
mostly reported judicial decisions and legal commentary and omits consideration of other 
evidence which might bear on the relevant social conditions or contexts. S ee id. at 1034-35 
& n.65. Other commentators who have addressed the issue of a filing requirement for leases 
are vu lnerable to the same criticism. 
162. 3 Coke 80b , 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Ch. 1601). The case was based on the Statute 
of 13 Elizabeth which provided that transfers with the "intent[] to delay, hinder or defraud 
creditors and others" were void , provided for recovery of the "whole value of ... goods and 
chattels" transfered, to be shared by the Crown and aggrieved parties (such as creditors) , 
and provided for criminal sanctions against the parties to the transfer. 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1570). 
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been associated closely with the development of chattel security 
law generally, including the evolution of systems of public filing or 
recordation. 163 The rule, as it has developed, may be stated simply 
to require that when A transfers an interest in A's property which 
is in A's possession, but A nevertheless retains possession of the 
property, the transfer is, or is presumed to be, fraudulent and void 
as against A's creditors and purchasers. 164 Curiously, Twyne's Case 
often is accepted as a principal source of the doctrine of ostensible 
ownership. 165 As others have pointed out, Twyne's Case was a 
criminal action involving imputed fraud, not ostensible owner-
ship.166 Although the transfer was made "pending the writ"167 of 
The statute was intended in large part as a revenue measure. 1 G. Gu::·m, FRAUDULENT CoN-
VEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §§ 61b, 61c, at 89-93 (rev. ed. 1940). It has been observed that 
Twyne 's Case, "inextricably mixed though it may be with Lord Coke's gloss, has become 
practically a part of the statute itself." A. ELKUS & G. GLENN, A TREATISE ON SECRET LIENS 
AND REPUTED OwNERSHIP 3 (1910). 
163. See, e.g., 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 2.1, at 24-25, § 2.5, at 40-41, § 14.1, at 
438-39, § 15.1, at 462-63; see also G. GLENN, supra note 162, §§ 350-53, at 609-11; 2 L. JoNES, 
supra note 23, §§ 324-26, at 10-13. English law took a more direct approach. The English 
Bills of Sale Acts sought to avoid disputes as to fraudulent intentions of vendors who re-
mained in possession by requiring public recordation of outright sales as well as security 
sales (i.e., mortgages) . See Diamond, Hire-Purcha se Agreements as Bills of Sale (pt. 1) , 23 
Moo. L. REv. 399 (1960). 
164. The statement in the text fails to consider various issues considered by courts 
and legislatures over the years, such as the effect of goods being in the possession of a third 
party bailee rather than the transferor, and whether subsequent creditors are enti tled to 
benefit from the rule. For an excellent modern treatment of the "vendor-in-possess ion" doc-
trine, see 1 G. GLENN, supra note 162, §§ 341-63, at 591-624; see also A. ELKUS & G. GLENN, 
supra note 162, §§ 1-118, at 1-85; 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 23, §§ 351-404, at 364-502; 
Coogan, supra note 24, § 4A.07A[1], at 4A-182 to -192. 
165. 
The thesis of the statute [of 13 Elizabeth, ch. 5] ... is that the possession of property 
is a good indication of ownership .... Twy ne's case judicially established the 
proposition. 
As the possession of property is, to the judicial mind a fair indication of its own-
ership, it is equally true, as a proposition founded upon human experience, that the 
possession of property presumptively begets credit. 
A. ELKUS & G. GLENN, supra note 162, §§ 6, 9, at 3, 5 (footnote omitted). 
166. See Dolan, supra note 16, at 30-33 (arguing that rule of Twyne's Case grounded 
in fraud rather than ostensible ownership concerns); see also Clark, The Duties of a Corpo-
rate Debtor to its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REv. 505, 514 (1977) (Twyne's Case may be 
characterized as one "which involved actual, detrimental deception"); Dolan, supra note 
152, at 819 ("Twyne itself rests not on ostensible ownership reasoning , but rather applies 
absent any showing of reliance. Twyne protects the concept of conveyancing by refusing to 
divorce it completely from notions of possession or seisin."). Twyne, the transferee , was 
convicted because there was found to exist an intent "to delay, hinder or defraud creditors." 
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another creditor of Pierce, the transferor who remained in posses-
sion, that creditor in no way was misled by the transfer and 
Pierce's continued possession. 168 The court simply did not believe 
that the transfer was legitimate and executed in good faith. 169 
Some of the confusion and imprecision surrounding the nexus 
between ostensible ownership concerns and antifraud concerns in 
the context of the vendor-in-possession doctrine is traceable to the 
"reputed ownership" provision, which was enacted as part of the 
English bankruptcy law. 170 Garrard Glenn explained that the rela-
tionship between the reputed ownership doctrine, which never was 
widely adopted by statute in the United States, and the avoidance 
of fraudulent conveyances based on the vendor-in-possession doc-
trine, is grounded in estoppel. 171 Yet, some examples of how the 
vendor-in-possession doctrine was applied by the courts indicate 
that the doctrine's relation to notions of reputed (i.e., ostensible) 
ownership is not as direct as Glenn perceived. First, in a majority 
of the states the effect of a seller's retention of possession is merely 
3 Coke at S2a, 76 Eng. Rep. at S16. Indeed, the transfer in question was made to Twyne in 
satisfaction of a valid claim of Twyne against Pierce, the transferor, "pending the writ" of 
another creditor. 3 Coke at SOb, 76 Eng. Rep. at S11. Pierce's retention of the property 
transferred was only one of six badges of fraud relied upon by the court. That the transfer 
was made "in secret" and was "general" appeared to be of no less concern to the court than 
Pierce's retention of possession. 3 Coke at SOb, 76 Eng. Rep. at S10-11. 
167. 3 Coke at SOb, 76 Eng. Rep. at S11. 
16S. The same can be said of an early and important case adopting the rule of 
Twyne's Case in the United States. Sturtevant v. Ballard, 9 Johns. 337 (N.Y. 1812). 
169. Steven Harris, noting the generality of the transfer condemned by the court, has 
made the point to the author as follows: "The court simply refused to believe that Pierce 
had transferred his underwear to Twyne." Telephone interview with Steven Harris, Profes-
sor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law (June 22, 1987). 
170. 21 Jac. I, ch. 19, § 11 (1623). That provision, carried forward in later enactments, 
provided generally that goods in the possession of a bankrupt would be available for the 
satisfaction of creditors' claims. The reputed ownership rule never was a part of the English 
Companies Acts which govern most business insolvencies. Moreover, the most recent version 
of the English reputed ownership provision, § 38(2)(c) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1914, has 
been repealed by the Insolvency Act 1985, on the basis that the doctrine has become obso-
lete. 2 Eliz., ch. 65, § 235(3), sched. 10, pt. III ( 1985); see A Revised Framework for 
Insolvency Law, 1984, Cmnd. No. 9175, at 40: Insolvency Law and Practice, 19S2, Cmnd. 
No. 855S, at 248-50. For a discussion of the relationship of the reputed ownership and 
fraudulent conveyance aspects of the vendor-in-possession doctrine, see 1 G. GLENN, supra 
note 162, §§ 344-63, at 602-24. 
171. 1 G GLENN, supra note 162, §§ 346-48, at 606-07. Thus, present creditors may 
forbear from pursuing their claims and subsequent creditors may extend credit "on the faith 
of the vendor's apparent ownership." ld. § 347, at 606; see also A. ELKUS & G. GLENN, supra 
note 162, § 12, at 8-9 (quoting Todd v. Nelson, 109 N.Y . 316, 327, 16 N.E. 360, 364 (1S88)). 
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evidence of, or creates only a rebuttable presumption of, fraud. 172 
Where an inference of fraud can be satisfactorily explained away, 
the retention of possession is not fraudulent even though the os-
tensible ownership concerns would be the same in either case. 
Second, it generally was held that a vendee, who takes possession 
of the goods prior to the time the goods are seized by legal process 
instituted by a creditor, will prevail over the creditor. Insofar as 
the vendor-in-possession doctrine is based on notions of reputed 
ownership, Glenn conceded that "[t]he logic of the rule breaks 
down" at this point. 173 Finally, the vendor-in-possession doctrine 
was applied in cases in which the goods were not in the possession 
of the vendor but, rather, were in the possession of a third party 
bailee, with the requirement that the vendee notify the bailee in 
order to defeat subsequently levying creditors.174 Again, this rule, 
or exception, is less than faithful to the ostensible ownership 
rationale. 
172. Writing in 1980, Coogan found only five states in which a seller's retention of 
possession was fraudulent per se. Coogan, supra note 24, § 4A.07A[1][a][i), at 4A-184 to 
-185. One of the states he identified, Oklahoma, repealed its vendor-in-possession statute in 
1986 when it enacted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 6 
(West 1987) (repealed 1986); see also 1 G. GLENN, supra note 162, §§ 351, 354, at 609-12; 2 
L. JONES, supra note 23, §§ 320-21, at 6-8. That a vendor's retention of possession of goods 
is merely evidence of fraud which can be overcome by evidence of good faith has been the 
law in England for many years. See Martindale v. Booth, 3 B. & Ad. 498, 110 Eng. Rep. 180 
(1832). The Code overrides the vendor-in-possession doctrine only to a limited extent and 
otherwise leaves non-Code law intact. See U.C.C. § 2-402(2) (1987) ("retention of possession 
in good faith and current course of trade by a merchant-seller for a commercially reasonable 
time after a sale or identification is not fraudulent"); id. § 2A-308(1) (similar rule); id. § 2A-
308(3) (seller-lessee's retention of possession in sale, for value and in good faith, to buyer-
lessor in sale-leaseback transaction not fraudulent). 
173. 1 G. GLENN, supra note 162, § 349, at 607. Glenn strongly criticized this rule: 
This result seems wholly illogical. ... These subsequent creditors should be enti-
tled to the benefit of the rule of reputed ownership ... 
Nor is there much logic in the reasoning by which the courts attempt to justify 
their rule .... [I]t is a real sale, but it is tainted, from the beginning, by the fact that 
the vendee does not take possession. Thus the ostensible ownership, which is mislead-
ing to creditors. How that can be cured by a last minute snatch on the buyer's part, is 
quite beyond the writer. 
Id. at 608-09 (footnotes omitted). Responses to Glenn's criticism are that the ultimate deliv-
ery by the vendor to the vendee is some evidence of the existence of good faith all along 
(i.e., possession would not be delivered if a transaction were a sham) and, further, when the 
absence of fraud is established, the reputed ownership concerns must give way. 
174. !d. § 358, at 615-16. In the case of a bailee that had issued a non-negotiable 
document of title, the rule was codified in § 34 of the Uniform Sales Act. UNIF. SALES AcT, § 
34, 1 U.L.A. 402 (1906) (superseded). Section 7 -504(2) now contains a similar rule. See 
U.C.C. § 7-504(2) (1987). 
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The common law courts traditionally viewed a transfer for se-
curity purposes, such as a mortgage, as merely one species of sale 
which could be subjected to scrutiny under the vendor-in-posses-
sion doctrine. Claw v. Woods17~ illustrates an early attempt to 
create a nonpossessory chattel mortgage. 176 In that case, a mort-
gage of all of a tanner's equipment and inventory was held 
"fraudulent and void" where the debtor was to remain in posses-
sion, in the absence of default, pursuant to the terms of the 
mortgage. 177 In so ruling, the court recognized the perceived risks 
imposed on creditors by virtue of the debtor's continued appear-
ance of ownership. 178 The debtor's retention of possession and the 
concurrent appearance of ownership, however, was only a part of 
the court's rationale for ruling as it did. 179 The court was con-
cerned, in the main, with the potential for such a transaction to be 
used as a means of deception and as a means to effectuate dishon-
est purposes. 180 The concern was fraud, actual or potential, and not 
175. 5 Serg. & Rawle 275 (Pa. 1819). 
176. Chattel mortgages eventually were legitimated in the United States by statutes, 
enacted in most states during the nineteenth century, that generally required public filing or 
recordation as a condition to validation. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, §§ 2.1-.2, at 25-26. 
The common law pledge was not so burdened by the fraud concerns because an essential 
component of the pledge was the bailment (i.e., delivery) of the pledged property to the 
pledgee, which reduced both the fraud and ostensible ownership concerns. See, e.g., J. 
STORY, supra note 21, §§ 286, 297, at 265-66; see also 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 14.4, at 
445-49 (discussing "equitable pledge"). For discussions of the distinction between the pledge 
and the chattel mortgage at common law, see 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 1.1, at 5-91; L. 
JoNES, supra note 23, § 4, at 10-12. 
177. Claw, 5 Serg. & Rawle. at 288. The court relied on the rule of the Statute of 13 
Elizabeth. Id. at 278, 288. See generally supra note 162. 
178. "In every case where possession is not given, the parties must leave nothing un-
performed, within the compass of their power, to secure third persons from the 
consequences of the apparent ownership of the vendor." Claw, 5 Serg. & Rawle at 282 (Gib-
son, J.) (emphasis in original). "There is no way of coming at the knowledge of who is the 
owner of goods, but by seeing in whose possession they are." Id. at 284 (Duncan, J.). 
179. Much emphasis also was placed on the absence of any attempt to do what was 
possible to effect a delivery of possession to the mortgagee, such as a symbolic delivery, id. 
at 281-82 (Gibson, J.); id. at 284-86 (Duncan, J.); the generality of the conveyance of all of 
the debtors stock in trade, including the failure to include a specific inventory, id. at 282 
(Gibson, J.); id. at 286-87 (Duncan, J.); and the absence of any good reason, aside from the 
parties' convenience, for the debtor's retention of possession, id. at 279, 281-82 (Gibson, J.J; 
id. at 285 (Duncan, J.). 
180. Id. at 282 (Gibson, J.) ("I do not suppose the parties had in fact a fraudulent 
view, but as such a transaction might be turned to a dishonest use, it was their duty, as far 
as in their power, to secure the public against it."). It is interesting that the court appeared 
to bless an alternative structure whereby the mortgagee would have purchased the goods at 
the outset and leased them to the mortgagor: 
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merely an estoppel-like reliance on the debtor's ostensible 
ownership.181 
The common law treatment of the conditional sale, unlike that 
afforded the chattel mortgage, demonstrated tolerance for the sep-
aration of possession and ownership. 182 At common law, the 
conditional seller's rights in the goods generally were held to be 
valid as against creditors of and purchasers from the conditional 
buyer in possession.183 That result is difficult to reconcile with the 
notion that the common law abhored "secret liens" and sought to 
protect third parties from the risks of misleading appearances. 184 
The object of the parties might have been attained without any (at least with less) 
risque to the public, by the landlord himself becoming the purchw;er in the first in-
stance, and permitting the tenant to have the use of the property: in which case, the 
transaction would have been a safe and fair one; and that course should have been 
pursued. 
!d. at 280 (Gibson, J.). Baird and Jackson suggest that perhaps "Justice Gibson, in 1819, 
could imagine a world without nonpossessory security interests, but he could not imagine a 
world without personal property leases." D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON. SECURITY INTERESTS IN 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 30 (2d ed. 1987). Their suggestion is plausible, although we will never 
know exactly what kind of world Justice Gibson might have imagined. It is clear enough, 
however, that because the outward appearances would be the same in the case of either the 
lease or the mortgage approach, what was perceived as "fair" and "safe," as opposed to a 
"fraud," turned on some considerations other than mere concern for the possessor's ostensi-
ble ownership. Had the possessor first acquired possession as a bailee (i.e., lessee), no issue 
of converting assets available to creditors into assets unavailable to creditors ever would 
have arisen. The appearance would have been the same, but the potential for defrauding 
creditors out of something to which they were otherwise entitled would not have existed. 
181. This judicial hostility and mistrust of nonpossessory chattel security arrange-
ments was not particularly slowed by the enactment of the chattel mortgage statutes, 
notwithstanding provisions for public filing in those statutes. S'ee supra note 176. The 
courts generally construed the statutes as strictly as possible against the mortgagees; chattel 
mortgages continued to be viewed as fraudulent conveyances. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 
23, § 2.2, at 26-27. The unfriendly reception by the courts was exemplified as well by the 
failure of many courts to give effect to after-acquired property provisions, especially those 
arrangements which left a debtor free to deal with its mortgaged stock in trade. See gener-
ally id. §§ 2.3-2.6, at 27-47. 
182. The conditional sale was an arrangement that evolved into a financing device in 
which the conditional seller of goods retained (reserved) title until the conditional buyer 
paid the purchase price, notwithstanding delivery of the goods to the conditional buyer. For 
discussions of the development of the conditional sale in theory and practice, see generally 1 
G. GILMORE, supra note 23, §§ 3.1-3.3, at 62-73; 2 G. GLENN, supra note 162, §§ 506a-515, at 
869-91; 3 L. JoNES, supra note 23, §§ 900-08, at 1-14. 
183. 3 L. JONES, supra note 23, § 1004, at 107; 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 23, §§ 324, 
326, at 265-68, 270-73. 
184. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 3.2, at 67 (" [T]he result achieved by condi-
tional sale theory ran directly counter to one of the most firmly rooted doctrines of the 
common law: the protection of creditors against undisclosed interests in property."). 
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Yet, from the standpoint of concerns arising from the risk of fraud, 
such as that involved in Twyne's Case/ 85 an obvious factual dis-
tinction appears: the conditional sale involved a delivery of goods 
to the conditional buyer, rather than a transfer by an existing 
owner in possession not accompanied by a delivery. 186 During the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the conditional 
sale emerged in the United States as an important secured financ-
ing device, a majority of the states responded legislatively by 
enacting conditional sale acts. 187 These statutes generally required 
some form of public filing or recordation as a condition to a condi-
tional seller's priority over good faith purchasers from and, in most 
cases, creditors of a conditional buyer .188 
185. 3 Coke SOb, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Ch. 1601). 
186. Glenn severely criticized the minority rule championed by Pennsylvania courts 
which subordinated a conditional seller's rights to those of a conditional buyer's creditors 
based on the reasoning of Twyne's Case as applied in mortgage cases such as Clow v. 
Woods, 5 Serg. & Rawle 275 (Pa. 1819). See, e.g., Martin v. Mathiot, 14 Serg. & Rawle 214 
(Pa. 1826). Glenn stated: 
The mistake lies in the idea that the conditional sale is really a sale with a condition 
subsequent, whereas in truth there is no sale at all, but merely a contract to sell. The 
fact that this contract is accompanied by a bailment for use cannot make out a case 
of reputed ownership unless we are to say that every bailment is void against credi-
tors of the bailee. No court in its senses ever said that. 
2 G. GLENN, supra note 162, § 509, at 876. Glenn concluded that the Pennsylvania courts 
were misled by the English Reputed Ownership provision (discussed supra note 168) which 
generally was not embraced in the United States. Id. at 874; see also Harkness v. Russell, 
118 U.S. 663 (1886) (canvassing United States authorities and discussing inapplicability, in 
most, of reputed ownership doctrine derived from English bankruptcy law). Ironically, 
Pennsylvania courts accepted the "bailment lease," a surrogate for the conditional sale 
which was functionally and economically indistinguishible, although no public filing or rec-
ordation requirements were applicable to bailment leases. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, 
§ 3.6, at 77 -78; 2 G. GLENN, supra note 162, § 509, at 875-76; Montgomery, The Pennsylva-
nia Bailment Lease, 79 U PA. L. REv. 920 (1931). 
187. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 3.2, at 67-68; 3 L. JoNES, supra note 23, § 1004, at 
107-08. 
188. See, e.g., UNIF. CoNDITIONAL SALES AcT § 5, 2 U.L.A. 6-9 (1918) (superseded). It 
has generally been accepted that the principal motivation for such public notice require-
ments was the protection of innocent purchasers and creditors from reliance on the 
conditional buyer's apparent ownership. See UNIF. CoNDITIONAL SALES AcT § 5 Commission-
ers' Note, 2 U.L.A. 7 (1918) (superseded) ("To prevent injury to innocent persons who may 
rely on the buyer's apparent ownership, it seems desirable to insert this filing requirement 
in the Uniform Act. The burden on the seller is slight, and the benefit to the public is 
great."); see also 3 L. JoNES, supra note 23, § 1004, at 107. But Gilmore's observation best 
captures this development: "Now that the conditional sale was being used as a security 
device, it should be treated like a security device. That is to say, it should be treated like a 
chattel mortgage." 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 3.3, at 68. 
I 
( 
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Judicial concerns about fraud were not limited to security de-
vices relating to goods, such as chattel mortgages and conditional 
sales. Benedict v. Ratner189 exemplified judicial hostility to secur-
ity devices and the continued significance of fraud (unrelated to 
ostensible ownership concerns). Benedict involved a financing ar-
rangement whereunder a debtor-assignor assigned its present and 
future accounts receivable to a lender-assignee to secure advances 
made by the lender-assignee. 190 The account debtors were not noti-
fied of the assignment, and the debtor-assignor was permitted to 
use collections of proceeds of the receivables in the usual course of 
its business without accounting for the collections to the lender-
assignee.191 Justice Brandeis, speaking for a unanimous Court, held 
the arrangement to be "fraudulent in law and void" under New 
York law. 192 According to the Court, this result was dictated by the 
failure of the lender-assignee to reserve and exercise dominion over 
the assigned accounts consistent with an assignment. 193 The fraud-
ulent nature of allowing the debtor unfettered and unpoliced 
dominion over its receivables was considered to be inherent, as it 
had been viewed in decisions relating to chattel mortgages covering 
a debtor 's stock in trade. 194 The opinion expressly eschewed reli-
ance on the concept of ostensible ownership. 195 Certainly, the fraud 
In England a different tack was taken. The Factors Act, 1889, was interpreted to permit 
innocent good faith purchasers to obtain good title from a conditional buyer. Factors Act, 
1889, 52 & 53 Viet., ch. 45, § 9; see Lee v. Butler, 2 Q.B. 318 (1893). The hire-purchase 
transaction, which was not subjected to the rule of the Factors Act, thus emerged as the 
English functional equivalent of the conditional sale which flourished in the United States. 
See Helby v. Matthews, 1895 A.C . 471 (P.C.). See generally R. GooDE & J. ZIEGEL, HIRE-
PuRCHASE AND CoNDITIONAL SALE 9-11 (1965); A. GuEST, THE LAw OF HIRE PuRCHASE 15-16 
(1966). 
189. 268 U.S. 353 (1925). 
190. Benedict, 268 U.S. at 357-58. 
191. Jd. at 359. The eventual emergence of " non-notification" accounts receivable fi-
nancing was influenced by Benedict, which was decided prior to the widespread use of such 
financing. See generally 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, cbs. 7 & 8. 
192. Benedict, 268 U.S. at 360. 
193. I d. at 361-64. 
194. Jd. at 362-63; see Gilmore, supra note 99, at 622-23 (criticizing the Court's appli-
cation of authorities relating to chattel mortgages on stock in trade to the assignment of 
receivables). 
195. Benedict, 268 U.S. at 262-63. 
[I]t is not true that the rule .. . is either based upon or delimited by the doctrine of 
ostensible ownership. It rests not upon seeming ownership because of possession re-
tained, but upon a lack of ownership because of dominion reserved. It does not raise a 
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concerns involving inherently unobservable intangibles were unre-
lated to misleading appearances, or ostensible ownership. 
The legislative approach to accounts receivable financing 
demonstrated most clearly that the purpose of public notice (i.e., 
filing) requirements was not limited to the ostensible ownership ra-
tionale. During the 1940s and 1950s most states enacted accounts 
receivable statutes. 196 Notwithstanding much controversy and de-
bate, eventually most of these statutes required public notice by 
filing as a condition for protection against subsequent assignees 
and creditors of the assignor. 197 But, it could not be clearer that 
the doctrine of ostensible ownership was not applicable to inher-
ently unobservable intangibles. Other benefits, or the elimination 
of other perceived evils, were at the root of arguments in favor of a 
filing requirement for assignments of these intangibles. Gilmore at-
tributes the eventual adoption of such filing requirements to the 
reassertion of "the traditional bias in favor of publicity and against 
'secret liens.' " 198 
presumption of fraud. It imputes fraud conslusively because of the reservation of do-
minion inconsistent with the effective disposition of title and creation of a lien. 
!d.; see also 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 8.4, at 262 ("[I]t was entirely clear that 'secrecy' 
was not a determinitive factor in the case."). 
Although the rule of Benedict was widely followed and non-notification receivables 
financers apparently learned to live with it, it was rejected by Article 9. See U.C.C. § 9-205 
comment 1 (1987); see also 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 8.5, at 265-71. Gilmore later 
criticized the approach taken in Article 9 and defended the policy justifications (if not the 
jurisprudential approach) for the result in Benedict. Gilmore, supra note 99, at 625-27. 
196. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 8.6, at 271. See generally id. § 8.6-8.8, at 274-
86. The principal impetus for such enactment was the decision of the Supreme Court in 
Corn Exch. Nat'! Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943), which, in the absence of 
such curative statutes, left non-notification accounts financing vulnerable in bankruptcy 
proceedings of a debtor-assignor under the common law of most states. See 1 G. GILMORE, 
supra note 23, § 8.6, at 271-74. The holding of Klauder exposed non-notification accounts 
financing to invalidation as a voidable preference under § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act which, 
at the time, deemed a transfer to occur at the time it was so far perfected so as to be 
superior to a good faith purchaser from the assignor-debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1898) (re-
pealed 1950). Thus, the assignments were vulnerable in states which adhered to the rule 
that a subsequent assignee would take priority over a previous assignee who had not notified 
the account debtor of the assignment. 
197. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 8.7, at 274-76. For an argument that public 
notice requirements should not be extended to assignments of accounts receivable and trust 
receipt financings, see Hanna, The Extension of Public Recordation, 31 CoLUM. L. REV. 617 
(1931). 
198. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 8.7, at 275. For the most part the statutes were 
drafted so as to encompass only the types of business receivables which typically served as 
collateral for the extension of business credit. I d. at 276-78. The common law rules dealing 
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The foregoing indicates that much of the judicial hostility di-
rected toward nonpossessory security interests was rooted in 
concerns about fraud. 199 It also shows that filing requirements were 
intended to address problems, including fraud, other than then-
perceived ostensible ownership, resulting from nonpossessory se-
curity devices. 200 Even the early pre-Code filing systems were not 
well-designed to address ostensible ownership concerns.201 The Ar-
ticle 9 filing requirements also serve purposes other than reducing 
concerns about ostensible ownership. 202 
with assignments of other choses in action were essentially left in place; public notice by 
means such as filing was not generally required. I d. at 277-78. Some courts held that the 
enactment of accounts receivable statutes effectively overruled Benedict u. Ratner. !d. § 8.8, 
at 281 -86. 
199. The reference to "fraud" is intended to include the distrust and suspicion of the 
motives of the parties , and the fear that such devices could be used to obtain unfair advan-
tages over other creditors. See Clark, supra note 166, at 506-17 (discussing fraudulent 
conveyances in terms of principles of "Truth, Respect and Evenhandedness" and the con-
nection between the "Evenhandedness" principle with the law of voidable preferences in 
bankruptcy). 
200. Glenn made the point well in the related context of recording acts for sales 
transactions: 
One thing which Coke recommended ... was publicity, and so it was felt in 
England, and in some of our States, that there must be a hard and fast method of 
settling at the outset the question whether there was good reason for the transaction 
taking the form which it did , or whether in truth it was a mere sham. In that way 
belated explanations, after thoughts, and perjury, would be avoided. Thus come the 
recording acts relating to the sale of goods. They were intended to provide a modern 
substitute for the notoriety which Coke advised in Twyne 's Case. 
1 G. GLENN, supra note 162, § 352, at 610 (footnotes omitted); see 2 G. GLENN, supra note 
162, § 497, at 853. 
Under the registry laws the filin g or recording of a mortgage has the same effect as a 
delivery of the property in relieving the mortgagee of the onus of proving the honesty 
and good faith of the transaction. Either of these acts is sufficient to compel anyone 
assailing the mortgage to prove affirmatively that it is fraudulent in fact . 
2 L. JoNES, supra note 23, §§ 329, at 15 (footnotes omitted); see also Harris, supra note 124, 
at 190-94. 
201. See Baird, supra note 79, at 48: 
[T]he nineteenth-century filing systems did little to address the ostensible ownership 
problem, the costs that arise when parties divide ownership interests in personal 
property. Secured parties . .. had to engage in elaborate and complicated filing rituals 
that not only were costly .. . but often did not provide ... information about the 
prospective debtor 's assets at low cos t, because [third parties often] could not easily 
determine which filing system he had to check. 
Baird's description is consistent with the argument that the filing systems to which he refers 
were, essentially, grounded in the rebuttal of fraud rather than solving problems of ostensi-
ble ownership. See Hanna, supra note 197, at 622. 
202. See infra Part V.B. 
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Gilmore sumed it up best with his observation that "(i]n the 
history of our security law there has been one constant factor: 
whenever a common law device has been covered by a statute, 
some form of public recordation or filing has been required as a 
condition of perfection of the security interest. "203 Yet, some of the 
drafters of Article 9 thought that filing ought to be abandoned. 204 
Moreover, Gilmore's statement is as striking for its narrowness as 
for its breadth. It addresses only statutory treatment of security 
devices. Certainly it does not encompass the survival of nemo dat 
guod non habet (one cannot give what one does not have) 205 under 
the common law and under the Code. 206 
203. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 8.7, at 274. Pre-Code public notice requirements 
have been mentioned in connection with chattel mortgages, see supra note 176, conditional 
sales, see supra notes 187-88, and accounts receivable, see supra notes 196-97. Other pre-
Code chattel security devices also were subject to some form of public notice requirement. 
For example: 
(1) Traders' Acts. See generally Burns, supra note 26, at 436-37; Skilton, The Factor's 
Lien on Merchandise, 1955 WIS. L. REV. 356. 
(2) Factor 's Lien Acts. See generally 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, §§ 5.3-5.6, at 133-
45. 
(3) Trust Receipts. UNIF. TRUST RECEIPTS AcT § 13, 9 U.L.A. 263-65 (1933) (super-
seded). See generally 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, §§ 4.4-4.11, at 99-124. 
204. Early in the process the Article 9 Reporters proposed that filing systems be 
scrapped in favor of imposing a duty on secured creditors to ensure that debtors' financial 
statements fully disclosed their security interests. This proposal was abandoned because of 
opposition by secured creditors who apparently realized that a unified , simplified notice 
filing system would provide them with more protection. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 15.1, 
at 463-65. 
205. See, e.g., J. VAINES, supra note 145, at 153-55; 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 23, § 
311, at 241-42; see also 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 7.10, at 229 n.1 ("It appears to have 
become fashionable to quote the rule in one of its Latin versions only in the nineteenth 
century."). 
206. See U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1987) ("A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his 
transferor had or had power to transfer .... "). One is expected to know that the phrase "all 
title which" must be read to include "only such title as." The nemo dat principle has been 
referred to, aptly, as a " derivation rule," since the rights of a transferee derive from those of 
a transferor. E.g., D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, supra note 180, at 3-8; Harris, supra note 124, at 
192 n.55. Section 2-403(1) states the obverse of nemo dat, which is "the shelter, or umbrella, 
principle: the taker receives everything the transferor had to convey." Dolan, supra note 
152, at 812 (footnote omitted) . The treatment of theft is a classic example; a thief can trans-
fer no better title to stolen goods than he has, which is none. R. BROWN, supra note 112, § 
9.3, at 193-94; 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 23, § 311. For an economic analysis of the thief 
rule, see Weinberg, Sales Law, Economics, and Negotiability of Goods, 9 .J LEGAL STUD. 569 
(1980). Of course, the thief rule does not apply in the case of negotiab le instruments and 
certain other intangibles. See , e.g. , R. BROWN, supra note 112, § 9.5, a t 195-97; Warren, 
supra note 145, at 478-79. A variety of exceptions to the rule of nemo dat were evolved at 
common law. SeeR. BROWN, supra note 112, §§ 9.6-9.7, at 197-206; J. VAINES, supra note 
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The treatment afforded leases and other bailments 1s a strik-
ing example of the survival of the nemo dat principle. Bailments 
generally have remained unburdened by public notice require-
ments and, absent estoppel or the like, essentially have been 
unimpaired by the doctrine of ostensible ownership. Possession is 
not and, at least for several hundred years,207 has not been a gen-
eral requirement for the protection of property interests in goods. 
Indeed, an early draft of Article 9 contained a public notice re-
quirement for certain leases, which ultimately was rejected. 208 
If "history" has anything to say about whether there ought to 
be a filing requirement for leases, it tells us that there ought not to 
be one. Yet, some proponents of a lease filing requirement suggest 
that "history" reflects a march toward requiring public notice of all 
separations of possession and ownership. 209 I disagree with those 
proponents. The enactment of a filing requirement for leases would 
be as much a departure from historical trends as it would be a 
natural progression. Hundreds of years of respect for the "secret" 
interest of a lessor, which survived intact during periods of intense 
judicial and legislative hostility toward nonpossessory security de-
vices, cannot be dismissed easily as "an accident of history . .. 
145, at 154-72, 187-88; 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 23, §§ 312-17, 348, at 242-55 , 348-50. The 
Code provisions dealing with "voidable title" and "entrustment" extended the exceptions 
even further. See U.C.C. § 2-403(1)-(3) (1987). See genera lly Gilmore, supra note 99, at 616-
19; supra notes 145-52 and accompanying text. 
207. See 0 . HoLMES, THE CoMMON LAw 169-70 (1881) : 
We find it laid down in the Year Books that, if I deliver goods to a bailee to keep for 
me, and he sells or gives them to a stranger, the property is vested in the stranger by 
the gift , and I cannot maintain trespas" against him; but that I have a good remedy 
against the bailee . ... These cases have been understood, and it would seem on the 
whole rightly, not merely to deny trespass to the bailor, but any action whatever .... 
No lawyer needs to be told that ... this is no longer the law. The doctrine of the Year 
Books must be regarded as a survival from the primitive times when we have seen the 
same rule in force .... 
Id . (footnote omitted). 
208. Section 7-404 of the May 1949 Draft of the Code (the secured transactions article 
was then denomiated Article 7) imposed a "sign posting" requirement on equipment lessors, 
although it provided that only "buyers" who "bought the equipment for new value and 
received delivery thereof without knowledge or reason to know of the owner 's interest" 
would take free of a noncomplying lessor's interest. U.C.C. § 7-404 (May 1949 Draft). This 
approach was ultimately rejected, in large part as a result of opposition by the leasing indus-
try. See Leary, supra note 46, at 250 n.85. 
209. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 178 (quoted supra note 14); Coogan & 
Boss, supra note 53, § 4.3.04[4)[1], at 4.3-45 (quoted supra note 61) . 
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developed largely from unexamined notions. "210 Gilmore sternly 
warned us not to ignore "what the courts were trying to tell us. "211 
If expanding the filing requirements to encompass leases of goods 
is sound policy, and it may well be, then it must be supported on 
grounds other than some vague notion of historical and logical 
inevitability. 
2. Ostensible ownership: A closer look.-The argument in 
favor of a filing requirement for leases of goods based on ostensible 
ownership concerns212 warrants close examination. The weakness 
of claims that pre-Code and Article 9 filing requirements were 
grounded on the ostensible ownership rationale213 does not prove 
that ostensible ownership problems are not real or that a filing re-
quirement is unwise. 
One flaw in the argument is immediately apparent. Because 
filing generally is not required for leases under current law,214 a 
lessee's possession of equipment2115 does not make ownership of the 
equipment ostensible at all. Simply stated, possession of equip-
ment by a user carries with it no suggestion whatsoever, based on 
existing law, that the equipment is owned, rather than leased, by 
the possessor.216 Moreover, the prevalence of equipment leasing 
210. Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 178. 
211. Gilmore, supra note 99, at 627 (criticizing the Code's extension of the good faith 
purchase doctrine in the face of increased and persistent judicial hostility). 
212. See supra text accompanying notes 159 passim. 
213. See supra Part V.A.l. 
214. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 
215. This discussion assumes that a filing requirement for leases would affect essen-
tially only leased equipment. See U. C.C. § 9-109(2) (1987) (defining "equipment" as "goods . 
. . used or bought for use primarily in business"). It is reasonable to assume that leases will 
virtually always involve a bailment for the purpose of use of the goods by the lessee (or, 
perhaps, the lessee's sublessee). Although some leased goods are consumer goods, see id. § 9-
109(1), most proponents of a filing ruie for leases have recognized that consumer leases 
probably would be excluded from the rule as with purchase money security interests in con-
sumer goods. S ee id. § 9-302(1)(d). When a lessee of goods subleases the goods to a 
sublessee, the goods would be characterized as the lessee's "inventory" for Article 9 pur-
poses. !d. § 9-109(4). The relevant consideration is not the precise characterization under 
Article 9, but the fact t hat the goods are being used by a possessor for business purposes. 
Because the goods will be equipment in the hands of the user, it would rarely make sense 
for a secured party (or lessor, if there were an applicable perfection requirement) to perfect 
by taking possession under § 9-:305. Perfection in such goods is virtually always achieved by 
filing. See id. §§ 9-302, 9-303. 
216. Harris makes the point well in the context of the vendor-in-possession doctrine: 
A straightfonvard premise underlies the common law notion that retention of posses-
sion is deceptive or fraudulent: possession of goods implies unencumbered ownership. 
In a legal system in which a contrary premise prevails and in which no inferences 
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during recent years 217 demonstrates, as a factual matter, that pos-
session by a user indicates a reasonable possibility that equipment 
is leased, not owned, by the user. A more refined conceptualization 
of the ostensible ownership argument is required. The ostensible 
ownership argument could be based on the assumption that if a 
filing rule were adopted for leases, then ownership (or, at least, 
freedom from claims of unperfected lessors) would be "ostensible" 
from the fact of possession of the leased equipment. Enacting a 
filing rule for leases, then, finally would provide a legal basis for 
the myth that ownership of equipment is ostensible from the fact 
of possession.218 
Because it is commonly known that business equipment often 
is subject to security interests, one might argue that such common 
knowledge justifies the abolition of a filing requirement for secured 
transactions as well. Justifications for a filing requirement for se-
cured transactions exist, however, which are unrelated to 
ostensible ownership concerns. 219 Focusing on ostensible ownership 
regarding the state of the title arise from possession of goods, retention of possession 
would not be fraudulent. 
Harris, supra note 124, at 191 n.49. The principal beneficiaries of a filing rule for leases 
would be those who are sufficiently sophisticated to realize the need to search the files and 
to know how and where to search. No doubt such parties realize that no inference of owner-
ship can be drawn from possession by a user of equipment. 
Under current law the possession of equipment does rebut certain signals, which other-
wise would flow from the absence of possession, to a creditor or a prospective purchaser who 
ascertains the fact of possession. For example, possession at least indicates that the goods 
are not subject to a security interest perfected by possession. See U.C.C. § 9-305 (1987). 
Additionally, it can be argued that a lessee's possession of equipment places it in a position 
to more easily deceive and defraud its creditors or purchasers. This raises an issue of osten-
sible ownership only to the extent that one not in possession might be less likely to affirm 
its possession out of fear that its misbehavior would be discovered. Cf. Baird & .Jackson, 
supra note 10, at 185 ("A debtor will be deterred from misbehaving, since a filing system 
deprives him of the possibility of gaining from such misbehavior."). 
217. See supra note 20. 
218. More precisely, a filing rule would permit an interested person who ascertained 
that a prospective debtor or seller is in possession of equipment and that the appropriate 
records do not reflect a fil ing to assume that the equipment is not leased or that any lessor's 
claim is unperfected. Even if the Article 9 perfection rules were applied to leases, however , 
some gaps would remain. For example, the four-month rule of§ 9- 103(1)(d) and the ten-day 
grace period for purchase money security interests in § 9-301(2) each undercut the ostensi-
ble ownership rationale. 
219. Consider a "colorful" rhetorical question put to me by John Dolan: Would the 
proponents of a filing rule for leases be satisfied, and would the ostensible ownership con-
cerns be solved, by a rule requiring that all leased equipment be painted "school bus 
yellow"? Aside from difficulties posed for sales and financings of school buses, not to men-
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problems created by nonpossessory interests offers an unduly nar-
row view of the various costs and benefits of imposing a filing rule 
as a condition for protection of any property interest. 
Another weakness of the ostensible ownership argument for a 
lease filing requirement relates to the "ostensible" component, 
rather than the "ownership" component just addressed. As an em-
pirical matter, are the potential beneficiaries220 of a filing 
requirement-creditors of and purchasers from lessees-often 
deceived or misled by the possession of equipment by lessees? 
Stated otherwise, do the potential beneficiaries actually rely on the 
possession of goods by a prospective debtor or seller? The propo-
nents of a filing rule for leases have not presented an empirical 
case that reliance, resulting in deception, is actually a problem. 
Some critics of the role of the ostensible ownership doctrine in our 
laws and jurisprudence have persuasively made the case for nonre-
liance, however. For example, John Dolan has observed that 
"[m]odern credit practices ... have outgrown the ostensible-own-
ership doctrine. "221 Although hard empirical data remains elusive, 
a review of Code cases dealing with priority disputes between les-
sors and third parties supports the argument that mistaken and 
detrimental reliance on lessees' possession of equipment is not 
commonplace. 222 Perhaps there is no real "problem" at all. 
tion tractors and taxicabs, surely the proponents of a fi ling rule would not be satisf. ed. A 
public fi ling system may provide a cheaper, more reliable, and more convenient means of 
ascertaining conflicting cla ims to property than a regime that would depend on phys ical 
inspections. Yet, the ostensible ownership concerns per se result only from a supposedly 
misleading appearance that can be ascertained, and therefore can be misleading, only by 
such an inspection. Of course, many interes ted persons may be satisfi ed t o rely solely on the 
word of a putative possessor as to the fact of possession. 
Part V.B addresses the justifications for filing under Article 9 and considers the extent 
to which similar benefits might result from subjecting leases to t he Article 9 perfection and 
priority regime. 
220 . T he identity of potential beneficiaries would depend on the nature of the priority 
rules that would accompany the adoption of a filing requirement for leases. Se e generally 
supra P art IV. 
221. Dolan, supra note 16, at 30. For similar arguments, see, e.g., Burns, supra note 
26, at 429, 456-67; Helman, supra note 16, passim; Phillips, supra note 16, at 35-38. See also 
Harris, supra note 124, at 191 n.49 ("That creditors rely on the debtor's possession of per-
sonal property in deciding whether to extend credit long has been consid ered dubious," 
ci ti ng Davis v. Turner, 4.5 Va. (4 Gratt.) 422, 441 (1 848) (Baldwin , J.) ). 
222. Cases reported in volumes 1 (fi rst se ries) through 2 (second series) of Callaghan's 
Uni form Commercial Code R eport ing S ervice were reviewed in an at tempt to estimate the 
incidence of actual reliance on leased , or purportedly leased , equipment by creditors of and 
purchasers from lessees. One hundred thirty cases (treating cases reported more t han once 
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Arguments that actual reliance on a debtor's possession of 
goods by extenders of credit is insignificant are persuasive, even 
compelling. 223 But even the total absence or elimination of ostensi-
as one case and excluding consumer cases) were identified in which the true lease-security 
interest issue was involved and which involved a priority dispute between a putative lessor 
and a third party. In 94 cases (7:2 .3% ) the priority dispute involved the failure to file a 
financing statement and in 36 cases (27. 7%) a purportedly defective filing was involved. Of 
these 130 cases, 92 (70.8 o/o) involved a priority dispute between a putative lessor and a lien 
creditor (or a trustee in bankruptcy or debtor in possession), 31 (23.8%) involved a dispute 
with a secured creditor, 6 ( 4.6 o/o) involved a dispute with a non-secured creditor purchaser, 
and 1 (.8%) was impossible to characterize. No distinction was made between cases conclud-
ing that the transaction involved was a true lease and those concluding that it was a secured 
transaction. It was assumed to be unlikely that any of the lien creditor (or trustee in bank-
ruptcy or debtor in possession) cases involved actual creditor reliance on the leased 
equipment. An attempt was made to glean from the remaining 37 decisions (competing se-
cured creditor and other purchaser cases) some indication of whether the competing parties 
relied on the debtor-lessee's possession. Seven cases (5.4 o/o) were class ified as probable or 
possible reliance cases, and 5 (3 .9 %) were impossible to classify. The remaining 26 (20%) 
cases were class ified as nonreliance cases. If the assumptions and classifications were accu-
rate, between 5.4% and 9.3% of the cases may have involved some reliance by a third party 
creditor or purchaser. 
The classifications were necessarily imprecise. Because actual reliance was not material 
to the decisions, as a legal matter, it generally was not mentioned. M oreover, certain con-
ventions were adopted in the classification process. For example, if a competing secured 
creditor claimed under an after ·acquired property clause, nonreliance was assumed. And, if 
the equipment involved was specificaliy mentioned in a competing secured creditor's secur -
ity agreement reliance was assumed. The attempt was made to identify reliance on the 
lessee's ownership of equipment rather than such reliance caused by the lessee's possession. 
As a general matter, the facts disclosed in the reports did not permit identification of reli -
ance on possession. Further investigation of court records. business records of the parties, 
and interviews with the parties and counsel would, no doubt, shed additional insight. Even 
allowing for a reasonable margin of error in the classi fications, however, it appears that the 
incidence of third party reliance may be sl ight. 
223. Reliance by buyers of goods, as opposed to creditors, may be a more frequent 
phenomenon. See supra note 147. 
The argument that the ostensible ownership doctrine has become obsolet e and is an 
anachronism is less satisfying. Empirical studies of creditor and debtor behavior necessary 
to demonstrate that less significance is attributed to possess ion of goods today than in ear -
lier times have not been developed. Moreover, the obsolescence argument assumes (i) the 
existence of circumstances at earlier times which led to substan t ial reliance on possession 
and (ii) that ostensible ownership concerns were and continue to be at the root of public 
notice requiremen ts . Each of those assumptions is t roublesome. See generally supra Part 
V.A.l. If the demise of ostensible ownership justifies a rejection of a filing requirement for 
leases today, then the argument also must acknowledge that the law was inappropriate dur-
ing earlier times (i.e., prior to the demise) when ostensible ownership concerns were real, 
but filing for leases was not requ ired. Have the tim es fin ally caught up with the law? 
The perceived demise of os tensible ownership may provide more cogent support for 
arguments in other contexts, such as the temporal issue of when one becomes a " buyer" for 
purposes of § 1-201(9) (defining "buyer in ordinary course of business"). David Frisch has 
persuasively argued that neither the passing of title nor the delivery of possession of goods 
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ble ownership concerns would not provide any clear signal as to 
whether a filing requirement for leases should be adopted. Again, 
the Article 9 filing regime provides benefits other than curing the 
problem of ostensible ownership.224 
Baird and Jackson argue that the ostensible ownership con-
cerns arising from a lessee's possession and the secret interest of a 
lessor are the baseline theme upon which a filing requirement for 
leases is justified.225 They contend that this baseline makes more 
sense than one which depends on locating the "ownership" or "ti-
tle" inherent in the interest of a true lessor. 226 But, neither 
theoretical model is necessarily useful in evaluating the merits of a 
filing requirement for leases. A presumption favoring either ap-
proach, "possession" or "title," can create a doctrinal trap that 
serves to cloud, rather than illuminate, the analysis. Rather, exam-
ining various types of property claims in particular contexts may 
provide a more useful framework for identifying the relative merits 
of requiring public notice as a condition for perfecting a property 
interest as against claims of third parties.227 
to a prospective buyer should mark the creation of "buyer" status. Frisch, Buyer Status 
Under the U.CC. A Suggested Temporal Definition, 72 IowA L. REv. 531, 556-67 (1987). 
Baird and Jackson, relying on ostensible ownership considerations, would opt for a rule that 
would make a buyer's taking of possession the criterion for obtaining "buyer" status in this 
context. Baird & Jackson , supra note 10, a t 209-12. Frisch contends that the time when a 
prospective buyer becomes a "buyer" should turn on when it becomes entitled to "an award 
of a possessory remedy" against the seller. Frisch, supra, at 570-72. The context of Frisch 's 
argument is that of construing the Code, a "modern" statute, in light of contemporary prac-
tices and expectations. But the lease filing issue occurs in a different context because the 
generally accepted norm for many, many years has been not to require public notice for 
leases. 
224. Se e supra note 219; see also infra Part V.B. 
225. See Baird & J ackson, supra note 10, at 186-90. 
226. !d. 
227. A decision to reject a filing requirement for leases does not necessarily mean that 
filing should not be required for certain other bailments. When goods constitute inventory 
in the hands of the bailee, such as in the case of "bailments for processing" or "tolling 
contracts," the benefits of a fi ling rule might exceed t hose that would result from a similar 
rule for leases if, for example, third parties rely more on possession of inventory than pos-
session of equipment. See White, supra note 92, at 397. 
I am not suggesting that every owner of a good who puts it in the possession of a 
third party runs the risk of losing it to a buyer or a trustee in bankruptcy unless he 
files a financing statement. Courts should be concerned with the circumstances of 
ostensible ownership . .. . I would argue ... for most industrial equipment in a society 
where equipment leases are so commonplace that one should not put much store by 
possession of equipment. T hat is not true, however, for cases involving inventory and 
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Notwithstanding their emphasis on ostensible ownership, the 
proposals of Baird and Jackson for exclusions from a generally ap-
plicable filing requirement for bailments do recognize that neither 
a title approach nor a possession approach will in all cases indicate 
the wisdom of a filing rule. The exceptions that they propose are 
related to the relative costs and benefits of imposing a filing re-
quirement in particular contexts. 228 Other proponents of a filing 
requirement for leases would, on similar grounds, exempt certain 
leases from the requirement. 229 It follows that my conceptual dif-
ferences with proponents of a filing requirement for leases, whose 
arguments are based largely on ostensible ownership concerns, may 
be limited. My substantive quarrels and uncertainties arise from 
two basic views. First, I take a different view of the approach to 
various costs and benefits which might flow from imposing a filing 
rule on leases. 230 Second, I remain unconvinced that either a base-
line of ostensible ownership grounded on a lessee's possession and 
a lessor's "secret" interest or a baseline grounded on the location 
of title or ownership provides a helpful benchmark for exammmg 
the policy in question. 
things like inventory .... Here there is little to put [a secured creditor of the posses-
sor] or other third parties on notice. 
!d. ; see also U.C.C. § 2-326 (1987) (public notice requirements must be met for protection of 
interest of consignor for "sale or return," but not in the case of consignor for "sale on ap-
proval"); infra note 308 and accompanying text. See generally supra note 17 and 
accompanying text. 
Although I argue more generally for consideration of the context of various separations 
of possession and ownership as an important element of evaluating the need for a rule man-
dating public notice, White 's argument appears to be grounded solely on an ostensible 
ownership rationale. Moreover, White's argument incorrectly assumes that ostensible owner-
ship concerns arising out of such contexts can have a bearing, under current law, on whether 
a transaction is covered by Article 9. See White, supra note 92, at 396-97. Since true bail-
ments are not covered by Article 9, and the appearances created by possession of goods are 
identical whether a bailment or a secured transaction is involved, ostensible ownership con-
cerns offer no guidance as to the determination of whether a true bailment or a secured 
transaction exists. White's argument may support a change in the law, but it does not sup-
port the conclusion that some true bailors are required to perfect their interests under 
current law merely because some baiiments are perceived to create serious ostensible owner-
ship problems. 
228. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
229. See generally supra Part III. 
230. See generally infra Part VI. 
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B. Benefits of Article 9 Filing Rules for Secured Transactions 
and Leases: A Comparison 
This Subpart addresses various benefits, including reductions 
in costs, provided by filing under the Article 9 perfection and pri-
ority scheme.231 These benefits are compared to those which might 
flow from subjecting leases of equipment to similar filing require-
ments. I argue that a filing requirement for leases probably would 
produce smaller and fewer benefits than those provided for secured 
transactions under existing law. 
In an important conceptual sense, Article 9 does not legitimate 
or provide the legal basis for secured credit. To the contrary, its 
perfection and priority scheme establishes barriers to secured 
credit. The rules comprising the scheme impede a debtor and a 
secured party from dividing property rights so as to be effective 
against third parties. 232 Property rights (i.e., security interests) 
transferred to or retained by a secured party may be transferred 
again by a debtor, and are vulnerable to claims by a debtor's credi-
tors and purchasers, unless the Article 9 perfection and priority 
scheme is observed. To this extent, Article 9 clearly overrides the 
principle of nemo dat quod non habet-one cannot give what one 
does not have. 233 
Concepts as ide, however, this characterization is distorted in 
an historical sense. Article 9 and its statutory predecessors repre-
sented an accretion of legislative "reforms" which ultimately 
displaced centuries of judicial and legislative rigidity and hostility 
toward nonpossessory security interests. 2 3 4 Such a hostile environ-
ment did not and does not generally prevail in the case of leases 
and other bailments. It is more appropriate, therefore, to ask why 
231. The discuss ion continues to focus on equipment and perfection by filing. See 
su pra note 215. Except as otherwise noted, the discuss ion also continues to assume that 
priority rules substantially the same as those provided by Article 9 would apply to a filing 
requirement for leases. 
As a general matter, I do not here question the need for filin g rules , such as those 
included in Art icle 9, in a perfection and priority scheme for secured t ransactions. Although 
ce rtain criticisms of the fu nctional role of possession in that scheme have merit , see gener-
ally Phillips, supra note 16, the thrust of this discuss ion assumes the general sati sfaction 
with and continued opera ti on of the exist ing Article 9 rules. 
232. Se e, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (1 987 ) (subordination of unperfec ted security interests 
to lien creditors and certa in purchasers) . 
233. See su pra notes 20.'i -06 and accompanying t ext. 
234. See ge nerally supra Part V.A. 
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leases should be included in the Article 9 perfection and priority 
scheme rather than why they should be excluded. 
What are the benefits of a filing scheme for secured transac-
tions? An essential characteristic of a security interest is the prior 
right in the collateral which is conferred on the secured party. A 
secured creditor will charge a lower interest rate on account of re-
ceiving collateral only if it can rely with relative safety on the 
priority of its claim.235 A secured creditor requires a means to de-
termine that it will receive such priority and can do so under the 
Article 9 notice filing system. 236 A viable regime for secured credit 
depends on the baseline, but not exclusive, rule of "first-in-time, 
first-in-right." 237 A secured creditor, once it achieves priority, re-
235. Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Credi tors , 88 
YALE L.J. 1143, 1153, 1163-64 (1979); see also Baird, supra note 79, at 62 & n.27; Baird & 
Jackson, supra note 10, at 183-86; Carlson, Rationality, Accident and Priority Under Arti-
cle 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 71 MINN L. REv. 207, 216-17 (1986). Jackson and 
Kronman go on to consider how the lower interest rate charged by secured creditors may 
not be fully offset by resultant higher interest rates charged by unsecured creditors (to ac-
count for an increased risk) , thus demonstrating benefits offered by secured credit. They 
rely primarily on the differences in "monitoring costs" incurred by differently situated cred-
itors. Jackson & Kronman, supra, at 1149-61. Their explanation has been criticized. See , 
e.g., Schwartz, Security Int eres ts and Bankruptcy P1iorities: A Review of Current Theo-
ries, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9-14 (1981) [hereinafter Schwartz, Current Theories ]; Scott, supra 
note 11, at 909-10. In recent years several commentators have engaged in highly theoretical 
discussions of the policy rationale and conceptual basis for the Article 9 perfection and pri-
ority scheme. See, e.g ., Ayer, supra note 27; Baird, supra note 79; Buckley, The Bankruptcy 
Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REv. 1393 (1986); Carlson, supra; Jackson & Kronman , supra; 
Jackson & Schwartz, supra note 15; Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the E conomic 
Efficiency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U PA. L. REv. 929 (1985); Levmore, 
Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49 (1982); 
Phillips, supra note 16; Schwartz, Th e Con tinu ing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 V AND. L REv 
1051 (1984); Schwartz, Current Theories, supra; Scott, supra note 11 ; White, Etficiency 
Justifications for Personal Property Secu rity, 37 VAND. L. REv. 473 (1984). This commen-
tary either deals in depth with, or is premised upon, attempts to "explain" a "theory" of 
secured credit and t he interplay be tween such explanations and the Article 9 perfection and 
priority scheme. These recent expositions are strikingly explicit and elaborate in their treat-
ment of the operation, effects, and rationale of the Article 9 rules as they affect the rights of 
secured creditors, other purchasers, and unsecured creditors. The commentary relies upon 
or deals with economic analyses of the "efficiency" or other justifications and explanations 
for the existence of secured credit. 
For purposes of this discussion, the author assumes that the law will continue to bless 
(not prohibit) the creation of security interests which are generally enforceable "against the 
world." 
236. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 79, at 56-57, 60, 63-64; Baird & Jackson, supra note 
10, at 183-84. 
237 . See, e.g., Baird, supra note 79, at 64-65; Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 179-
80; Jackson & Kronman, supra note 235, at 1162. A perfected security interest in goods 
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quires an assurance that, as a general matter, no subsequent 
conflicting claim will become senior. 238 The Article 9 notice filing 
scheme provides a mechanism for the operation of this first-in-
time principle for security interests. 239 
A prospective secured creditor may receive some assurance of 
priority in goods upon discovering that the debtor is in possession 
of the goods, thereby confirming that the goods have not been 
pledged to a competing secured party240 or delivered to a buyer, 
and searching the proper filing office to ascertain the nonexistence 
of prior filings against the debtor covering the same collateral.241 
generally is prior to the rights of later-arising lien creditors, U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1987), 
subsequent good faith purchasers, id. § 9-301(1)(c), and later-perfected or later-filed secured 
creditors, id. § 9-:312(5)(a). There are, of course , exceptions. See, e.g., id. § 9-307(1) ("buyer 
in ordinary course of business .. . takes free of a security interest created by his seller"); id. 
§ 9-312(3) (purchase money security interest priority for inventory) ; id. § 9-312(4) (purchase 
money security interest priority for collateral other than inventory). The exceptions create 
more controversy than the general first-in-time rule. See, e.g. , Jackson & Kronman, supra 
note 235, at 1167-75 (explaining justifications for purchase money priority rules); Scott, 
supra note 11 , at 961-63 (criticizing Jackson and Kronman explanations and offering other 
explanations). 
Perceptions of the function and importance of the first-in-time principle may vary de-
pending on whether a priority contest exists between a secured creditor and a lien creditor, 
between a secured creditor and a purchaser other than a secured creditor, or between se-
cured creditors inter se. 
238. See, e.g., Jackson & Kronman, supra note 235, at 1161-64. 
239. David Carlson has observed, accurately, that the Article 9 scheme does not 
strictly embrace the principal of first-in-time, since that label is more properly descriptive of 
the time of acquisition of rights in property. The Article 9 scheme is better described as a 
first-to-perfect system. See Carlson, supra note 235, at 212 & nn.14, 15. To be even more 
precise, if perfection is achieved by filing, then the time of filing generally will be used for 
priority purposes as between secured parties. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1987). 
240. See U.C.C. § 9-305 (1987) (security interest in goods may be perfected by posses-
sion); id. § 9-312(5)(a) (security interest perfected by possession is senior to security interest 
subsequently perfected by filing). If the property is intangible, such as accounts, then the 
debtor 's possession is not material. See id . § 9-302(l)(a); id. § 9-305 (perfection of security 
interest in accounts only by filing and not possession). 
241. This process would involve determining the correct name of the debtor, the rele-
vant state's law which governs perfection, and the proper filing office or offices in such state. 
See U.C .C. § 9-103 (1987) (choice of law rules for perfection of security interests in multiple 
state transactions); id. § 9-401 (place of filing) . Other issues may be subsumed in such deter-
minations, depending on a determination of the type of goods involved, such as the period 
of time during which the goods have been located in a particular jurisdiction or the location 
of the debtor. See id. § 9-103(1)(d) (four-month grace period for reperfection when goods 
already subject to security interest are brought into state); id. § 9-103(3)(a) & (b) (location 
of debtor determines law applicable to perfect ion when collateral is mobile goods); id. § 9-
103(3)(e) (four-month grace period for reperfection when debtor changes its location to an-
other jurisdiction); see also Harris, supra note 124, at 212-13 & nn.l43-45. 
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Similarly, other interested persons (prospective buyers and un-
secured creditors, for example) may benefit from a filing system 
which discloses the existence of potential prior claims to personal 
property.242 Thus, one benefit of the Article 9 filing regime is that 
it provides information to interested third parties who desire to 
uncover potential claims to the property of a debtor.243 If requiring 
filing for purposes of perfection and priority of security interests is 
the least costly way to provide such information, then the costs of 
discovering the information and the risks of nondiscovery imposed 
on third parties who desire the information are reduced by the fil-
ing regime. 244 
It follows that imposing a filing requirement for leases would 
allow interested third parties to discover the interest of a lessor by 
searching the files. A clean filing search coupled with verification 
of the debtor's possession of goods, would provide a prospective 
secured creditor, purchaser, or unsecured creditor with assurance 
that either the goods were not leased or, if they were, that the les-
sor would be unperfected. 245 This benefit is qualitatively the same 
as that provided by the perfection requirements for secured trans-
actions under Article 9.246 The proponents of a filing requirement 
242. See infra text accompanying notes 289-91, 299-302. 
243 . See Baird, supra note 79, at 57-59, 62-66. 
244. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 183-84 . 
245. This assurance of freedom from claims would extend only to security interests 
created by the debtor and claims of lessors of goods to the debtor, not to claims of the 
debtor's predecessors in interest or security interests created by them. For example, the 
goods might be stolen or some other defect in the debtor's title might exist. 
246. Baird and Jackson make a similar point: "The subsequent creditor's need for this 
information is in no way diminished by the fact that the earlier interest was acquired 
through a bilateral agreement that had the attributes of a lease. Therefore, these attributes 
should not affect the filing requirement. " Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 188. 
It has been argued that financial statements prepared in accordance with generally ac-
cepted accounting principles (GAAP) should be sufficient to protect creditors and 
purchasers from being misled by "secret" interests of secured parties of and lessors to a 
debtor or lessee. E.g ., Helman, supra note 16, at 29-30. Others disagree. See, e.g., Phillips, 
supra note 16, at 29-41. In the case of leases , the existence of material leases should be 
disclosed in financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP. See generally Dieter, 
Stewart & Underwood, supra note 20, ch. 4. On the other hand, many lessees do not prepare 
financial statements in accordance with GAAP . And transactions which occur in the gap 
between the time of preparation and dissemination of financial statements and the time of 
preparation and dissemination of subsequent periodic statements would not be reflected. It 
certainly must be true tha t financial statements place many purchasers and creditors on 
notice that some of a debtor -lessee's property is subject to security interests or leases. But, 
as a general matter , reliance on finan cial statements would appear to be a poor substitute 
for filing. 
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for leases generally have recognized this benefit and have con-
cluded that it sustains the argument in favor of a filing 
requirement for leases. 
Such a narrow approach, however, is flawed. In three respects 
it fails to take into account, attempt to compute, and compare the 
aggregate net benefits.247 First, the informational benefits of a 
lease filing requirement might be quantitatively less than the ben-
efits resulting from the existing filing requirement for secured 
transactions. For example, it may be easier and less costly for third 
parties to discover that goods are leased than it would be for third 
parties to discover the existence of a security interest in the ab-
sence of a filing requirement. 248 Second, there may be other 
benefits provided by the filing requirement for secured transac-
tions that are greater than those that would result from a filing 
requirement for leases. 249 Third, the costs to lessors, lessees, and 
third parties of imposing a filing requirement may exceed the costs 
resulting from the existing perfection requirements for secured 
transactions. 2~0 The wisdom of mandating filing for leases is not 
demonstrated merely by identifying one perceived bene-
fit-information-which would be substantially identical to the 
benefit resulting from the perfection and priority rules applicable 
to secured transactions. Otherwise, the logical extension of the ar-
gument would be the imposition of a comprehensive title 
registration scheme for all forms of personal property.251 Most 
would agree, however, that the cost of such a scheme could not be 
justified by the benefits. 252 
The remainder of this Subpart addresses the first and second 
categories of possible differences in benefits-differences in reduc-
247. Baird and Jackson consider the net benefits of imposing a filing requirement on 
non-secured transaction separations of possession and ownership in the context of excep-
tions to the general rule of filing. Baird & Jackson , supra note 10, at 190-94. But they 
proclaim that the inherent bilateral differences between leases and secured transactions 
have no impact on the benefits to be obtained and imply that the costs, similarly, would not 
be affected by such bilateral distinctions. ! d. at 186, 188, 190. 
248. See infra text accompanying notes 257-86. 
249. See generally infra text accompanying notes 260-88. 
250. Costs of a filing requirement for leases and the accompanying priority rules are 
discussed supra Part IV and infra Part VI. 
251. With the exception of certain specialized types of property, such schemes are un-
known for personal, as opposed to real, property. S ee Baird & Jackson, supra note 79, at 
306-07. 
252. ld. 
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tion of discovery costs and other, greater benefits-between a 
proposed lease filing requirement and the filing requirement appli-
cable to secured transactions. 
1. Information: Reduction of discovery costs.-Under existing 
law, an interested person who wants to discover conflicting claims 
to a debtor's goods may search the public records for the existence 
of financing statements covering the goods. Once the appropriate 
records are identified and inspected,263 the searcher will learn 
whether a secured creditor of the debtor might claim an interest in 
the goods. 264 But even if a debtor is in possession of goods and no 
filings are found, an interested person nevertheless must conduct 
further investigation to determine the nature and existence of con-
flicting claims to the goods. Such investigation is necessary even in 
order to determine the appropriate filing office to be searched.266 
As a general matter, the Article 9 scheme extends only to whatever 
rights in the goods which the debtor might have. The nature and 
extent of the debtor's rights must be divined from the debtor or 
other sources. 266 
The investigation by an interested person might reveal that 
the goods are leased. For example, a lessee, when asked by an in-
terested person, may disclose the existence and particulars of the 
lease. Of course, a debtor, when asked, also could reveal the exis-
tence of a security interest even in the absence of a filing system. 
The interested person also might discover the existence of a lease 
by searching the Article 9 files, if the lessor had filed a precaution-
253. See supra note 241. 
254. A filed financing statement, however, will not confirm whether the secured party 
in fact claims a security interest. "A financing statement may be filed before a security 
agreement is made or a security interest otherwise attaches." U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1987) (sec-
ond senctence). Except in the case of consumer goods, a secured party is not obligated to 
terminate a filed financing statement after satisfaction of the secured obligations unless de-
manded by the debtor. ld. § 9-404(1) (second sentence). The information required to be 
included in an effective financing statement is rather meager. See id. § 9-402(1) (first sen-
tence); see also Baird & Jackson, supra note 79, at 308-09. 
255. See supra note 241. 
256. Prospective purchasers and secured creditors probably rely to a substantial ex-
tent on the debtor for such information. In some cases only naked representations by the 
debtor may be requested and relied upon. In other cases, evidence of the source of the 
debtor's title, such as invoices or bills of sale, may be examined and the authenticity of such 
evidence may be verified with predecessors in the chain of title. This might require addi-
tional Article 9 searches against the names of such predecessors. Such relevant information 
is not normally available either from searching against the debtor's correct name in the 
correct filing offices or from verifying that a debtor is in possession of goods. 
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ary financing statement in the proper office pursuant to section 9-
408.257 Moreover, the interested person might request documenta-
tion to evidence the source of rights in goods held by a debtor or 
lessee. Unless a lessee provides fraudulent documentation and the 
interested person does not discover the fraud, such as by failing to 
verify the authenticity of documentation, the documentation nor-
mally would inform the interested person of the existence of the 
lease. Authentic documentation would show that the lessee is not 
an owner of the goods, as well as the existence and nature of the 
lessor's claim. 
It is significant, however, that in most cases the receipt of au-
thentic documentation as to a debtor's rights would not reveal the 
interest of a conflicting secured claim. An interested person inves-
tigating the source of a debtor's title, no matter how diligent, 
might not be satisfied regarding the nonexistence of a security in-
terest granted by the debtor unless the interested person relied on 
the debtor's assurances or could rely on the absence of any con-
flicting public filing. The debtor's title documentation would look 
the same whether or not the debtor had granted a security interest. 
But the existence of a lease as the source of a lessee's interest is a 
positive, rather than a negative, fact which could be discovered by 
an investigation of a debtor-lessee's source of title. 258 Therefore, in 
many cases it is less costly for an interested person to discover the 
existence of a lease than it would be for a person to discover a 
security interest in the absence of filing. A filing requirement for 
leases would not reduce the costs of discovery, including risks of 
nondiscovery, to as great an extent as the existing filing system 
reduces the costs of discovering security interests. Stated other-
257. The information function of the Article 9 perfection scheme is fully satisfied 
when a filing is made regardless of whether any sanction is imposed for the failure to file. 
258. The statement in the text should be qualified in two respects. First, where the 
evidence of title cuns ists of documentation which itself reveals the ex istence of a security 
interest, such as in a conditional sa le or when t he equipment is covered by a certificate of 
title di sclos ing a securi ty interest. then an investigation of the source of title should reveal 
the claim of the secured party. Second, if a lessee were a previous owner of the goods and 
had sold them to a lessor and leased them back, the lessee's original evidence of t itle might 
appear regular in all respects and would not reveal the existence of the leasing arrangement. 
See infra Part V.D (discussi ng sale-leaseback transactions). Kripke acknowledges tha t the 
point made in the text, which he attributes to Donald Rapson, has merit. Kripke, su pra 
note 5, at 800-01. However, he argues that the same ci rcumstances may exist in the case of a 
conditional sale and concludes that the argument "is insufficient to warrant a statutory in-
terruption of the movement toward public notice of sp lit ownersh ip s ituations. " !d. 
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wise, there is a greater need for a filing requirement for secured 
transactions than for leases. 2159 
The foregoing further illustrates that except in cases of debtor 
misbehavior, such as a debtor's failure to reveal conflicting inter-
ests or provision of fraudulent documentation, the filing system 
may provide little additional information to interested persons. 
Many interested persons will, at a minimum, inquire as to conflict-
ing interests. Perhaps the informational function of the Article 9 
filing regime, at least in the context of prospective extensions of 
credit and purchases, may not be significant in fact. 
2. Other, greater benefits for secured transactions. 
(a) Timing and veracity: Priority ordering; discouraging 
fraud and collusion.-Under Article 9, the exact time of perfection 
or filing generally controls priority.260 In the case of equipment, 
perfection is virtually always accomplished by filing. 261 Filing pro-
vides definite, irrefutable evidence of t he baseline time on which 
the first-in-time priority rule will be applied. This memorialization 
of the relevant time, for priority purposes, serves as an "official 
scoreboard" that is visible and, by definition , accurate. 262 
Determining priorities based on the time of public filing 
reduces evidentiary costs and disputes in connection with secured 
transactions. It eliminates the need to ascertain and prove the time 
at which a security agreement was signed, an advance was made, or 
a debtor acquired rights in collateral in order to apply the first-in-
time principle.263 
259. Searching the p u bli c fi les, however, migh t be less costly than investigat ing the 
debtor's source of ti tl e. 
260. See U.C.C . § 9-301(1) (1987) ; id. § 9-312(.5)(a). 
26 1. See su pra note 215. 
262. See Baird , supra note 79, at 55 ("A notice-fi li ng system .. . so rts out p rope rty 
cla ims among those who have or seek property claims; its fu nction is not to give t he world at 
large notice of security interests ." (emphasis added)); id . at 62-63 (notice filin g under Arti-
cle 9 similar to staking claims to mineral interests, cit ing Kitch, The Nature and Func t io n. 
of the Pa tent System , 20 ,J. L Aw & EcoN. 265 (1977) ). 
26;3. See id. at 64 (other poss ible benchmarks fo r a gene ral priority rule unsatis factory 
because they would req ui re reliance on debtor 's records); see also Jackson & K ronman, 
supra note 235, a t 1162. Perfect ion by possession does involve a determination of issues 
such as t hose mentioned in t he text and has been criticized on this bas is . Ba ird , supra note 
79, at 64 & n.3 1; Ph illips, supra note 16, at 20-34. But any perce ived deficiencies in the rul es 
fo r pe rfect ion by pussess ion does not reduce the im porta nce of t hi s memoria li za tion func -
t ion of fi ling. Many organ izations, la rge and small , may lack systems of recordkeeping which 
would fac ilita te determinatio n of the exact timing of acq ui sit ion of rights in co ll a teral, espe -
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Another, perhaps more significant, benefit results from a sys-
tem which encourages memorializing the timing of transactions by 
public filing: the reduction of opportunities for fraud and collusion. 
The filing made in a public office ensures the veracity of the timing 
and the existence of a security interest by eliminating the possibil-
ity, which might exist under a "first-to-attach" rule, that a debtor 
and a secured party could conspire to claim that a security interest 
was created earlier than it actually was. 264 The relationship of pub-
lic filing to the veracity of claims to security also may explain the 
rule that provides priority to lien creditors over unperfected secur-
ity interests. 2611 
A filing requirement for leases generally would not produce 
timing and veracity benefits as great as those provided for secured 
transactions. 266 The timing and veracity of a lease normally would 
cially if the acquisition were not being contemporaneously financed on a secured basis, the 
making of advances, and, in particular, the execution of documents. 
264. Notice filing does not actually evidence the creation of a security interest. See 
supra note 254. However, because the time of filing generally controls priorities, there is 
little risk that collusion concerning the time of creation will affect priorities. Concerns about 
potential fraud and collusion associated with nonpossessory security interests also influ-
enced the development of pre-Code filing systems. See generally supra Part V.A. Burns 
agrees that "collusion" is a "type of fraud which public filing may be especially useful in 
defeating." Burns, supra note 26, at 465. 
The timing and veracity effects of filing discussed here are inherently related to the 
informational functions of filing discussed above. See supra text accompanying notes 235-
59. The earlier discussion focused on the ex ante discovery of information about claims to 
property by a prospective extender of credit or purchaser. This discussion focuses on other 
benefits: reducing evidentiary costs and discouraging fraud and collusion. 
265. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1987). The point is most vividly illustrated by imagin-
ing a debtor's bankruptcy proceeding in a world where unperfected security interests prevail 
over lien creditors and, pursuant to § 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor's trustee in 
bankruptcy. The absence of a filing requirement might be viewed as creating the potential 
for debtor and creditor misbehavior , perhaps in order to escape the avoidance of a prefer-
ence under § 547 of the Bankruptcy Code or otherwise. The existence of a public record 
verifiable as to time of filing discourages false, perjured claims of secured status as an after-
thought. See supra note 200 and accompanying text; see also Baird & Jackson, supra note 
10, at 184 & n.34 (" [T]he absence of a record of a superior interest is unambiguous, because 
unless the interest is recorded, it cannot be superior. It therefore provides a reliable check 
on the veracity of the information provided by the debtor.") . 
266. Burns argues that a filing requirement for leases is not the best choice for reduc-
ing collusion, although she acknowledges that it would have that effect. Burns, supra note 
26, at 466-67. Although her conclusion may be correct, her argument is not persuasive. First, 
she claims that a filing requirement would result in "a public file chock full of entries" and 
would not solve the true lease-security interest definitional problems. ld. at 466. I fail to see 
how her point bears on the issue. Second, she argues that "certified financial statements and 
credit reports .. . offer public confirmation of leases" and that investigation of the source of 
1 
i 
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be easier to determine and prove than would be the timing and 
veracity of many secured transactions were it not for the existing 
Article 9 filing requirements. Unless a lessor is a manufacturer, 
there often will be a third party vendor involved in a leasing trans-
action and, consequently, some independent, verifiable paper trail 
will reflect the time of the lessor 's acquisition of its interest in the 
equipment. And the lessee will have no genuine evidence of any 
interest other than its interest as lessee under the lease. 267 It is also 
likely that documentary evidence, perhaps involving third party 
carriers or the like, may exist to demonstrate the time of lessee's 
receipt of possession of the equipment under the lease.268 But 
when a debtor grants a security interest in previously acquired 
equipment, there often may be no evidence of the timing of the 
transaction other than the agreements between the debtor and the 
secured party. 
Under existing law, there is no timing issue for leases at all. If 
a transaction is a true lease, the lessor's interest generally prevails 
over prior and subsequent creditors of and purchasers from the 
lessee.269 Adopting a filing rule for leases at once would create a 
timing issue and require that the timing to be memorialized by a 
public filing. Moreover, it is probable that leases would not be sub-
jected strictly to the first-to-file rule in any event, assuming a filing 
were made substantially contemporaneously with the leasing trans-
action. A purchase money-type priority rule would be appropriate 
for leases if a filing requirement were imposed. 270 The lessor's in-
acqu isition of goods provides adequate means to discover leases. Jd. She is closer to the 
mark here, because she appears to recognize that discovery of leases may be easier than 
discovery of secured transactions. Yet, she fail s to explain explicitly why this is so. 
267. Sale-leaseback transactions, however, represent an exception to this point. See 
infra Part V.D. 
268. It is customary practice for professional equipment lessors to obtain an "accept-
ance and delivery certificate" or the like in order to memorialize the delivery of equipment 
to lessees. See Bayer, supra note 122, at 166-68. 
269. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 
270. Most commentators have acknowledged that a "purchase money" type priority 
rule, similar to§ 9-312(3) or (4), would be appropriate for leases if a filing requirement were 
imposed. Filing within 10 days after the lessee's receipt of possession of the equipment 
would be necessary for lessor priority if§ 9-312(4) were to be used as a model. Application 
of a rule based on § 9-312(3) , which covers purchase money security interests in inventory, 
would requi re the lessor to file and to give notice to prior-filed secured parties prior to the 
lessee's receipt of possession. See also U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (1987) (purchase money security 
interest perfected by filing within ten days after debtor receives possession has priority over 
intervening lien creditor). How would these purchase money priority rules work in the case 
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terest, then, would be superior to previously or subsequently filed 
or perfected security interests. 
(b) Purchase money security interests.-The argument that 
the information, timing, and veracity characteristics of public filing 
provide greater benefits for secured transactions than would result 
from a filing requirement for leases can be criticized on the basis 
that it fails to take account of the treatment of purchase money 
security interests under Article 9. Certainly, purchase money se-
curity interests have more in common with leases than do other 
security interests. Purchase money security interests in equipment, 
however, are not excused from the Article 9 filing requirements271 
and also are not strictly subjected to the first-to-file priority 
rule. 272 And, like most leases, purchase money security interests 
necessarily involve the acquisition of a new asset.273 
This criticism is well taken. Filing does provide smaller bene-
fits for purchase money security interests than for transfers of 
security interests in earlier-acquired collateral. Nevertheless, some 
features of purchase money security interests and leases suggest 
of a lessee which never received possession of the goods (such as when a lessor or vendor 
delivers goods directly to a sublessee without the lessee ever obtaining possession)? Would 
proponents of a filing rule based on curing ostensible ownership problems be satisfied if 
such a lessor were not required to file? A literal application of rules such as those in §§ 9-
301(2), 9-312(3), and 9-312(4) could mean that the filing necessary for purchase money pri-
ority could be delayed indefinitely, since the ten-day grace periods provided in those 
sections do not begin to run until the debtor receives possession of the collateral. Cf. In re 
Automated Bookbinding Servs., Inc., 471 F .2d 546, 552 (4th Cir. 1972) ("receives posses-
sion" as used in § 9-312(4) means the demonstration of ostensible ownership through 
exercise of "simple physical control," citing 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 29.3, at 787). 
The same issue can arise und er current law for a purchase money lender (the secured party) 
to an equipment lessor (the debtor) when the equipment is delivered by the vendor directly 
to the lessee. A purchase money security interest even might be perfected after the com-
mencement of a bankruptcy case and nevertheless prevail over a § 544(a) avoidance claim. 
See Bankruptcy Code §§ 544(a), 546(b). But see Bankruptcy Code § 547(e)(2)(C) (transfer 
not perfected within ten days after it is effective between the parties deemed to be made 
"immediately before the date of the filing of the petition"). That it may seem bizzare for the 
late-filing purchase money secured party to be prior to competing secured parties and lien 
creditors, so long as it files prior to a final determination of priority, serves to undercut 
arguments that the Article 9 perfection and priority scheme is grounded essentially on an 
ostensible ownership rationale. I would argue t hat when purchased goods reach a state of 
repose in connection with a fully consummated sale transaction, the ten-day grace period 
should begin to run notwithstanding that the debtor-buyer may not have received actual 
physical possession of the goods. 
271. See U.C.C. §§ 9-302(1), 9-303 (1987). 
272. See id. §§ 9-301(2), 9-312(3), 9-312(4). 
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that a filing regime produces greater benefits in the case of 
purchase money security interests than would result from a filing 
requirement for leases. For example, in many purchase money 
financings the debtor receives documentation evidencing title 
which does not reflect the existence of the purchase money secured 
party.274 Additionally, there may or may not exist a prior-filed se-
cured party claiming an interest in the new equipment, and even if 
such a prior-secured party does exist, its security interest may be 
extinguished subsequently by satisfaction of the secured obliga-
tion. As to all subsequent claimants, then, the purchase money 
secured party is like any other secured creditor, and the first-to-file 
rule will ensure priority. 27 r; Moreover, a debtor's "equity" in equip-
ment subject to a purchase money security interest, even if the 
security interest is perfected by filing, may be put in play in the 
marketplace by the creation of a subordinate security interest, at-
tachment, execution by a creditor, or other transfer of the 
equipment.276 As to subsequent claimants and transferees, filing 
for purchase money security interests provides benefits (informa-
tion, timing, and veracity for ordering priorites) similar to those 
274 . This situation exists when a debtor borrows money and uses it to purchase the 
collateral. If the only documentary evidence of the debtor's acquisition of the collateral is a 
conditional sale or similar agreement, then the debtor's title documentation itself would be 
likely to reflect the secured party's interest. But excluding conditional sales from a filing 
requirement would encourage parties to structure financings as conditional sales so as to 
avoid filing. 
275. It can also be argued that Article 9 need not be taken as it is found in order to 
compare the relative benefits of a filing requirement for leases. Perhaps Article 9 ought not 
to require filing for purchase money priority as against prior-filed secured parties. That was 
the law prior to the Code. See Carlson & Shupack, Judicial Lien Priorit ies Under Article 9 
of the Uniform Commercial Code (pt. 1) , 5 CARDOZO L REv. 287, 326 & n.169 (1984); see 
also infra note 296. I do not attempt to sustain that argument here. Note, however , that 
such an approach would be inconsistent with one of the basic conceptual underpinnings of 
Article 9: the unification of treatment of all secured transactions that have the same eco-
nomic effect without making unnecessary distinctions based on the form of the transaction 
or the location of "title." See U.C.C. § 9-101 comment ("The aim of this Article is to provide 
a simple and unified structure within which the immense variety of present-day secured 
financing transactions can go forward with less cost and with greater certainty. "). See gener-
ally 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 9.1, at 288-94 . Yet, Article 9 does contain exceptions 
from filing as a condition to perfection. See U .C. C. § 9-302(1)(a) ( 1987) . 
276. The equity may result from a downpayment, reduction in the secured debt, or 
appreciation of the equipment. A transfer of an interest in the equipment might or might 
not violate the debtor's agreement with the purchase money secured party. See U.C.C. § 9-
311 (1987) ("debtor's rights in collateral may be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred ... 
notwithstanding a provision in the security agreement prohibiting any transfer or making 
the transfer constitute a default") . 
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provided for other secured transactions. A filing requirement for 
leases might provide fewer benefits. If a lease were perfected by a 
proper filing, then, as under current law, the lessee would have no 
interest to transfer or to be subjected to creditors ' claims except a 
leasehold interest. Leasehold interests are inherently less marketa-
ble interests than ownership interests and consequently may be 
less frequently put in play, especially by honest lessees, than own-
ership interests in equipment subject to security interests, 
purchase money or otherwise. 277 Some will be unconvinced by ar-
guments that appear to split hairs so as to distinguish between 
benefits provided by filing for purchase money security interests 
and leases. Others may argue that filing should not be required for 
purchase money security interests. 278 The issue is where to draw 
the line. 279 
(c) Contextual differences between secured transactions and 
leases .-The previous discussion in this Part illustrates some ways 
in which the benefits that would be achieved by a filing require-
ment for leases might be less significant than those which result 
from the existing filing requirement for secured transactions. But 
that discussion is incomplete. It fails to acknowledge explicitly that 
Article 9's shape largely reflects patterns of credit markets rather 
than property markets. The discussion implicitly proceeded on the 
premise that the principal, if not the sole, function of the Article 9 
scheme is to provide a means of ensuring a secured creditor's prior 
claim to specific assets of a debtor. 
Article 9 does not limit either the types of "obligations" which 
may be secured by a security interest in personal property or who 
277. As an empirica l matter, a leasehold interest in equipment probably is far less 
useful to a lessee's cred itors and t ransferrees than an ownership interest in equipment sub-
ject to a pr ior security interest. See id . § 2A-303 (1) (lease contract may prohibit voluntary 
t ransfers; effectiveness of transfers that materia lly increase burden or risk to a party de -
pends on p roviding specified protections t o such party); id . § 2A-307(1) (credi tor of lessee 
gen era lly t akes subject to lease contract) . S ee generally H arris, The Rights of Creditors 
Under Article 2A , 39 ALA. L. REv. 803 (1988) (this Symposium). 
278. Pu blic fi ling rules were slow to be adopted for cond itional sales. S ee generally 
supra notes 182- 88 and accompanying text. Although the ost ensible ownership concerns af-
ter the delivery of goods under a condit ional sale and in t he case of a chattel mortgage are 
the same, generally the courts responded with less concern about the fraud potential of 
condi tional sa les t han with the ''secret " nonpossessory mortgage of goods already on hand. 
279. Even if t he benefits provided by fil ing for purchase money security interests and 
leases were the same, the costs of imposing a fi ling requiremen t for leases could be greater. 
See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text. 
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may be a secured party. 280 But it cannot be seriously questioned 
that security interests usually are taken by professional lenders or 
sellers engaged in the business of extending credit. Viewing se-
cured transactions in the context of a credit market may provide 
insight into the function of the perfection and priority rules that is 
not provided by considering those rules either in the context of a 
system of ordering claims to specific property or in the context of 
curing ostensible ownership concerns arising from nonpossessory 
interests in personal property. As discussed in Part IV, secured 
creditors may be expected to rely less on collateral than lessors 
rely on the residual interest in leased goods. 281 A filing requirement 
for secured transactions may provide benefits relating to credit ex-
tension and related conveyancing aspects of t he Article 9 
perfection and priority rules which might not be provided by a fil-
ing requirement for leases. 
Operating in conjunction with the concept of notice filing and 
the broad sweep of after-acquired property and future advance 
clauses, Article 9's first-to-file rule282 may create a "situational mo-
nopoly' ' for a secured creditor.283 Aided by the first-to-file rule, an 
abbreviated notice filing and a security agreement entitles a se-
cured party to obtain priority in after-acquired personal property, 
as well as existing personal property, to secure existing debt and 
future advances. 284 T he dominant, exclusive position which a se-
cured creditor may achieve under Article 9 may be usefully 
characterized as the "relational" aspect of secured transactions. 285 
280. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1987) ("'Security interest' means an interest in personal 
property or fixtures which secures an obligation."). The term "obligation" is not defined in 
the Code. 
281. See supra text accompanying notes 118-25. 
282 . See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1 987); see also id. § 9-30l(l)(b). 
283. See, e.g. , Jackson & Kronman, supra note 235, at 1167 ("Although the after-ac-
qu ired property clause saves costs, it also creat es what economists call a 'situational 
monopoly,' in that a creditor with a security interest in after -acquired property enjoys a 
special competitive advantage over other lenders in all his subsequent dea li ngs with the 
debtor. " (footnote omitted)). 
284. See U.C.C . § 9-204( 1) (1987) (security agreement may cover after-acquired colla t -
eral ); id . § 9-204(3) (secured obligations may include future advances); id. § 9-205 & 
comment 1 (debtor's liberty to "use, commingle or dispose .. _of collateral" does not render 
secur ity interest " invalid or fraudulent against creditors"; repealing rule of Benedict v. 
Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (192.5)); id. § 9-312(5)(a) (general first-to -file-or-perfect priority rule as 
among secured cred itors) ; id. § 9-402 (formal req uisites of financing sta tements). 
285. See Scott, supra note 11. Scott reviews and critiques various current theories 
seek ing to explain why secured credit exists and the benefits, if any, that it provides. A 
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The related, but in some respects discrete, functions of infor-
mation, ordering of priorities, timing, and veracity embraced by 
the Article 9 filing scheme serve not only to identify and evidence 
claims to collateral, but also to identify the existence and extent of 
the dominant position of secured creditors.286 Secured creditors, 
then, may stake claims on relationships as well as collateral. 287 The 
user-friendly structure of Article 9 many not be so friendly to gen-
eral creditors who do not hold a dominant position by virtue of 
secured status. But the informational attributes of the filing sys-
tem may protect such creditors from such security interests just as 
it provides protection for secured creditors.288 
principal criticism is the emphasis that such theories place upon the collateral itself is the 
"focal point for the creditor's efforts to discourage asset substitutions or conversion ." !d. at 
911. He also criticizes such theories for assuming that the myriad types and contexts of 
secured financing are subject to explanation by a single theory. 
While the drafters of the Code sought to achieve some transactional efficiency by 
bringing these diverse patterns under a single regulatory scheme, they may have un-
wittingly contributed to the current uncertainty. It is unlikely that a single 
explanation can rationalize all of these various forms of security. Because they are 
attempts at comrehensiveness [sic], current analyses are vulnerable to criticism from 
competing visions. As a consequence, the existing literature fails to assemble and 
evaluate even the most rudimentary data on patterns of secured and unsecured 
lending. 
!d. at 912. Scott examines prevailing patterns of secured credit and finds them largely con-
sistent with a "relational theory" of secured financing. !d. at 918-19, 925-33, 958-59. 
Here, Scott's article is useful only as an example of the identification and description of 
the dominant relationship that a secured creditor may achieve as a result of the Article 9 
priority scheme. I do not address or express any view here on whether Scott's more refined 
descriptions of and hypotheses concerning creditor and debtor behavior are accurate or 
demonstrate economic benefits of secured credit, as he claims. 
The "relational" aspect of secured credit, as I have qualified the use of that term, is not 
unlike the "enterprise theory," which Leary described more than twenty years ago. See 
Leary, Secured Transactions, Revolution or Evolution, 22 MIAMI L. REv. 54, 62-65 (1967) 
("Let others talk of the floating lien, the author prefers the 'enterprise concept'; the idea of 
a going concern or a flow of goods, or a balance-sheet asset, even if fluctuating, as security 
for a debt."). 
286. The meager requirements for financing statements under § 9-402 may require a 
searcher of the files to undertake further investigation to uncover the facts. See supra note 
254. 
287. This may explain some of the interest in Article 9 filings by some unsecured cred-
itors and, thereby, the rule providing lien creditors with priority over unperfected security 
interests. See infra notes 300-01 and accompanying text. 
288. The exceptions to the first-to-file rule, principally the purchase money priority 
rules of§ 9-312(3) and (4), underscore the obvious point that notice of the potentially domi-
nant posiiion of a secured creditor is not the only function of the Article 9 filing scheme. 
Just as no single explanation may account for the occurrence of or the benefits provided by 
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It would be anomalous for features such as after-acquired 
property clauses and future advance clauses to be included in an 
lease agreement. A lessor's interest in discrete leased equipment, 
therefore, would not represent the same type of "threat" to a 
lessee's creditors that is represented by many secured financing ar-
rangements. Lessors would not be expected to occupy the role of a 
dominant, relational secured creditor. Consequently, a filing re-
quirement for leases would not provide information about a 
dominant relationship or a transaction possessing significant con-
veyancing attributes, such as after-acquired property and future 
advance clauses. 
(d) Different effects on beneficiaries.-How would a filing re-
quirement for leases of equipment affect the potential beneficiaries 
of such a requirement, assuming the general applicability of the 
Article 9 priority rules? A response to this question will illustrate 
some of the points previously made in this Part, as well as some 
additional points. 
(i) Buyers: Non-secured creditor purchasers.-Buyers of 
goods in ordinary course of business would be affected very little 
by a filing requirement for leases. Even in the unusual situation 
where goods are leased to a merchant dealer in goods of that kind, 
such buyers would take free of the interest of a lessor to their 
seller.289 Buyers of used equipment not in ordinary course would 
benefit to the the extent that they would take free of an un-
perfected lessor's interest, assuming a priority rule similar to 
section 9-301(1)(c) were adopted for unperfected leases. Under ex-
isting law such buyers would not take free of a lessor's interest. 290 
It is doubtful, however, that a filing rule would be worth the candle 
solely on the basis of protection of such buyers. Unless such a 
buyer were completely happy to accept the seller-lessee's 
creditworthiness to stand behind title warranties, buyers in such 
non-ordinary course transactions ought to, and probably do in 
secured credit, no single explanation may account for the existence and function of the filing 
scheme for secured transactions. 
289. U.C.C. §§ 2-403(2) & (3) (1987). Application of the priority rule of§ 9-307(1) to 
leases would have the same effect. See id. § 2A-305(2). 
290. The rule of nemo dat holds here. See id. § 2-403(1) (first sentence). Not only 
would a buyer who is not a buyer in ordinary course of business fail to take free of a lessor's 
interest, but a lessee may be restricted from voluntarily transferring its leasehold interest. 
See id. § 2A-303(l)(a) & (7). This is a different rule than would apply to a debtor's transfer 
of an interest in collateral. Id. § 9-311. 
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most cases, investigate the source of the seller's title. 291 Such an 
investigation likely would reveal the existence of the lessor's 
interest. 292 
(ii) Secured creditors.-Baird has argued forcefully that 
the principal beneficiaries of Article 9 filing are secured creditors 
and potential secured creditors who require information in order to 
be assured of priority.293 A creditor who obtains a security interest 
in a debtor's existing equipment would benefit from a filing rule 
for leases if the secured creditor failed to investigate the source of 
the debtor's title and if the debtor's misbehavior deceived the se-
cured party as to the existence of the debtor's lessor. 294 Secured 
purchase money financers of used equipment can make the same 
investigation of title as that made by non-ordinary course 
buyers. 295 
As for lenders who claim an interest in after-acquired prop-
erty, the value of after-acquired property clauses is most 
pronounced in the context of financing continually shifting masses 
of property, such as inventory and receivables, rather than in the 
context of financing used equipment.296 A principal value of after-
291. The statement in the text is based on personal experiences and observations of 
documentation and procedures employed in sales transactions and commonly rendered ad-
vice of counsel to buyers. See also Burns, supra note 26, at 459 (arguing that because of the 
''unusual nature of such transactions" such buyers should rely on their own vigilance, in-
cluding "external evidence of title"). 
292. See supra text accompanying notes 258-59. 
293. Baird, supra note 79, at 60-62. 
294. See supra text accompanying notes 257-59. 
295. See supra text accompanying note 291. If the debtor were a buyer in ordinary 
course of business, the purchase money financer would be sheltered from claims of the 
seller's secured creditors or a lessor to the seller to the same extent as the debtor. See supra 
note 289 and accompanying text. 
296. See U.C.C. § 9-204(1) comment 2 (1987); see also Hawkland, Consignments 
Under the U.C C .. Sales or Security?, UC C CooRDINATOR ;:S95, 412-13 (1963); Jackson & 
Kronman, supra note 235, at 1166-67. Some commentators have argued that this phenome-
non suggests the propriety of applying a "transactional" filing rule, rather than the Article 9 
presumption favoring notice filing, for collateral other than inventory, receivables, and the 
like. See Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities Among Secured 
Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 HARV L. REv. 8:38, 879-80 (1959); Jackson & 
Kronman, supra note 235, at 1180-82. 
Baird and .Jackson argue that the law should condition purchase money priority in 
equipment on the giving of notice to a prior-filed secured party, as is now required for 
purchase money priority in inventory. Compare U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1987) with id. § 9-312(4). 
See Baird & .Jackson, supra note 10, at 194-96. Apparently they perceive that secured credi-
tors claiming after-acquired equipment place such reliance on equipment that negative 
covenants of debtors do not provide sutficient protection. Remarkably, they base their argu-
( 
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acquired property clauses covering equipment may lie in the rela-
tional function of security rather than secured creditor reliance on 
collateral value of equipment that a debtor may acquire from time 
to time. 297 Empirical investigation might demonstrate that the 
chief benefit of a filing rule for leases, insofar as secured creditors 
of lessees claiming under after-acquired property clauses are con-
cerned, would be only the prospect for an unexpected "windfall" 
when a lessor fails to file or makes a defective filing. 298 
In sum, it is plausible that the principal effects of a filing re-
quirement for leases would be to protect certain creditors who 
claim security interests in equipment, but fail to investigate their 
debtor's source of title and are deceived by their debtor's misbe-
havior, and to provide a windfall potential to secured creditors who 
claim under after-acquired property clauses. 
(iii) Unsecured creditors.-It is likely that the chief im-
pact on unsecured creditors of a filing requirement for leases would 
be a windfall benefit resulting from a lessor's noncompliance with a 
filing requirement. 299 Although Baird acknowledges that some ben-
ment on ostensible ownership grounds, but they fail to address the empirical question of 
creditor awareness and reliance on debtors ' possession of after-acquired equipment. See 
supra text accompanying notes 220-23. 
297. I do not suggest that an after-acquired property clause covering accounts and 
inventory, for example, may not similarly place secured creditors in a dominant position. 
Rather , the point is that because equipment acquisitions generally are more infrequent, 
sproadic, and fortuitous than accounts and inventory acquisitions, from a lender's perspec-
tive creditor reliance on the collateral value of such equipment is likely to be less 
pronounced. See Harris, A Reply to Theodore Eisenberg 's Bankruptcy in Perspective, 30 
UCLA L. REv. 327, 338 n.66 (explaining that the two-point test of Bankruptcy Code § 
547(c)(5) voidable preference exception properly applies only to accounts and receivables, 
not equipment): 
[T]hose who take equipment as collateral typically expect the original collateral to 
remain in the debtor's possession so that he can use it to generate income that will 
enable him to repay the loan. Although they may easi ly take a security interest in 
after-acquired equipment, ordinarily these lenders do not expect to rely upon it and 
would be protected without it. 
298. The NCF A proposal appears to limit the effect of a lessor's failure to file to cir-
cumstances more likely to involve reliance-i.e., the priority would work only in favor of 
secured parties and only to the extent of advances made after the lessee came into posses-
sion. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. In the absence of evidence that secured 
financers generally become aware that after-acquired equipment has been acquired by their 
debtors, however, the possibili ty remains that the reliance nexus is indirect and tenuous. 
299. The reference to unsecured creditors is intended to include lien creditors because 
priority over an unperfected lessor under § 9-30l(l)(b) would depend on achieving that sta-
tus . The "windfall" refers to the senior claim to equipment that was not relied upon by an 
unsecured creditor at the time credit was extended. Obviously, there is some actual reliance 
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efits of filing information inure to unsecured creditors, he 
questions whether such benefits alone would justify the costs of the 
filing system. 300 But, even if unsecured creditors typically do not 
conduct record searches they may receive relevant information on 
filings indirectly, such as through credit reporting services. 301 Em-
pirical data relating to the impact of filings on unsecured creditor 
behavior and credit decisions would be useful. However, Baird 
probably is correct that the benefits that unsecured creditors re-
ceive from information contained in Article 9 filings are even less 
significant, and less direct than those afforded secured creditors. 302 
And, to the extent that unsecured creditors do rely on filings, it 
may suggest that the identification of dominant relational secured 
creditors, rather than claims to discrete goods, is paramount. 
3. Conclusions.-Filing under Article 9 provides various bene-
fits, but the nature and magnitude of the benefits differ according 
to the context. It is difficult to identify and isolate any overriding 
theme or theoretical basis for Article 9's filing rules that applies 
uniformly in all contexts. Although a filing requirement for leases 
would seem to provide fewer and smaller benefits than filing pro-
vides for many secured transactions under existing law, the 
disparity is the least when leases are compared with purchase 
money security interests held by sellers of goods. The question is 
on any property levied upon once a creditor goes to the time, trouble, and expense to levy 
execution. See Burns, supra note 26, at 459-61. 
300. Baird, supra note 79, at 60-62; see also Burns, supra note 26, at 456-57. 
30 1. For example, standard Business Information Reports issued by Dun & Bradstreet 
Inc. always include information on public filings , including Art icle 9 filings, against the 
debtor covered by the report. This information provides important signals to existing and 
prospective unsecured trade creditors and sometimes may affect the type of credit terms 
extended to the debtor or even may be the basis for denying credit extensions. Telephone 
interview with Delaine Donohue, Senior Vice-President, Dun & Bradstreet Information Re -
sources (July 10, 1987). 
302. Baird, supra note 79, at 60-62. T o the extent that benefits of the fi ling system for 
unsecured cretlitors are questionable, what justification exists fo r the § 9-301(l)(b) rule that 
provides priority to lien creditors, irrespective of knowledge, over unperfected security inter-
ests? Concerns about ostensible ownership do not appear to offer an explanation; it is 
diffi cult to imagine that existing or potential unsecured creditors would investigate and rely 
on a debtor's physical possession of assets, especially equipment, wh ile fa iling to investigate 
and rely , directly or indirectly, on public records. Carlson has persuasively argued that the 
priority rule of § 9-301(1)(b) is not justifiable on efficiency grounds alone. See Carlson, 
supra note 235, at 218-23. The antifraud and anticollusion function of filing may offer justi -
fi cations for the rule. See supra note 265, text accompanying notes 260-70. The rule also 
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where, short of a title registration system for all interests m per-
sonal property, the line ought to be drawn. 
C. Code Treatment of Consignments and Sales of Accounts 
and Chattel Paper: Analogues, Exceptions, or Red Herrings? 
Several commentators have relied on the Code's treatment of 
consignments of goods and sales of certain receivables as support 
for their arguments that leases should be subjected to a filing re-
quirement. 303 In both consignments and sales of receivables, the 
Code places the burden of giving public notice on a "real" owner of 
personal property at the risk of subordinating the owner's interest 
to creditors. Those who question the wisdom of adopting a filing 
requirement for leases ought to distinguish the treatment of con-
signments and sales of receivables from that which would apply to 
leases under a filing rule or, alternatively, explain why the treat-
ment of consignments and sales of receivables is not appropriate. 
This Subpart addresses the Code's treatment and concludes that 
the imposition of a filing requirement for leases might produce 
fewer net benefits and impose greater costs than result from the 
public notice requirements applicable to consignments and sales of 
certain receivables. 
1. Consignments.-The Code perpetuated the pre-Code dis-
tinction between "true" consignments and consignments which are 
disguised secured transactions. 304 True consignments are dealt with 
303. See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 189 n.46; Coogan & Boss, supra note 
53,§ 4.3.04[4][a], at 4.3-45 to -46; Hawkland, supra note 46, at 114; Leary, supra note 25, at 
1088. 
304. Section 1-201(37) provides, in pertinent part: " Unless a [lease or] consignment is 
intended as security, reservation of title thereunder is not a 'security interest,' but a con-
signment in any event is subject to the provisions on consignment sales (Section 2-326)." 
U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1987) (emphasis added). The bracketed language in the quotation was 
deleted and the italicized language was added by the 1987 Official Text. The effect of these 
changes was to remove leases from the operation of the sentence and to change the sentence 
structure slightly. No substantive change affecting consignments was made or intended. 
Consignments had a checkered past under pre-Code law. The use of consignments was em-
ployed both as a device to enhance marketing (i.e., the consignee was not obligated to 
purchase the consigned goods, at least until they are sold to a third party) and as a price 
fixing scheme. The demise of the latter purpose was occasioned by developments in anti-
trust law. Judicial treatment, even when consignments were respected in theory, tended to 
be unfriendly based on ostensible ownership, as weii as fraud, concerns spawned by the 
consignor's "secret" interest. See generally 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 3.5, at 73-75; 
Dolan, supra note 16, at 22-24; Duesenberg, Consignment Dist ribution Under the Uniform 
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in section 2-326, which provides that when goods are delivered for 
"sale or return" (i.e., "primarily for resale"), they are "subject to .. 
. claims [of the buyer's creditors] while in the buyer's posses-
sion."305 But an exception to this rule is made when public notice 
of the consignor's interest is given.306 The public notice required 
normally is satisfied by the filing of a financing statement as if the 
transaction were subject to Article 9. 307 Thus, the treatment of 
consignments under section 2-326 imposes a filing requirement on 
bailments of goods and the sanction for noncompliance is subordi-
nation to the bailee's creditors-essentially the same result urged 
by proponents of a filing requirement for leases, which are another 
form of bailment. 
The Code's present treatment of consignments does not sup-
port an argument that a filing requirement should be imposed on 
leases as a logical extension based on similar policy concerns. If 
anything, the Code treatment suggests the opposite. Section 2-
326(2) expressly provides that goods delivered for "sale on ap-
proval" (i.e., "when goods are delivered primarily for use") "are 
not subject to claims of the buyer's creditors until acceptance."308 
On the merits, the existing provisions of section 2-326 dealing with 
"sale or return" and "sale on approval" do not tend to advance the 
argument either for or against a filing rule for leases. 
Commercial Code: Code, Bankruptcy, and Antitrust Considerations, 2 VAL. U.L. REv. 227, 
228-41, 243-46 (1968); Hawkland, supra note 46, at 108-12. 
As with leases for security, consignments for security create full-fledged security inter-
ests subject to the Article 9 rules, but true consignments are generally excluded from the 
scope of Article 9. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37), 9-102(2) (1987). Although true consignments are not 
security interests, § 9-114 does deal with the priority between a true consignor and secured 
creditors of the consignee. See infra text accompanying notes 318-22. 
305. U.C.C. § 2-326(1) & (2) (1987). When goods are delivered for sale to a dealer in 
such goods the delivery is "deemed to be on sale or return." I d. § 2-326(3) (first sentence). 
306. !d. § 2-326(3) (third sentence). 
307. See id. § 2-326(3)(c). The public notice requirement also may be satisfied if the 
consignor "complies with an applicable law providing for a consignor's interest or the like to 
be evidenced by a sign" or "establishes that the person conducting the business is generally 
known by his creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others." Id. § 2-
326(3)(a) & (b) . The dearth of sign posting laws and the uncertainty inherent in the "gener-
ally known" standard make Article 9 filing the only practical alternative for the true 
consignor. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SuMMERS, HANDBOOK ON THE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE 
883-85 (2d ed. 1980); Hawkland, supra note 46, at 109. 
308. U.C.C. § 2-326(2) (1987) (emphasis added). However, the rule in subsection (2) of 
§ 2-326 is made subject to the provisions of subsection (3), with the result that even a con-
signment for use, pending acceptance, will be subject to the public notice requirements if 
the the consignee maintains a place of business and deals with goods of the same kind. 
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What policies are promoted and what benefits are provided by 
the public notice requirements of section 2-326? The Official Com-
ment indicates that protection is afforded in circumstances where 
"creditors of the buyer may reasonably be deemed to have been 
misled by the secret reservation" of title by the consignor. 309 The 
rationale of the Comment is the ostensible ownership concern cre-
ated by the consignee's possession of the goods. 310 Dolan has 
questioned the assumption that creditors rely on the consignee's 
possession and has argued persuasively that the current policy ra-
tionale of section 2-326 is the protection of creditors from 
fraudulent practices. 311 Whatever label or rationale is asserted as 
the policy justification for the filing requirement resulting from 
section 2-326, there are fundamental differences between true con-
signments and leases. These differences relate to the nature and 
309. !d. § 2-326 comment 2. 
310. See Dolan , supra note 16, at 29. 
311. Dolan has stated: 
The only advantage of the pro-creditor rule [of § 2-326(2) & (3)] today is its inhibi-
tion of fraudulent practices at little cost ... .. 
At one time creditors may have relied on their debtor 's stock in trade , but mod-
ern commercial lenders, beginning with the advent of open-account selling and 
inventory finan cing, stopped extending credit based on a debtor's ostensible owner-
ship of merchandise. Today creditors either investigate that appearance or do not 
rely on it at all. 
Modern credit practices thus have outgrown the ostensible-ownership doctrine. 
Creditors actually do not rely on their debtors' ostensible ownership of inventory; 
instead they verify that ownership with more than filing searches, rely on other col-
lateral, or depend on the general creditworthiness of the borrower or a guarantor. 
!d. at 29-30 (footnotes omitted). Interestingly, Dolan ultimately concludes that antifraud 
considerations alone do not justify denial of protection to the true consignor, such as by 
imposing a public notice requirement, but he justifies the public notice rules of § 2-326 on 
the grounds that "the cost of distinguishing" the true consignment from the security con-
signment " is great." !d. at 35. But see Coogan, supra note 24, at 958 n.126 ("The test as to 
whether a consignment is a true consignment or a disguised security agreement should pro-
vide no difficulty except in establishing the bargain of the parties."). Note also that the 
failure to tile will subordinate the true consignor's interest to all creditors of the consignee 
while the security consignor would be subordinated only to such creditors who have become 
lien creditors . Compare U.C.C. § 2-326(2) (1987) with id. § 9-30 l (l)(b). See Hawkland , 
supra note 46, at 110. Yet, this difference is of little practical significance in most circum -
stances because the principal means for a creditor to acquire an interest in the goods is for 
such creditor to become a lien creditor. See U.C.C. § 9-301(3) (1987) (defining "lien credi-
tor"). Moreover , the consignee's trustee in bankruptcy could avoid the unfiled true 
consignor's interest as well as the unfiled security consignor's interest. See Bankruptcy Code 
§ 544(a) & (b). 
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extent of the benefits to be derived from and the costs imposed by 
a filing requirement. 
The consignor desires and probably expects that the goods will 
be sold by the consignee to a third party buyer. If and when the 
goods are sold, the consignor expects to receive only a payment 
from the consignee equal to the purchase price of the goods. The 
consignor's role is similar to that of a credit seller to the consignee; 
after a sale to a third party, the consignor is a creditor of the con-
signee with respect to payment of the price of the goods. 312 The 
effect of a consignor's noncompliance with a filing requirement 
does not result in any increase in the amount of the consignor's 
claim over the amount expected to be claimed upon the sale of the 
goods to a third party-the purchase price. In contrast, a lessor 
does not expect to have a claim against the lessee for the entire 
value of the leased goods except upon the occurrence of uncontem-
plated events, such as destruction or loss of the goods. 313 The 
lessor expects to claim only the rentals and redelivery of the goods 
at the end of the lease term.314 In the event of either nonfiling or a 
sale of the goods to a third party, the consignor expects to lose its 
rights in the goods.315 Nonfiling by a lessor (assuming a filing rule 
were to apply), however, would have the effect of cutting off the 
lessor's expected residual interest in the goods.316 The risks and 
costs of noncompliance are greater for the lessor than for the 
consignor. 317 
Other distinguishing contextual features arise from the nature 
of goods consigned for "sale or return" as "inventory."318 Section 
9-114 provides a priority rule as between the interest of the true 
312. See U.C.C. § 9-114 comment 1 (1987) ("It is believed that under many true con-
signments the consignor acquires a claim for an agreed amount against the consignee at the 
moment of sale, and does not look to the proceeds of such sale." (emphasis added)). 
313. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
314 . See supra text accompanying notes 112-31. 
:n5. The typical context of consignments suggests that most buyers would be "buyers 
in ordinary course of business" and would take free of the consignor's interest under § 2-
40:3(2), just as such buyers would take free of the security consignor's security interest under 
§ 9-307(1). 
:316. See supra text accompanying notes 112-31. 
317. Essentially the same arguments and reasoning set forth in Part IV apply here. 
See supra text accompanying notes 112-31. 
:118. The characterization of the goods as inventory, as defined in § 9-109(4), would 
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consignor and secured creditors of the consignee. That rule is sub-
stantially the same as the inventory purchase money priority rule 
of section 9-312(3). 319 Hawkland has explained the need for filing 
as well as notice to prior-filed creditors in the case of purchase 
money financing of inventory and consignments. 320 Because inven-
tory, by its nature, is expected to be sold and replaced continually, 
secured creditors rely substantially on after-acquired property 
clauses to assure them of a continuously prior perfected security 
interest in the shifting mass of inventory. 321 Secured party reliance 
on after-acquired property clauses covering more stable goods, 
such as equipment, is less significant. 322 Indeed, some inventory fi-
nancing may represent an example of frequent, actual reliance by 
secured creditors on debtors' possession of after-acquired prop-
erty.323 Whether or not reliance typically is placed on possession, 
the point remains that inventory financers have high expectations 
that there will be no unknown interference with their claims to 
shifting masses of inventory. 
Finally, the shifting nature of inventory makes it difficult for 
existing or potential secured creditors to rely on evidence of a 
debtor's source of title to inventory. Continual shipments of con-
signed goods might create much greater impediments to discovery 
of conflicting claims than normally would be expected in the case 
of equipment covered by leases. 324 For this reason the filing re-
319. If the consignor files a financing statement prior to the consignee's receipt of pos-
session of the goods and gives notification in writing to prior-filed secured parties claiming 
interests in that type of goods less than 5 years prior to the consignee's receipt of possession , 
the consignor will obtain priority over such prior-filed secured creditors of the consignee and 
"identifiable cash proceeds" from the goods. U.C .C. § 9-114(1) (1987). 
320. See Hawkland, supra note 46, at 111. 
321. ld. 
322. See supra notes 296-99 and accompanying text. Baird and Jackson, however, 
favor imposing on purchase money finance rs of equipment a § 9-:312(3) -type obligation to 
notify prior-tiled secured parties as a condition to purchase money priority. Baird & Jack-
son, supra note 10, at 194-96; see supra note 296. 
323. See White , supra note 92, at 397 (quoted su pra note 227). The statement in the 
text is supported by somewhat ci rcular reasoning since existing law induces reliance by in -
structing secured parties that such reliance is app rop riate for inventory until such time as a 
notification is received from a consignor or a purchase money inventory finan cer. See U.C.C. 
§§ 9-114(1), 9-312(3) (1987). 
324. See supra text accompanying notes 253-59 (discussing the effect of tiling on di s-
covery of conflicting claims and lower costs of discovering leases t ha n discovering secured 
transactions in the absence of a filing requirement). 
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quirement for consignments provides more benefits than such a 
requirement for leases would provide. 
2. Sales of receivables.-The Code mandates filing for certain 
sales of accounts325 and chattel paper326 by using a technique dif-
ferent than that employed for encouraging public notice of 
consignments. Sales of accounts and chattel paper actually create 
security interests that are subject to Article 9. 327 The principal ef-
fect of subjecting sales of such receivables to the Article 9 scheme 
is the impact of the Article 9 filing and priority rules. 328 In several 
respects the Article 9 treatment of sales of accounts and chattel 
paper seems to be an apt analogue for adopting a filing require-
ment for leases. The buyer of accounts or chattel paper is the 
"real" owner, and the Article 9 default and remedies provisions are 
inappropriate, just as with leases. Nevertheless, such sales are sub-
ject to the Article 9 perfection and priority rules. 
Including outright sales of accounts within the scope of Article 
9 was not a new idea. 329 However, the exclusion from the scope of 
Article 9 of the outright sales of certain receivables and other in-
tangibles is enlightening as to the Article 9 drafters' rationale for 
those that are included. Article 9 was intended to cover only sales 
325. "'Account' means any right to payment for goods sold or leased or for services 
rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper, whether or not it has 
been earned by performance." U.C.C. § 9-106 (1987). 
326. " 'Chattel paper' means a writing or writings which evidence both a monetary 
obligation and a security interest in or a lease of specific goods ... . "!d. § 9-105(1)(b). 
327. !d.§ 1-201(37) ("The term [security interest] also includes any interest of a buyer 
of accounts or chattel paper which is subject to Article 9."); see also id. § 9-102(1). Certain 
security interests in and sales of accounts and chattel paper, however, are excluded from the 
scope of Article 9. See id. § 9-104(f). Additionally, certain assignments of accounts are ex-
cluded from the Article 9 filing requirement. See id. § 9-302(1)(e). 
328. Security interests in accounts may be perfected only by filing, but security inter-
ests in chattel paper may be perfected either by filing or possession. !d. §§ 9-302(1), 9-305. 
Sales of receivables are largely excepted from the impact of the Article 9 default and rem-
edy provisions. Unlike security interests that secure an indebtedness, if accounts or chattel 
paper, which have been sold, are collected upon or disposed of after default, the secured 
party (i.e., buyer) is not entitled to a deficiency claim and the debtor (i.e., seller) is not 
entitled to any surplus, unless otherwise agreed. !d. §§ 9-502(2), 9-504(2). 
329. The same approach was employed in the pre-Code accounts receivable statutes, 
which generally encompassed security assignments as well as factoring transactions involv-
ing nonrecourse purchases of accounts. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 8.7, at 275-76, § 
10.5, at 308-09; see also supra note 196 and accompanying text. Gilmore explained that 
omitting such sales (i.e., factoring) transactions from the accounts receivable statutes would 
have exposed "non-notification" assignments to attack in bankruptcy under the rule of Corn 
Exch. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943). Chattel paper, per se, was 
not included within the scope of such statutes, however. 
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of intangibles within the context of typical business financing 
transactions; the sales of intangibles excluded from its scope were 
considered not to fit that mold. 330 
The functions and benefits of a filing requirement for sales of 
receivables reveal a pattern which is similar to that considered for 
consignments and conventional secured transactions securing obli-
gations. Sales of receivables subject to Article 9 are essentially 
financing transactions. Money passes from the buyer-secured party 
to the seller-debtor, and an interest in receivables of (presumably) 
equal value passes from the seller-debtor to the buyer-secured 
party. But, rather than relying on a contractual obligation of the 
seller-debtor to repay the funds advanced, the buyer-secured 
party's "way out" is the collection of the receivables from the ac-
count debtor obligors.331 Such transactions, indeed, are extensions 
of credit to the seller-debtor, but the buyer-secured party relies 
primarily on the creditworthiness of the account debtors rather 
than on that of the seller-debtor.332 Thus, loans secured by such 
receivables vary from sales of receivables in the degree of reliance 
on the debtor's creditworthiness. 
330. See 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 10.5, at 309 ("Article [9] was meant to apply 
to sales of intangibles in institutionalized financing transactions (such as factoring) ; the 
three types of transfers which are specifically excluded [by § 9-104(f)] are merely examples 
of 'non-financing' sales.") Section 9-104(f) excludes from the scope of Article 9: 
a sale of accounts or chattel paper as part of a sale of the business out of which they 
arose, or an assignment of accounts or chattel paper which is for the purpose of col-
lection only, or a transfer of a right to payment under a contract to an assignee who is 
also to do the performance under the contract or a transfer of a single account to an 
assignee in whole or partial satisfaction of a preexisting indebtedness. 
U.C.C. § 9-104([) (1987) . Gilmore does not otherwise dwell on the policy rationale for such 
exclusions except to note that "[o]ne defect of the accounts receivable statutes was that on a 
literal reading many transfers would be included (and thus subjected to filing requirements) 
which were not financing operations, which it made no sense to file, and which no one would 
ever think of filing." 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 23, § 10.5, at 309. 
331. Such transactions may be denominated "sales," "assignments," or "nonrecourse" 
or "limited-recourse" loans which limit the source of repayment to the collateral. The eco-
nomic effect is the same. 
332. Receivables financings are found in all shades of gray in a spectrum between 
clearly recourse loans secured by receivables and clearly nonrecourse sales. Coogan argued 
that the exceedingly difficult task of distinguishing the receivable sale from the secured loan 
is even more difficult than the parallel distinction between leases and secured transactions. 
Coogan, supra note 24, at 957-58. He concluded that this difficulty was an important justifi-
cation for subjecting receivables sales to the Article 9 filing regime since the filing rule 
would largely reduce the need to decide the issue at the outset of a transaction. I d. at 942-
47, 957-58. 
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Sales of receivables are both similar and dissimilar to equip-
ment leasing transactions in ways that influence an evaluation of 
relative benefits of a filing requirement. The nonrecourse feature of 
a receivables sale means that the buyer-secured party relies less on 
the debtor and more on the collateral (i.e., the account debtors' 
creditworthiness and any collateral for their obligations) than may 
occur with more conventional secured loans. As earlier discussed, 
equipment lessors similarly, and necessarily, rely more on the 
equipment involved than do lenders whose interests are secured by 
equipment. 3 3 3 However, it would be a mistake to conclude that a 
receivables buyer-secured party does not rely substantially on the 
creditworthiness and integrity of the seller-debtor. Unlike the typi-
cal equipment leasing scenario, the seller-debtor in a receivables 
sale typically generates the property (i.e., receivables) which is the 
subject of the transaction. Consequently, the buyer-secured party 
must rely on the business practices and integrity of the seller-
debtor as to the quality of the receivables (such as their validity 
and freedom from defenses of account debtors), the warranties of 
the seller-debtor with respect thereto, and the creditworthiness of 
the seller-debtor to back up such warranties.334 
Assuming those warranties are complied with, the receivables 
buyer-secured party relies on the property involved in order to re-
cover its investment, as does an equipment lessor. Moreover, 
nonfiling jeopardizes that recovery, as would be the case for nonfil-
ing if filing were to be required for leases, assuming Article 9 
priority rules were applied. But the unperfected receivables buyer-
secured party is left with an unsecured damage claim against the 
seller-debtor in an amount which is essentially equal (ignoring dis-
count and profit factors) to the value given to the seller-debtor.335 
333. See supra text accompanying notes 111-31. 
334. Although this feature serves to distinguish receivables sales from equipment 
leases, equ ipment lessors also may rely on the lessee for some analogous purposes such as 
the maintenance and repai r of the equipment. When a small number of large receivables are 
involved, receivables fina ncers may seek verification from account debtors as to the exis-
tence of the rece ivab les and the absence of claims and defenses. See U.C.C. § 9-318(1) 
(1987). Receivables financers also may require waivers of such defenses from account debt-
ors. S ee id . § 9-206(1) . 
33.5. The statement in the tex t assumes that the receivables sold are fully collectible 
or, at least, of the bargained -for value. Agreements fo r the sale of receivables invariably 
contain seller-debtor warranties of t itle and freedom from con flic ting claims as well as war-
ranties covering validity, enforceability, and the like . If an unperfected buyer-secured party 
is deprived of its inte rest in the receivables by a trustee in bankruptcy or a creditor of or 
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The equipment lessor's claim, however, might be substantially in 
excess of the value transferred to the lessee-the right to use the 
equipment during the lease term.336 Also, if the receivables sale 
transaction works out as expected, the receivables will be gone 
(i.e. , collected) at the end of the day. The essence of leasing trans-
actions, however, is the existence of the equipment's residual value 
for the lessor at the end of the term. Again, a lessor's investment in 
equipment may be subjected to a greater degree of risk, and cost, 
in the event of nonfiling or defective filing than presently exists for 
a receivables buyer-secured party.337 
There are other differences between receivables sales and 
leases which bear on the relative costs and benefits of a filing rule. 
First, as with most secured transactions, a receivables transaction 
begins with property owned by the debtor and, indeed, normally 
generated, through sales or services or extensions of credit, by the 
debtor. An investigation by a prospective lender or purchaser as to 
conflicting claims to the receivables, such as accounting records, 
invoices, or the like, would not be likely to uncover the nonexis-
tence of a prior transfer of the receivables by a less than honest 
debtor, especially if the account debtors had not been notified by a 
prior transferee. 338 The costs of discovery of competing claims, 
then , is greater for receivables than for equipment, in the absence 
of a filing rule. 339 Second, because assignments of receivables that 
are subject to the Article 9 filing rules take place exclusively in the 
financing credit context, the risk that such rules would affect non-
professionals adversely may be slight when compared to such risks 
in the context of leases of equipment. 340 Third, receivables often 
purchaser from the debtor-seller, the buyer-secured party would have a damage cla im for 
breach of warranty. 
336. S ee supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
337. See supra text accompanying notes 112-31. 
338. See supra text accompanying notes 257-59. However, sometimes an ass ignee of 
receivab les will mark the accounting records of the assignor so as to indicate the existence of 
t he assignment. 
339. See supra text accompanying notes 257-59. F iling also provides other, related 
benefits for receivables sales , such as priority ordering and discouragement of fraud and 
collusion, to a greater extent than would be the case if filing were required for leases. See 
supra text accompanying notes 260-79; see also Coogan, supra note 24, at 944 (" [T ]he prior-
ity rules of article 9, including the fi rst-to-file rule of § 9-312(5)(a) , might work poorly if 
sales of accounts we re outside the scope of the article. ") . 
340. See supra text accompanying note 141. The statement in t he text assumes that a 
fi ling ru le would be applicable to some nonprofessional lessors. 
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represent a debtor's most liquid collateral and its principal means 
of financing its operations. The importance of receivables as a 
source of financing, and the consequent importance of satisfying 
lenders' and purchasers' priority concerns, may justify the ex-
panded reach of the Article 9 filing rules for receivables. 341 Finally, 
the operation of the first-to-file rule, especially in the absence of 
influence from an overriding purchase money priority rule, when 
considered with the importance of receivables financing, suggests 
that receivables financings, including sales, frequently may involve 
dominant, exclusive, relational secured creditors. Notice of such re-
lationships provided by a filing rule may provide more significant 
benefits than would result from a filing requirement for leases. 342 
A comparison of costs and benefits of filing for receivables 
sales and equipment leases is especially problematic. There are no 
smoking guns. The principal reason given by the drafters for sub-
jecting receivables sales to Article 9 was the difficulty of 
distinguishing true sales from secured sales.343 The similar diffi-
culty inherent in the true lease-security interest distinction would 
seem to cut in favor of a filing requirement for leases. 3 44 But that 
argument is incomplete. The principal benefits of filing for receiv-
ables sales also result from the commercial importance of 
receivables financing, the need for information about conflicting 
claims and assurance of priority for lenders and buyers alike, and 
the difficulty of discovering such claims and verifying such priority 
in the absence of a filing requirement. In each case, filing for re-
ceivables sales provides more benefits than filing for leases. 
341. See Coogan, supra note 24, at 944. The importance of accounts financing was 
recognized by the drafters of the 1972 amendments to Article 9, which amended § 9-312 so 
as to make it clear that the priority of a purchase money securi ty interest in inventory 
extends only to cash proceeds and not to other proceeds such as accounts. See U.C.C. § 9-
312(3) & (6) (1987). "Accounts financing is more important in the economy t han financing 
the kinds of inventory that produce accounts, and the desirable rule is one which makes 
accounts finan cing certain as to its legal position." !d. § 9-312, Reasons for 1972 Change. 
342. See supra text accompanying notes 282-88. 
343. See U.C .C. § 9-102 comment para. 1 (1987) (" [C]ertain sales of accounts and 
chattel paper are brought within this Article to avoid di fficult problems of distinguishing 
between transactions intended for security and those not so intended.''). 
344. Coogan, however, argued that the Article 9 approach to sales of receivables 
should not be applied to leases, in part because t he distinction between a true sale of receiv-
ables and a loan secured by receivables is more difficult to make than the true lease-security 
interest distinction. Coogan, supra note 24, at 957-58. 
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3. Summary.-The foregoing discussion identified various 
characteristics of both consignments and sales of receivables that 
indicate greater benefits and fewer risks and costs may be achieved 
by the existing filing requirements for such transactions than 
would result from mandating filing for leases of equipment. Con-
signments and receivables sales, when viewed in the context in 
which they typically occur, demonstrate characteristics that sup-
port the wisdom of a filing requirement and that are not unlike 
those of more conventional secured transactions. 
D. Sale-Leaseback Transactions 
For a variety of reasons, an owner of equipment may desire to 
sell the equipment and lease it back, all the while maintaining pos-
session and use. If the leaseback is a security lease, rather than a 
true lease, the transaction as a whole amounts to nothing more 
than a loan secured by a "chattel mortgage" security interest.345 A 
consummated sale-leaseback transaction is, with one principal ex-
ception, like any other equipment lease, and what already has been 
stated concerning the relative costs and benefits of a filing require-
ment remains applicable to the sale-leaseback. T he exception is 
that prior to the sale-leaseback transaction, unlike most equip-
ment leases, the lessee was the owner and in possession of the 
equipment. Two issues are raised by this circumstance. 
First, as with most secured transactions, other than certain 
purchase money financings,346 an attempt to investigate the source 
of the seller-lessee's title likely would fail to uncover the sale-lease-
back if the seller-lessee were less t han forthcoming. The seller-
lessee might well retain evidence of its original acquisition of ti-
tle.347 Thus, a stronger case is presented for a filing requirement 
for leases resulting from sale-leaseback transactions than for leases 
345. Cf. In re Berez, 646 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1981 ). My experience and observations 
indicate that a very high percentage of such leasebacks are secured t ra nsact ions. The buyer-
lessors are, a lmost invariably, fin ancial institutions that are less likely to re ly substa ntially 
on the res idual value of used equipment than the residual value of new equ ipment. 
:346. See supra text accompanying notes 257-59. 
347. Investigation of accounting records might uncover the tra nsaction, but such au-
dits would be cos tly and unusual in credit transactions secured by equi pment. Moreover, 
unless a transaction was material and sufficient time had passed fo r it to find its way into 
the seller-l essee's fin ancial statements , normal credit investigations often wo uld not reveal 
that the t ransaction had occurred . See supra note 246. 
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generally. The antifraud and anticollusion functions of filing also 
might be more useful in the case of sale-leasebacks than for leases 
generally. 348 
The second issue is not directly related to the Article 9 filing 
requirements. The remnants of Twyne's Case349 manifested in the 
"vendor in possession" doctrine continue to cast a shadow over the 
retention of possession by sellers in many jurisdictions. 3150 Although 
few states make such retention of possession a per se avoidable 
fraudulent conveyance, it does create a presumption, or at least 
evidence, of a fraudulent conveyance in most states.351 A few states 
have addressed the problem by allowing some form of public notice 
to provide a definitive cure. 352 
Hawkland has argued that eliminating the spectre of the ven-
dor-in-possession doctrine and providing certainty for buyer-
lessors in sale-leaseback transactions would be significant virtues 
of a filing requirement for leases.353 Hawkland's argument misses 
the point. It is true that if the law were changed so that leases were 
subject to Article 9 perfection and priority rules and if the law also 
were changed so that an Article 9 filing would cure the vendor-in-
possession fraud risk, then the vulnerability of the lessor in a sale-
leaseback transaction would be reduced and some useful informa-
tion might be provided to the marketplace. But the second change 
in the law does not follow from or depend upon the first. The Cali-
fornia approach,354 which provides that public notice will cure the 
fraud risk in sale-leaseback transactions, exists in the absence of a 
general filing requirement for leases. Perhaps the law ought to be 
that a permissive filing for leases under section 9-408 would pro-
vide conclusive protection from the vendor-in-possession fraud 
348. See supra text accompanying notes 260-74. 
349. 3 Coke SOb, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Ch. 1601). 
350. See ge nerally supra text accompanying notes 162-7 4. 
351. See supra note 172. The Uniform Fraudulent Transfe r Act, promulgated in 1984, 
provides that "[i]n determining actual intent under subsection (a)(l), cons ideration may be 
given, among other factors, to whether ... the debtor retained posssession or control of the 
properly t.ransferred after the transfer. " UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AcT§ 4(b) , 7A U.L.A. 
653 (1984). Art icle 2A overrides the vendor-in -possession doctrine for sale- leasebacks when 
the buyer-lessor buys for value and in good faith. See U.C.C. § 2A-308(3) (1987). 
352. See, e.g ., CAL CIV. CoDE §§ 3440. 1-.9 (West Supp. 1987) . 
35:3. See Hawkland, supra note 46, at 114-15. 
354. See supra note 352. 
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risk. 355 But the wisdom of permitting a filing to cure the risk of 
fraudulent conveyance avoidance in a sale-leaseback transaction 
does not provide support for the wisdom of a filing requirement for 
leases generally in other contexts. 
Such a means of curing the fraud risk might have other bene-
fits as well. An opportunity to cure the fraud risk as well as the 
risk of a subsequent determination that a lease is one for security 
would provide an increased incentive for all lessors in sale-lease-
back transactions to file, although most probably file anyway. 
Although more filing by lessors might occur (thus providing more 
beneficial information), it would not be accompanied by the prob-
lematic results of coercing filing by imposing the Article 9 priority 
rules on all leases. 356 
VI. CoNCLUSION: CosTs AND BENEFITS CoMPARED 
A. The Approach 
Any attempt to identify and quantify costs and benefits to so-
ciety that might flow from a change in the law is an enormously 
difficult task. 357 Indeed, my principal criticism of much prior com-
mentary is not directed so much toward the conclusions reached 
(i.e., that a filing requirement should be imposed), but toward the 
surprising ease with which those conclusions were reached. Propos-
als to expand the Article 9 filing scheme to cover leases have not 
adequately identified and explored, much less balanced, the vari-
ous costs and benefits of such a change in the law. Previous 
commentary appears to have overstated the benefits and underes-
timated the costs of imposing such a filing requirement. 
Nevertheless, I reach no firm conclusions based on consistent theo-
retical and empirical grounds as to whether the law should impose 
a filing requirement for leases. 
355. Such a rule, however, would be largely superfluous in a state which had enacted 
Article 2A. See U.C.C. § 2A-308(3) (1987); supra notes 172, 351. 
356. See generally supra Part IV. 
357. Apparently, it is difficult to explain or describe what happens under Article 9. See 
supra note 235. It is even more daunting to contemplate and explain what the effects would 
be if the filing requirements were expanded. 
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This article does not rely on a paradigmatic model or hypothe-
sis designed to reveal the "correct" analysis or conclusion. 3~8 
Because too little information is available and too many questions 
remain to be asked and answered, any such model or hypothesis is 
likely to provide inconclusive results. 359 An information base of a 
358. Baird and Jackson have proposed a microeconomic pricing model, of sorts, on a 
very general level : Secured creditors charge lower interest rates because they rely on specific 
assets and, therefore, require reliable information about competing cla ims to the collateral. 
See Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 183-90. See generally supra text at notes 71-81. A 
filing requirement for leases would enhance the reliability of such information and thereby 
reduce costs fo r secured parties and, therefore, the price of secured credit. I d. The analysis 
in Baird and Jackson's model suggests, therefore, that the widespread enactment of a filing 
requirement for leases would result in a measurable reduction in the average interest rate 
charged for secured credit. Has the impact of public notice requirements as a positive in-
strument of anti-inflat ionary monetary policy been overlooked? The costs of such a filing 
requirement which Baird and Jackson identify are limited to those involved with a lessor's 
cost of filing and otherwise dealing with the filing process. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 
10, at 185-86. They acknowledge that their argument depends on empirical assumptions. !d. 
at 183 (quoted supra note 79) . Other commentary proposing a filing requirement was even 
less refined and also relied essentially on the untested assumption that leases create a prob-
lem of ostensible ownership. 
359. For this reason, I have sought to walk a tightrope strung above the fray of legal 
analysis based on economic theory and empirically based analytical techniques developed by 
social scientists and historians, not to mention critical legal scholarship. Yet, these and 
other analytical tools may be useful to any effort to reach a t houghtful policy decision. 
Some take the position that economic analysis of law based on an efficiency model is 
invariably destined to provide inconclusive results. 
In the end, we can only say what every law-and-economics article ends up saying: In a 
world with no transaction costs, no one gives a hoot what the law is. But in a world 
wit h transaction costs, who the hell knows what is going on! 
Carlson, Is Fraudulent Conveyance Law Efficient?, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 643, 682 (1987) (argu-
ing that fraudulent conveyance law is not efficient, but is justifiable on ethical grounds). My 
point is more modest. The less that is known about behavior of the players, and the less 
deep t he inquiries about diffe rences between the existing operation of the Article 9 perfec-
tion and priority rules and the existing and potential results of leasing with and without a 
fi ling requirement, the more likely it is that any conclusions will be inconclusive or, perhaps, 
wrong. See Schwartz, Curren t Theories, supra note 235, at 37 (concluding that efficiency 
justifications for existing security law are "problematic" and that "current knowledge" is 
insuffic ient to establish a normative basis to change bankruptcy priorities and calling for 
further research); Scott. supra note 11, at 970 (explaining that the development of a "theo-
retical framework " to understand secured credit requires "accumulated evidence of the 
actual operation of credit markets"); see also Weinberg, supra note 206. Weinberg concludes 
that the "efficiency criterion has proved useful in explaining the pattern of protection for 
legally innocent purchasers of goods that exists under American law. " !d . at 592. However, 
he recognizes that other issues, such as "costs of a rule change" and "public and private 
costs of alternative regimes,'' should be considered before a conclusion is reached as to the 
desirab ility of changing the ru les. ld . Of course , the likelihood that an approach to a policy 
quest ion will produce inconclusive results does not mean that the analysis will not surrender 
valuable insights or indicate areas which might warrant further investigation. 
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sufficient critical mass is necessary to devise an appropriate model 
or hypothesis to be tested. 360 One goal of t his article is to provide 
an agenda relating to existing filing requirements for secured 
transactions, as well as for leases and other bailments, which may 
facilitate more rigorous exploration than has been achieved to 
date. 
My methodology, if it can be given that label, is to identify the 
various likely, or reasonably possible, costs and benefits of impos-
ing a filing requirement on leases and to compare the costs and 
benefits of a filing requirement for leases with those presumed to 
flow from the existing Article 9 rules. 361 "Costs" and "benefits" 
360. Economic analysis of law or anything else relies on assumptions which often do 
not exactly or even roughly replicate the real world. But economists also relax their assump-
tions in various contexts in order to more closely reflect the real world. See generally M. 
PoLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION OF LAw AND EcoNOMICS 2-4 (1983); R. PosNER, supra note 125, 
at 15-17. Even though the complexities of the world are such that the assumptions will 
never be accurate or complete, the creation of any economic mod el for the purpose of analy-
sis of an existing or proposed legal rule, including the art of simplifying and relaxing 
assumptions, requires an understanding of its operation, the players which are likely to be 
affected by any change, and the nature of the effects. Similarly, social scientists who investi-
gate empirical evidence in society must develop hypotheses to be tested based on 
perceptions, imperfect as they may be. See, e.g. , Sullivan, Warren, & Westbrook, The Use 
of Empirical Data in Formulating Bankruptcy Policy, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 200 
(1987) ("It is not merely important that the researcher identify the normative and empirical 
issues clearly. It is necessary to identify the right questions- or at least the most useful 
ones-in advance, so that scarce resources will not be squandered."). It is likely that neither 
the other commentators nor I have a sufficient grasp of the behavioral patterns or value 
judgments of the players who would be affected by a filing requirement. Anecdotal observa-
tions such as mine, while useful, do not provide a substitute for employing various, more 
rigorous analytical tools of scholarship. See Jackson & Schwartz, supra note 15, passim. But 
theoretical analysis in the absence of an adequate information base is equally problematic. 
361. Douglas Baird has criticized this approach because it compares the likely effects 
of a filing requirement for leases with those of filing requirements for all secured transac-
tions rather than only the closest analogue of a lease, a purchase money security interest 
held by a seller of equipment. Letter from Douglas Baird to Charles W. Mooney, Jr., supra 
note 126. Baird's criticism is fair and astute and the comparison he favors must be made. 
See supra text accompanying notes 271-79. But the analysis also may benefit from an ap-
preciation that filing under Article 9 serves a variety of purposes which vary in qua lity and 
quantity depending on the context. The lease- purchase money security interest comparison 
Baird proposes might indicate that such security interests should not be subjected to a filing 
requirement under Article 9. Indeed, it would be appropriate also to explore more generally 
the wisdom of the existing Article 9 filing rules. If the filing rules under Article 9 are not 
warranted, then the argument that they should be extended to leases would be crippled. 
This article does not undertake t hat task, except to the extent that it identi fies the costs 
and benefits of the existing rules . 
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mean different things to different people. 362 For present purposes 
the terms "costs" and "benefits" continue to be used in a broad 
sense. And the assumptions are maintained that the Article 9 
perfection and priority rules are generally satisfactory and likely to 
remain in place and that the priority rules which would accompany 
a filing requirement for leases would be similar to the existing Arti-
cle 9 rules. 
B. The Benefits 
What are the benefits which might be expected to flow from a 
filing requirement for leases? 363 
(i) Information: Reduction of discovery costs. 
A principal benefit would be the provision of information, as is 
contemplated by the Baird and Jackson model. The costs to inter-
ested persons of discovering, and risks of not discovering, leases 
might be reduced. Since leases are easier to discover than most se-
cured transactions, a filing requirement for leases would provide 
fewer benefits than filing for secured transactions. 364 And the pro-
ponents of a filing rule for leases have not demonstrated that the 
costs of existing law are sufficiently significant to warrant a change. 
For example, a very small percentage of reported decisions appears 
to involve reliance creditors or purchasers who have been misled.365 
Even if filing were required, many reliance creditors and purchas-
362. "Cost-benefit analysis" has reached an enormously refined state in the economic 
literature generally. See, e.g., A. RAY, CosT-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, IssuEs AND METHODOLOGIES 
146-50 (1984); BENEFIT-CosT ANALYSIS OF SociAL REGULATION: CASE STUDIES FROM THE 
CouNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY (J. Miller III & B. Yandle eds. 1979). For an earlier 
example of an effort to weigh and balance the costs and benefits of imposing a filing or 
recording requirement on assignments of accounts receivable and trust receipt financing, see 
Hanna, supra note 197. 
363. It is difficult to separate the discussion of benefits and costs. The benefits of en-
acting a filing rule for leases would serve primarily to reduce costs resulting from the 
absence of a filing rule under existing law. 
One benefit claimed by other commentators-curing the problems of ostensible owner-
ship-is unproven and probably spurious. See supra Part V.A.2. Moreover, the 
identification of dominant, relational creditors, a benefit of filing under Article 9, would not 
be served by filing for leases. See supra text accompanying 280-88. 
364. See supra text accompanying notes 253-59. 
365. See supra note 222. 
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ers might continue to investigate the source of a lessee's interest in 
any event. 366 
(ii) Timing and veracity: Priority ordering and dis couraging 
fraud and collusion. 
Although a filing requirement for leases also might discourage 
fraud and collusion, such benefits probably would be smaller than 
those provided by filing for secured transactions. 367 Sale-leasebacks 
are an exception. 368 Moreover, it is doubtful that a filing rule would 
provide material benefits in connection with the evidentiary as-
pects of determining priorities.369 
(iii) Reduction of true lease-security interest controversy. 
A filing requirement for leases might reduce true lease-security 
interest characterization disputes. 370 Uncertain and vague legal 
rules may impose costs by making the outcome of an existing or 
potential dispute more difficult to predict and by encouraging 
costly litigation.371 But an argument that the law should eliminate 
the true lease-security interest distinction for purposes of priority 
in order to save costs, standing alone , is absurd. 372 The argument 
must be that if there is some other rational basis for imposing a 
filing requirement, such as providing useful information to the 
marketplace, or if there is no rational basis for the true lease-se-
curity interest distinction in this context, then a collateral benefit 
would be the reduction of costs associated with determining the 
issue. In any event, to the extent that lessors file voluntarily under 
section 9-408 and to the extent that the true lease-security interest 
366. Interested persons might be no less inclined to pursue such investigation, even in 
the face of a filing search showing no leases, so as to uncover prior owners and to search for 
filings against such prior owners. In those circumstances, a filing requirement would provide 
little additional information , except when the prospective debtor or seller provided fraudu· 
lent documentation of its source of title. 
367. See supra text accompanying notes 262 · 70. 
368. See supra note 258; supra Part V.D. 
369. See supra text accompanying notes 266-68. 
370. See supra note 130. 
37 1. See, e.g., R. PosNER, supra note 125, at 512-14. On the other hand, it is the very 
vagueness of the frontier between true leases and secured transactions that appears to en-
courage precautionary filing by lessors. 
372. The law also might be changed to abolish the crime of murder or even to create a 
comprehensive title registration system for all interests in personal property. Predictability 
would then be enhanced and costly litigation would be reduced. 
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determination would be necessary for other purposes, there would 
be little or no reduction in costs. 373 
C. The Costs 
It seems clear enough that some benefits would result from 
subjecting leases to a filing requirement, even though estimating 
the materiality of such benefits is problematic. But the various 
costs which might arise as a result of a filing requirement also must 
be considered. 
(i) Costs of compliance. 
The most obvious costs, and the principal costs addressed by 
prior commentators, are costs of compliance with a filing require-
ment. 374 These costs include filing fees, search fees (depending on 
the applicable priority rule37 ~) and, in particular, the cost of deal-
373. The true lease-security interest determination would be necessary anyway in 
many situations where the nature of appropriate remedies and damages on default (most 
priority disputes occur in the context of a default) and bankruptcy issues are involved as 
well as in various other contexts. See supra text accompanying notes 32-36. Determination 
of the amount of a lessor's claim, and consequently determination of the true lease-security 
interest issue, would be necessary in the case of avoidance or priority occas ioned by a les-
so r's failure to file. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29. 
Kripke argues that the revised § 1-201(37) will result in more predictability and , conse-
quently, fewer instances of voluntary filing by lessors. Kripke, supra note 5, at 798; see also 
Cuming, supra note 40, at 258. Although the new definition is an improvement, it probably 
is not that good. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. Additionally, aggregate costs 
associated with fewer voluntary filings would be offset, at least partia lly, by the more clear 
and predictable definition. It remains anyone's guess as to the materiality of any cost sav-
ings based on reducing the circumstances where t he t rue lease-security interest di stinction 
need be made for perfection and priority purposes. 
374. These costs sometimes have been addressed by arguing that, as among a lesso r, a 
lessee, and third parties, the lessor can most cheaply bear the cost of so lving problems (i.e., 
creating benefits) by filing. See , e.g. , Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 188-89; see also R. 
PosNER, supra note 125, § 3. 10, at 71. If the filing related costs were the only costs involved, 
this argument would be more persuasive. But there are other costs to cons ider. Posner ac-
knowledges that the "lower-cost avoider" should not always bear the risk. In discussing the 
thief rule, he states: 
Although [the owner] could prevent the erroneous transfer to [the good faith pur -
chaser] at lower cost than the [the good faith purchaser] by taking greater 
precautions against theft, allowing [the good faith purchaser] to obtain a good titie 
would encourage theft .... We do not want an efficient market in stolen goods. 
375. For example, Baird and .Jackson wou ld require a lessor to notify secured parties, 
who previously fi led on equipment, in order to acquire the equ iva lent of a "purchase money 
priority." Baird & .Jackson, supra note 10, at 195-96; see U.C.C. § 9-:3J2(:n (1987) (purchase 
money priority for inventory requires similar notification); supra notes 296 -97. 
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ing with the detail and structure of a filing and priority scheme. 376 
The apparent frequency with which many professional lessors now 
make routine precautionary filings under section 9-408 indicates 
that at least for those lessors, these costs of compliance or at-
tempted compliance may not be significant. Presumably, however, 
there are some nonprofessional lessors who do not file routinely. 
For these lessors the educational investment necessary to comply 
with a filing requirement, or even to know about it, and the risks of 
noncompliance, would be substantial.377 To the extent such non-
professionals would be excluded from the filing requirements, the 
remaining lessors subject to the requirement might be those who 
generally now file anyway. 
(ii) Costs of noncompliance. 
To lessors: A filing requirement for leases would impose costs 
on lessors by increasing the risk of loss from noncompliance. Under 
existing law the lessor who fails to file or makes a defective filing 
runs the risk of subordination only if the lease is characterized as a 
secured transaction. If a filing rule incorporating the Article 9 pri-
ority rules were imposed, a lessor would be exposed to the risk of 
subordination whether or not the lease would be so recast. The les-
sor would be exposed not only to the extent of the value 
transferred to the lessee (i.e., the lessee's right to use the equip-
ment during the lease term) , but also to the extent of the lessor 's 
residual interest. 378 Because lessors normally rely more on the 
equipment than secured creditors, the effects of nonperfection by 
lessors would be more costly than those for secured creditors. 379 
To lessees: The increased exposure of lessors to costs resulting 
from a filing rule also would impose costs on lessees. A lessor 's un-
secured damage claim arising from third party priority or 
avoidance of the lessor's property interest could exceed the value 
ultimately conferred on the lessee or its estate. 380 Such a claim 
could force the lessee to assume an involuntary obligation for the 
entire value of the equipment.381 Unsophisticated lessees may not 
376. T he lessor would be compelled to determine the proper place of fi ling, the formal 
requisites of the filin g, and the like. S ee supra note 241. 
377. See supra text accompanying notes 140-42. 
378. See supra text accompanying notes 114-25. 
379. / d. 
380. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
381. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
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be well positioned to deal with this risk by coping with Article 9-
type rules. 382 Also, increased risk to lessors might be passed on the 
lessees, thereby increasing the cost of leasing. 383 
(iii) Additional discovery costs. 
Another group of costs would flow from the operation of prior-
ity rules similar to the Article 9 rules that would, it is assumed, 
accompany a filing requirement for leases. These costs would be 
imposed on third parties, as illustrated by Example B in Part 
IV.384 A filing requirement for leases would require a prospective 
creditor or purchaser to ascertain whether equipment had ever 
been subject to a lease in order to determine any potential claims 
of secured creditors of a previous lessee. An investigation of a 
debtor-transferor's source of title often would not reflect whether 
equipment previously had been leased. These costs would offset, to 
some extent, benefits that third parties would receive from such a 
filing rule. 
(iv) Costs of exclusions. 
Most commentators have recognized that such a requirement 
would not be appropriate for all leases. But exclusions also give 
rise to the costs of drawing lines, unpredictability, and litigation. It 
is impossible to address the significance of those costs without 
knowing exactly what lines would be drawn. 385 
(v) Institutional costs. 
Some costs of a filing requirement would be widely dispersed 
and may be characterized as institutional or systemic costs. First, 
it has been argued that imposing a filing requirement for leases 
would add additional burdens to an already burdened, and in some 
states broken, Article 9 filing system, thus making the existing Ar-
ticle 9 regime less efficient and more risky. 386 Second, any change 
382. These risks would be exacerbated in the case of an unsophisticated lessee from a 
nonprofessional lessor. 
383. From the standpoint of an aggregate cost-benefit analysis, any decrease in the 
price of secured credit resulting from a lease filing rule would be offset to the extent that 
costs resulting from increased risks to lessors are passed on to lessees. 
384. See supra text accompanying note 134. 
385. The lines drawn for excluded transactions might or might not be more clear than 
the line between true leases and secured transactions. At least the latter dichotomy can be 
considered with the benefit of substantial precedent and the new § 1-201(37), which may 
lead to increased predictability. 
386. See Huddleson, supra note 5, at 674. The argument is not persuasive. The bur-
den caused by widespread voluntary filing by lessors probably has already taken its toll. The 
Article 9 filing systems are in need of direct therapy. The ABA UCC Committee is studying 
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in law which provides for a novel approach to important commer-
cial transactions includes enormous costs associated with drafting, 
consensus building, enactment, education, and maintenance of uni-
formity. Although Article 2A is long and complex, its changes to 
existing law are generally modest. The imposition of a filing re-
quirement, especially if accompanying priority rules necessitated 
changes to Article 9, could even jeopardize enactment.387 Finally, 
many other issues and problems in commercial law may be in more 
need of attention. Given the financial and human resources availa-
ble to the uniform law process at any point in time, it is important 
to consider the foregone opportunity costs of pursuing one project 
to the exclusion of another. 
(ui) Variance Costs. 
Some of the costs of a filing requirement for leases could be 
reduced by varying priority rules from those which apply to se-
cured transactions under Article 9.388 Such variations would result 
in additional differences in treatment between secured transactions 
and true leases. That would reduce the benefits of a filing require-
ment, particularly the possible reduction of true lease-security 
interest disputes. 389 
D. The Balance 
I am not prepared to quantify and balance the costs and bene-
fits of subjecting leases to a filing regime such as that provided by 
Article 9. Nor has anyone else done so. Previous commentators 
have reached conclusions on both sides of the argument, but their 
approaches were not thorough enough. This discussion, like other 
commentaries, is full of explicit and implicit empirical assumptions 
and intuitions concerning the way things are . Most are untested 
and uncertain. I have adopted the modest approach of using a 
helpful heuristic. I have taken the existing Code rules dealing with 
security interests and consignments as a baseline and compared 
the performance of the filing and search systems in the various jurisdictions. See Mooney, 
In t roduct ion to the Uniform Com m ercial Code Annual Survey: Some Observations on the 
Past , Present , and Future of the U.C.C., 41 Bus. LAw. 1343, 1352 (1 986). 
387. It also would have been quite anomalous if a filing requirement had been imposed 
fo r leases but no t for ce rta in other bailments that might be viewed as even more appropriate 
candidates for filin g. See supra notes 17, 227 and accompanying text. 
388. See supra text accompanying notes 154-57. 
389. See supra text accompanying notes 370-73. 
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the application of those rules with the application of similar rules 
to leases. It is comforting that some legal scholars recently have 
suggested that a more modest approach sometimes may be more 
useful and enlightening. 390 
A comprehensive analysis of the relative costs and benefits of 
either adopting a filing requirement for leases or of continuing the 
existing rule should take into account many variables. Several are 
mentioned elsewhere in this article and most are difficult or impos-
sible to quantify. It would be necessary to assign probabilities to 
the occurrence of various costs and benefits in the process of 
quantification. 
Consideration of a plausible, but oversimplified, paradigm may 
be illustrative. Assume the following: (i) there exists a filing re-
quirement for leases that generally incorporates the Article 9 
perfection and priority scheme; (ii) in the absence of that filing 
rule, costs would be imposed (i.e., under existing law, costs are im-
posed) upon third parties as a class as a result of the absence of 
readily available information about lessors' "secret" claims; (iii) 
the costs to lessors as a class of minimizing such third party costs, 
by filing, are less than the costs to third parties as a class of mini-
mizing their own costs by investigation; and (iv) the costs to lessors 
as a class of complying with filing requirements are less than the 
costs imposed on lessors as a class resulting from noncompliance 
(failure to file or defective filing)-i.e., loss or reduction of lessors' 
interests in leased goods. Based on these assumptions one might 
conclude that lessors are the lower cost avoiders. Lessors would be 
390. 
If these arguments are correct, then the standards for judging academic work in eco-
nomics and constitutional law should be reconsidered. Perhaps the current bias in 
favor of brilliant, "paradigm shifting" work should be abandoned. The more pedes-
trian "normal science," may be the worthier endeavor. 
There is a tendency today for high flying theorists to scoff at those whose work 
stays closer to the ground. Icarus, too, was undoubtedly scornful of pedestrianism. 
Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REv. 917, 929-30 (1986) (footnotes 
omitted). 
If this hypothetical confessional instinct were translated into legal scholarship, almost 
all the theogonies deduced from contemplating the texts of cases and statutes would 
disappear, to be replaced by some exceedingly modest suggestions full of self-con-
sciousness about the difficulties of cause and effect between law and society. Although 
less dazzling, such a literature would constitute an advance. The assertion that laws 
are dictated by some overriding normative principle is paralyzing. 
Carlson, supra note 235, at 208. 
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encouraged to file in order to avoid greater costs of noncompliance 
(assumption (iv)). Their costs of compliance would be less that the 
third parties' costs of investigation (assumption (iii)), and such in-
vestigation would be necessary in the absence of a filing rule. 
These assumptions alone, however, are not sufficient to determine 
whether leases should be subjected to a filing requirement (i.e., 
whether efficiency concerns dictate that lessors, through a filing re-
quirement, should bear the costs of eliminating the third party 
costs). Another assumption is necessary. Assume, for example, that 
(v) the costs to lessors as a class of noncompliance with a filing rule 
would exceed both (a) the costs imposed on third parties as a class 
by the absence of a filing rule and (b) the costs to third parties as a 
class of curing or reducing their costs by investigation. If assump-
tion (v) were true, then lessors as a class should not be required to 
incur costs under a filing rule which exceed the costs which would 
be imposed on third parties in the absence of a filing rule. 391 As 
mentioned elsewhere, it is safe to assume that some portion of the 
lessors would fail to file or would make defective filings. 392 The 
problem, then, is one of quantification.393 
There is some support for a conclusion as to the wisdom of a 
filing requirement for leases which has not been reached by any of 
the commentators: Perhaps it really does not matter what the rule 
is. 394 For example, the costs to third parties inherent in a lessor's 
391. Cf. Harris, supra note 124, at 211-21 (economic analysis of priorities as between 
unperfected secured party and bulk buye r who fails to comply with requirements of Article 
6). 
392. Supra note 124. 
:393. No such quantification is attempted here. One criticism of the example is that the 
same analys is coul d be ap plied to secu red transactions for which filing is required under 
current law. However, as discussed elsewhere , the consequences of nonperfection appear to 
be more harsh for lessors t han for secured creditors. See supra t ext accompanying notes 
114- 25. Assuming a lease filin g requirement were applicable only to professional lessors, it is 
reasonable to expect that approx imat ely the same percentage of defaults would occur , and 
approximately the same percen tage of nonperfect ion would occur , in the cases of secured 
transactions and leases alike. If this were so, then the losses incurred by lessors as a class 
could be expected to exceed, afte r adjustment for transaction amounts and volume of trans-
actions, t he losses incu rred by secured parti es as a resul t of nonperfection. 
:394. Scholars generally take little satisfact ion in belaboring insignificant points (more 
correctly, points that they recogniz e as insignificant) and expend much effort explaining 
(read defending) the importance of their agendas. Perhaps t his conclusion fi ts Farber 's pro-
totype of a "brilli ant," but almost inva riably defective , theory. See Farber, supra note 390. 
Nevertheless, it is not always easy t o explain t hat someone may be beating a dead horse. 
Arguments will always arise as to whether t he conduct constitutes beating, whether the 
animal is a horse or something else and whether the animal, whatever it is, is dead . 
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"secret" interest may be so slight and attenuated that prospective 
creditors and purchasers simply do not take them into account. 396 
It is also possible, but unlikely, that the various costs to lessors 
arising from a filing requirement would be ignored. Or the issue 
may be very difficult and closely balanced-one upon which rea-
sonable scholars and lawmakers might disagree and one for which 
it is, and will remain, impossible to ascertain the "best" solution.396 
There are four bits of "evidence" which tend to support (or, at 
least, are not inconsistent with) this "who cares?" hypothesis. 
First, secured credit and leasing have coexisted, indeed prospered, 
in spite of the persistence of existing law which generally requires 
no public notice for leases.397 Certainly the expansion of equipment 
leasing in recent years has not been the death knell of credit se-
cured by equipment.398 Second, my observations of the process 
395. See Carlson, supra note 235, at 222-23 (arguing that slight increases in prospects 
of recovery may be so "infinitesimally tiny" that they are "too unimportant to command 
attention" of lenders in pricing credit). 
396. See Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Pur-
chaser, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 45 (1987): 
I argue that variety in the treatment of the good-faith purchaser of stolen property 
can be linked to . .. the difficulty of discerning the best solution to a hard question. 
Societies may share the goal of minimizing the costs associated with the theft of 
property but may disagree over the way to achieve this goal. 
To be sure, the poor (or lucky) soul who would suffer (or benefit) in a given circumstance 
because of the existence of one rule or the other would not be so sanguine. But such exam-
ples will always flow from line drawing in any legal regime. 
397. That is not to say that this circumstance refutes the notion that one rule or the 
other may be more beneficial at the margin. Rather, the selection of either rule may not 
produce material differences in the aggregate costs and benefits. 
398. Jackson and Kronman have argued that the principal advantage of secured credit 
would be lost without a generally applicable first-in-time priority rule. Jackson & Kronman, 
supra note 235, at 1162-63. Baird and Jackson have argued that the existence of secured 
credit depends on a "level of assurance of repayment that surpasses that of the unsecured 
creditor" and further that this assurance is provided by the Article 9 first-in-time perfection 
and priority scheme that is effected, in part, by the public notice perfection requirements. 
Baird & Jackson, supra note 10, at 179; see also Baird, supra note 79, at 62. It is apparent 
that the "defect" in the level of assurance that results from the general absence of a lease 
filing requirement has not been sufficient to eliminate the existence of secured credit. Se-
cured business credit and equipment leasing are both commonplace. 
Perhaps the Article 9 public notice-related perfection and priority rules are not essen-
tial to the existence of secured credit after all. Yet, I doubt that this is the case; the role of 
filing under Article 9 is quite important. See generally supra Part V.B. Alternatively, it may 
be that the volume of leased equipment is not substantial enough to impose material risks 
on secured parties. I am also skeptical of this explanation, given the staggering volume of 
equipment leasing during recent years. See supra note 20. More plausibly, perhaps the inci-
dence and risks of debtor misbehavior or errors resulting in false reliance by secured parties 
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resulting in promulgation of Article 2A suggest to me that neither 
professional secured lenders nor professional equipment lessors 
have convincingly argued that they cannot or could not live with 
one rule or the other. Although the NCFA urged a filing require-
ment, their proposal came somewhat late in the process.399 Perhaps 
they would not have proposed any change in law requiring filing 
for leases had not the Article 2A project already been com-
menced.400 The American Association of Equipment Lessors 
strongly opposed a filing requirement for leases,401 but the appar-
ently routine ·practice of voluntary filing by professional lessors 
may belie, at least to some extent, the strength of the opposi-
tion.402 Third, no private mechanisms have developed which would 
are so minimal that they are regularly disregarded. See Carlson, supra note 235, at 222-23; 
supra note 395 and accompanying text. Also plausible is the explanation that one reason 
such risks are negligible is that lessors almost always file financing statements. See U.C.C. § 
9-408 (1987); supra note 46. The risk that the lessee or a third party may assert that a lease 
is actually a secured transaction may be sufficient to encourage filing. On the other hand, 
secured creditors may be engaged in routine costly investigation of the source of title to 
collateral so as to verify that it is not leased, and, perhaps, such investigation would not be 
undertaken if the only risks were defects such as a thief in the chain of title. Finally, it is 
also possible that the peaceful coexistence of secured credit and equipment leasing belies 
the seriousness of the problem-secured creditors may be rou tinely subjected to material 
losses which could be greatly reduced by a filing requirement that would lower the cost of 
secured credit. But this possibility does not appear likely, assuming that the reported cases 
involving assertions that leases were actually secured transactions provide a reliable indica-
tion. See supra note 222. All of this conjecture is difficult to sustain without empirical 
evidence. 
399. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. 
400. Cf. Phillips, supra note 16, at 46-47 n.182: 
Article 9 has never rested its basic test of inclusion and exclusion of transactions on 
the doctrine of ostensible ownership. Rather , the basic test is that of an intention by 
the parties to create a "security interest." ... For example, Article 9 does not cover 
"true" leases even though the debtor possesses property upon which the debtor's 
other creditors might rely .. .. Moreover, there has been little dissatisfaction with the 
intention test since the Code came into widespread use some 15 years ago. If, instead, 
creditors relied predominantly upon what they saw, we would have expected expres-
sions of greater dissatisfaction on the ground that the debtor's recordation habits 
would make little difference to observing third parties. 
401. See Huddleson, supra note 5, at 674. 
402. I do not intend to suggest that the leasing industry's opposition to a filing re-
quirement was not se rious and strongly felt, but I suspect that the opposition was 
overstated. The leasing industry probably would have recognized the benefits of Article 2A 
even with a filing requirement and would have learned to live with it. To the extent that the 
costs to lessors would be increased by a filing requirement such costs would, presumably, be 
passed on to lessees. Thus, the result might have been that leasing would have lost some of 
its competitive advantages over conventional secured financing. That possible result also 
may explain in part the NCFA support for a filing requirement. 
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indicate a strong need by secured lenders for additional sources of 
information about lessor's "secret" interests. Voluntary filing by 
lessors no doubt reflects the desire for protection in the event of 
recharacterization of leases as secured transactions, not the desire 
to provide information needed by third parties. Finally, notwith-
standing the careful deliberations by members of the drafting 
committee for Article 2A, several of whom initially were disposed 
toward a filing requirement, the committee remained unconvinced 
that a filing requirement was necessary.403 
None of this "evidence" is even remotely conclusive. But it 
does indicate that the issue may burn more brightly for legal schol-
ars than it does for the players affected by the status quo or who 
would be affected by a change in law. Perhaps there are bigger fish 
to fry. 
E. Denouement 
It seems so simple. Most professional lessors appear to file 
precautionary financing statements for leases anyway. And filing is 
so cheap! Would not the imposition of an Article 9-type filing re-
quirement for leases represent a natural, reasonable next step for 
these commercial transactions which have, in recent years, "come 
of age" as important " financing" devices? After all, a lessee's pos-
session of goods "looks just like" a debtor's possession. But the 
problem is not susceptible to a simple solution grounded on simple 
theoretical and historical bases. Assuming that the Article 2A 
drafting committee considered some of the troublesome issues 
treated herein, it is difficult to fault the drafters for their failure to 
depart from longstanding, well-settled law. 
It is distressing that we know so little about the "real world" 
functions, effects, and operations of the existing Article 9 filing re-
quirements. It is especially troublesome, therefore, to embrace an 
expansion of those requirements to other transactions beyond 
t raditional bounds. There exist fundamental unresolved issues con-
cerning the operation of credit markets and the role of possession 
of goods and the behavioral relationships between the two. The ex-
isting informational base is too thin. 
-±ml. See suora notes 42-44 and accompanying text. 
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Further study of bailments, including leases, provides an ex-
ceptional opportunity for gaining greater understanding of the role 
of filing for secured transactions under Article 9. A bailment of 
goods and a security interest in goods each usually involves posses-
sion by a debtor or lessee. Existing law provides a laboratory for 
examination of both the impact of a filing requirement and the ef-
fects of an absence of a filing requirement. Absent an adequate 
information base, this article has considered areas of critical com-
parison (i.e., reliance or nonreliance on possession, information, 
ordering of priorities, veracity and timing, effects of nonfiling, etc.) 
while filling the gaps with assumptions based on personal experi-
ence and observations, views of other observers, case law, 
conjecture, and intuition. This approach is more a beginning than 
an end. Yet, earlier treatments grounded on unproven assumptions 
concerning ostensible ownership and historical homilies fare no 
better (no matter how often repeated and revived) and, moreover, 
are less complete. 
The process resulting in Article 2A might have been seized 
upon as an opportunity to explore more intensely many of the 
matters considered here. One reason that the process did not foster 
such an exploration was the failure of those who questioned the 
wisdom of a filing requirement for leases to explain why such a 
requirement would not be appropriate. This article comes too late 
for Article 2A. At an earlier time it might have provoked deeper 
and broader expositions supporting the case for a filing rule. Or its 
deficiencies might have prompted others to sort out better the 
downside to a filing requirement. It is not too late, however, for 
continued efforts to understand the Article 9 perfection and prior-
ity rules and the wisdom of similar public notice requirements for 
nonlease bailments. 
The issue is closer and more difficult to assess than the earlier 
commentators on either side have seen it to be. Perhaps it is inevi-
table that strong views are easiest to embrace when the 
underpinnings of a position are unknown or unprovable. 
